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PREFACE
The role of the United States Navy in Jap&neee-Araerican relations is
an excellent example of a military branch of one country significantly
influencing foreign relations with another country. In choosing a
dissertation topic involving the i nited States Navy in international relatione
I gravitated to relations in the Pacific area, eventually narrowing the
subject to a study of the role of the Navy in relations with Japan in the
decade before I earl Harbor. Once I had begun work at ray first course of
original material in the Naval History Division, Navy Department, Washington,
it was apparent that the early 1930 «s offered very little material, while
the period beginning with 1936 wa« decidedly richer. Consequently, I
further limited ay field of study to the 1236-12U1 period*
I consider myself most fortunate in the quality and quantity of
original documents made available to me. Within the Naval History Division
I was allowed access to the complete files of the War Plans Division (Op
16), the Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy Files, the
unpublished work of Captain Tracy Kittredge which purportedly was to have
been a history of the Navy in World War II, the unpublished narrative of
Admiral Thomas C. Hart and naval orders and documents which were promulgated
only within the structure of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The filing system of the Navy in the prewar period left much to be desired
and cross-referencing was very limited, necessitating a page by page check
in some folders to insure complete coverage.
Of equal importance to me, and most enjoyable from the view point of
exact indexing and cross-referencing, were the State Department records in
the National Archives. I visually sighted each State Department entry to
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and from the Navy Department for the period of study. Records and documents
in the Naval War College and the Roosevelt 'ap«rs at Jtyde Park were used to
complement the Washington sources.
The interesting and varied facets of American relations with Japan
involving the Navy made a topical rather then a purely chronological
^recantation seen beet. There was a certain sacrifice involved in choosing
the former approach because interesting material which did not "fit in"
to any chanter and was too Halted to warrant a separate chapter was left
out of the paper. In this category I would place the personal relationships
between Admiral Nomura and other senior Japanese naval officers with
Admirals P ba *fc and Turner, the work of Naval Intelligence against the
* ae espionage network and the use of the Good Offices of the r&vy by
the Jspanssft to get restricted material released from other departmental
control.
I am very grateful to a large number of persons without whose help I
could never have finished in the time allowed me. I m particularly
grateful to ]*ntain James C. Longino, :jf>N, for his friendship and guidance
as my naval > vlserj Captain F. Kent Toomls, \MM$ Director of Naval History,
for his assistance in granting clearance to classified Ifevy r*e
Commander Burton Robert Trexler, '2>N, for his prompt work in declassifying
desired selections; Mr. Dean Allard, Custodian of Ifeval History Division
files for his very cooperative assistancej Kr. William H. Franklin,
Director Historical Office of the State Department for his advice and
permission to review State Department classified documents, Mr. £• Taylor
Parks for his assistance, advice and excellent cooperation in expediting
the return of research materials to me} Mrs. r atricia Dowling for cheerfully
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section of the National Archives! Hr. Hernial Kaha, head of the Civil
Records Branch of the Kational Archives for hie advice, Miss Elisabeth
Drewry, Director, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, for her assistance and
cooperationj Kr. John F» DiNapoli, Director of Libraries, Revel Her College
for his assistance in promptly getting requested materials to me, Mrs*
Winifred R# Barton for the clerical assistance in preparing the thesis, and
finally and most importantly, my very able and patient adviser, Doctor
Whitney Trow erklns, who generously gave his tine, suggestions and guidance,
Any mistakes or shortcoming are solely mine and should not reflect
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In the Rail of 1936 a newly re-elected President Franklin Roosevelt
relaxed in South American waters on the cruiser, tf»S.S# DIDZAKAPOLIS* While
on the cruise the President learned of the Anti-Comintern Pact of Bovember
25 tying Japan to Germany and Italy in agreements directed at communism and
the Third international. Germany the previous Spring had violated the Treaty
of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties by reoccupying the demilitarised
Hhineland and the Italians had taken Addis Ababa in July to end their
Ethiopian war* The actions of the two European militants seemed to be part
of the pattern begun by the Japanese in their seisure of Manchuria in 1931*
The news that the three leading aggressors of the time were united was
certainly reason enough for the "resident to inquire of his naval aide the
status of the nation's war plans* The answer to the President received by
the naval aide from the Chief of Naval Operations covered the general status
of the war plans and emphasised that the war planners in the Navy considered
Japan the most probable enemy with which the United States mirjht wage war*
The war between Japan and the United States which finally broke out on
!)eoember 7» 192|1 has been called "the logical results Of the events which
began in Manchuria*" If the Manohurian Incident were considered the start
of a trend of events , the tempo of sequence of those events increased
noticeably in 1936 and accelerated until the crippling naval defeat at ?earl
1
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Karbor brought the Jnited States into war. In 1936 actions by ^erroany and
Italy and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War filled the headlines of
American newspapers, but the attention of the Joited States Navy was focused
in the I acific and future relations vdth Japan, The frame of reference
through which the naval strategists viewed their problems was drawn from
the traditional roles of the Navy in the Facific, the theories of Captain
Alfred Thayer Mahan, the history of Japanese actions in the 'acific, the
experience of the recent naval treaties and the attitudes of the statesmen
of the nation toward problems in the Orient.
The assessment by the Navy of Japan as the most likely enemy of the
:nitod states had obvious historical roots. Before developing the role of
the Navy in the relations between Japan and the United States from 1936 to
Pearl Harbor, it is necessary to examine briefly the influences and back-
ground which conditioned the thinking of the naval leaders in 1936*
Traditional roles of the Navy in the Far East .
The United States Navy had two traditional associations with the Far
ast. One, almost as old as American trade with China, was the group of
naval vessels stationed in the Orient since 1835 to protect American
nationals and their commerce. It was from the American forces in the Far
Fast that Commodore lorry drew support in the "opening" of Japan in 1653
and from which Admiral Dewey formed his force to attack the Spanish at
Manila in 1898. In the twentieth century the collective vessels in the Orient
were called the Asiatic Fleet*
A second and more modern relationship of the Navy to the Far East came
with the ranid acquisition of islands in the acific in 1698-1899. Possession
of Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the r hilippines raised the American flag over
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potontial naval bases strategically located between the west coast and the
Far East* A line of communications seemed in place ready to be developed to
promote increased commerce with the Orient, and. concomitantly, there arose
the responsibility for the Navy to defend the line across the Pacific. The
lack of existing bases and the absence of a fleet capable of defending the
new territories or future bases were major problems to be solved if
possession of the islands were to be an asset instead of a liability* The
solution of the two basically naval problems; i.e., secure bases and a
strong fleet, would become the most important strategical consideration in
the Pacific in the twentieth century.
The Influence of Hahan in the ?acific.
The recognised authoritative figure on naval affairs and international
relations in the late nineteenth century was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan.
First as a lecturer and then as second President of the newly established
Naval War College, Mahan developed his knowledge of naval history and in
1690 published his first lectures under the title t "The Influence of f-ea
Tower upon History, 1660-1783 * * The book, an excellent history of British
naval development, a clear explanation of the art of naval warfare and a
strong endorsement of a large navy, was well known and well received in
Europe before it attracted attention in the United States. The admiration
of Mahan for the British naval and mercantile growth and power ensured
favorable reception In Britain. In Germany, Wilhelm II was so impressed with
the book that he ordered a copy placed in the wardroom of each ship in the
new German Navy, and more of Mahan' s works were translated into Japanese
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than into any other language. In the nited States his reputation was
primarily aiiong scholars and naval officers, although his prolific pen
accounted for numerous articles in the periodicals* The two most ardent
exponents of Mahan 's ideas, who through personal friendship had direct
access to his views on international and naval affairs, were fenator Henry
Cabot Lodge and Assistant Secretary of the Havy, later I resident, Theodore
Roosevelt*
Kenan's theory may be summarised as follows* In order for a nation to
be truly great it must have sea power* Sea power encompassed a merchant
marine, markets, bases, and a strong capital ship navy to guarantee the use
of lines of communications* The six natural factors in a country upon which
sea power depended were: (1) geographic position, (2) physical conformation,
(3) extent of territory, (20 number of population, (5) character of the
3
people, and (6) character of the government* The nited States possessed
the potential to develop sea power to rival and surpass Britain, contended
Hahan, if the people and the government were convinced of the advantages to
be gained and were shown how to manipulate their resources to accomplish
their goal* One of the prerequisites for success was a system of bases
similar to those possessed by Mahan »s model, Britain*
Though Mahan envisaged the Caribbean Sea, after completion of an
Isthmian canal, as a great artery of maritime activity and an area in which
the United States should have bases, his interest was directed to the
acific in terms of strategy and commerce* His first focal point of
2
Alfred T. Mahan, From fteam to Gail (New York and London: Harper and
Brothers, 190?), p* 303.
3
Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea I ower upon fflstory, 1660-1783
(Bostom Little, Brown and Company, 1C90), pp. 28-69.
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interest in that area was Hawaii. In 1890 Mahan wrote that Hawaii was
politically unstable and that it was to toerican Military and commercial
k
interests "to allow no foreign influence to equal our own" there. In
1893 in a letter to the Editor of the New York Tines Mahan used the "yellow
horde" threat of possible invasion of the islands by Chinese as justification
for a civilised Maritime power to have a firm hold on the islands. "Our
own country, with its Pacific coast, is naturally indicated a proper guardian
for this most important position. To hold it, however, whether in the
supposed case or in war with a European state, implies a great extention of
our naval power. Are we ready to undertake this?" Mahan well knew that
the United States Navy was not then prepared to wage war to hold Hawaii, but
his blueprint for future action was being clearly drawn. He continued his
literary campaign for annexing Ik-rail in an essay: "Hawaii and Our Future
Sea Tower" in Forum magaaine in March 1893* His approach this time was one
of strategic position. "It is rarely that so important a factor in the
attack or defense of a coast-line — of a sea frontier — is concentrated in
a single position) and the circumstances renders doubly imperative upon us
6
to secure it, if we righteously can." Senator Lodge and like-minded cohorts
used Kahan«s statements in their arguments for annexation, and Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt wrote t "As regards Hawaii I take your views
absolutely, as indeed I do in foreign policy generally. If I had my way we
L
Alfred T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Tea ower, I resent and
Future (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1B9B), p. 7.
5
Letter: Hahan to New York Times , January 31, 1893* reprinted in
Interest of America in r** lower , op. cit., pp» 31-32.
6
Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea ?ower," reprinted in The Interest of
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would annex those islands tomorrow,"
Roosevelt may have been ready to annex the islands , but he was not the
President. fter the attempt at annexation failed in 1893, Mahan continued
to write articles and letters favoring annexation* It was not until after
Admiral Dewey »s victory at Manila that the Hawaiian Islands were finally
annexed by joint resolution. Mahan' s "first fruit" in the i aoific had
become American.
The naval strategist who valued Hawaii as vital to the defense of the
vest coast and as an asset to the comsnercial interests of America in the
Pacific did not look upon the acquisition of the Philippics with equal
enthusiasm* He wrote to Lodge:
I myself, though rather an expansionist, have not
fully adjusted myself to the idea of taking them, from
our own standpoint of advantage. It does seem to me,
however, that the heavy force, army and navy, we have put
in T uaon, has encouraged the revolutionists to an extent
for which we are responsible. Can we ignore the
responsibility and give them back to Spain? I think not
• •••Might it not be a wise compromise to take only the
^]3arianas7 and Lusonj yielding to the "honor" and
exigencies of Spain the Carolines and the rest of the
Philippines.8
If Mahan were unsure of the wisdom of annexing the Philippines, he was part
of a host of Americans. The scales upon which with complex pros and cons
of annexation were being weighed were tipped in favor of annexation by at
least three factors* the feeling of moral obligation to the Philippine people,
the desire for a Far fcst naval base and, especially pertinent, ignorance of
any other suitable solution.
7
Roosevelt to Mahan, May 3# 1897 1 *jo >sevelt Papers, quoted in William E.
Livesey, Mahan on Tea Power (Norman* University of Oklahoma Tress, 1^*7),
p. 168.
8
Mahan to lodge, July 27, 18*?8, Lodge Papers, quoted in v ivezey, op . cit..
pp. 182-183.
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: ossession for possession's sake was not part of Hahan *s concept of
bases and commercial markets. After the annexation of the Philippines and
Guam, he considered naval bases at Manila and Guam sufficient to protect
American commerce into the rich Yangtae valley and to uphold John Hay's
Open Door policy. Nevertheless, though the two potential bases were thought
sufficient, Hahan appreciated that American naval power alone would never
be strong enough in the Orient to force acceptance of the Open Door policy.
Moral influence by the United States and mutual cooperation by the other
9
commercial powers were cine qua non to the success of the policy.
The influence of Kalian on >eific policy had passed its senith by the
time of the announcement of the Open itoor policy, but in another very
important area bearing on I acific balance of power it was yet to be fulfilled.
That area concerned the composition and employment of the fnited States Navy.
The late nineteenth century function of the Navy was coast defense and
battleships were thought of as floating forts to be stationed around ports
to augment shore batteries. Xhe suggestions of Hahan for a fleet as a
collective force of capital ships capable of cruising long distances,
seeking out and destroying or containing the enemy went unheeded by the
Secretaries of the tfavy. Two events pushed the ideas of Mahan to fruition.
They were the acquisition of the Philippines and Guam and the succession to
the residency on the assassination of MCKlnley of Theodore Roosevelt. As
the acquisition of the islands had made the nited States a Far Astern power,
it likewise made necessary ships designed to cruise long distances in order
properly to defend the islands. From Hawaii to Guam was 3300 miles and to
9
Alfred T. Hahan, The i roblem of Asia ( Bostorn Little, Brown, and
Company, 1900), pp. 172-179 and The Interest of America in International
Conditions (Boston* little, Brown and Company, 1910), pp» Ui7^1u9, 182-155.
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the Philippines from Hawaii was ^800 miles* Few ships in the Navy could
steaia the 1*800 Miles without refueling and many could not make the leg from
Hawaii to Guam. So in a matter of simple logistics, future ships would have
to be something more than the "coast-line" battleships authorised as late
&b 1899, The shackles tying the Navy to coast defense were broken with the
arinexation of Hawaii; the shackles were thrown away by the naval-oriented
President Roosevelt who was determined that, not only would the !«avy have
long range ships, but that they would meet the specifications of capital
ships advocated by Kalian.
The results of the drive by the energetic President were spectacular.
From 1901-190$ Congress authorised at his insistence ten first-class battle-
ships, four armored cruisers and seventeen other ships. In 1905 Roosevelt
called for a breathing spell and advocated a , rojiram of replacement at the
rate of one-a-year. At this juncture, counting ships under constriction,
the Navy had twenty-eight battleships and twelve armored cruisers — strength
exceeded only by France and Britain.
Two situations caused Roosevelt to renege on his one-a-year replacement
program. The first situation was successfully handled by Roosevelt
personally; the second, required Congressional action and involved a defeat
for Roosevelt and the Kavy. i ublic sentiment in Japan, which became anti-
American over the absence of a cash indemnity from Russia in the Treaty of
ortsmouth of 1905, flared to a war fever pitch over the segregation of
Oriental school children in San Francisco in 1906. Roosevelt finally
managed to placate both the Califoraians and the Japanese and to reach a
"Gentleman* 8 Agreement11 on future Japanese immigration, but he also
exploited the ensuing crisis to request more battleships. Ffts subsequent
dispatch of sixteen battleships on a world cruise was to impress the
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Japanesa and to win support for his last drive for additional ships.
The second event occurred in late 1906 when the British launched the
revolutionary new battleship, the KHf« with a main battery of ten
twelve-inch guns, greater speed and heavier armor. Its Harked superiority
in fire power, speed and protection made all other battleships obsolete.
In January 1907 Roosevelt asked for four new battleships comparable to the
DRKAENOJOHT to keep the United States as a leading naval power and to be
ready for any action by the Japanese* Congress for many reasons fought the
second drive for modernisation of the Ifevy, quoting often Roosevelt's one-
s-year plan* Reluctantly, two new ships were authorized and two aore the
following year, but four ships were still four short of that which was
requested* Roosevelt and the Navy were blocked from keeping up a modern
capital ship force. At the rate of two or less battleships a year under the
following administrjitions, the Navy deteriorated in capital ship and
balanced force strength to a nadir from which resident Wilson lifted it in
1916.
The role of naval bases in American-Japanese relations*
No deficiency in naval strategy in the twentieth century caused more
frustration to American naval leaders than the lack of bases in the western
Pacific. From the acquisition of the Philippines to the eve of Pearl Harbor
the question of a secure base in the Philippines and whether the !&vy would
be able to defend the islands was interwoven in American-Japanese relations.
With a secure base and a superior capital ship force the United States not
only could defend the Philippines, but also go a long wa/ toward backing
up the principles of the Open Door policy in China. But as far back as
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defending the * hillppines and backing the Open Door policy could crush
Japan, Neither the American people nor any administration was ready to
risk war with Japan to assert such superiority in the Orient, Tet
conversely, If Japan were strong enough to defend herself against American
naval action, it could also defeat the American naval units in the Far
Past and/or take the Philippines, Tlwodore Roosevelt's calling the
Philippines, America's "Achilles heel" was quite appropriate. In the face
of determined Japanese aggression, the United States had the choices of
getting out of China and the Philippines; risking defeat, at least
temporarily} or resorting to other means to thwart the Japanese. The
history of the United States shows that the combination of the latter two
was used, with the "other means" being treaties, nonrscogniticn and moral
influence.
The question of potential bases came up before the treaty with Spain
was signed in Paris in 1898, A Jnited States Navy spokesman urged the
commissioners to ask Spain not only for the V hillppines and Guam but also
the Carolines, the Felews and the remainder of the Marianas, These islands
contained many sheltered anchorages suitable for possible naval stations
and possession of the continuous chain of islands through the western
acifie would guarantee the ; Jnited States a secure line between the acific
coast and the hillppines. In the hands of an enemy they would offer a
10
serious menace to the route to the Philippines, The general feeling was
that Guam and the hillppines were all the fueling stations the Jnited States
needed and in the face of Spanish resistance over giving up the other
10
Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a !few Order of Sea lower
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islands, the commissioners demanded and received only Guam and the
Philippines* When Spain disposed of her remaining Pacific islands by ceding
them to Germany, there was still little opposition, since German occupation
with European entanglements seetiingly precluded her becoming a threatening
acific naval power.
From 1900 to 1907 the Army and Ttevy in the : hilippines worked on their
respective plans for a fortified naval base. The Wavy favored Olongapo on
Subig Bay, about sixty miles from Manila, since it was easily defended by
sea, while the Army's plan involving defense against land attack called
Manila Bay the easiest to defend. Impetus to develop a base came with
increased tensions with Japan in 1907. Within the Navy the General Board
reminded Secretary Metoalf that without an impregnable base in the
hilippines, the islands would be at the mercy of the enmy during the three
months required to move the battleships from the Atlantic to the Far East.
Since Congress had already appropriated $$00,000 for Philippine defense,
11
the Navy wanted the entire sum spent on fortifications of a naval base.
The resultite argustents between the War and Tiavy Departments res alted
finally in the Joint Board in If09 "recommending that the government abandon
the idea of developing a first-class base in the Philippines, locate its
principal insular base at I earl iiarbor in the Hawaiian Islands, and maintain
12
only a small, unfortified station at >langaT>o." Congress had already
appropriated $900,000 to begin work on a base in Hfewaii and with the Joint
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voted. The development of I earl Harbor was undoubtedly a viae step; the
wisdom of the abandonment of plans for a fortified base in the Philippines
was questionable. The United States was still committed to defend the
islands and Japan still remained a potential threat.
Five years later the Japanese naval forces occupied the Geman owned
Marshall, Caroline and Marianas Islands as World War I came to the Pacific,
At the time of occupation it was still pretended both in London and in
Tokyo that this move was temporary, and that Japan entertained no intention
Hi
of holding these islands beyond the duration of the war, A Treaty of
Alliance in 1902 had united Japan and Britain for mutual advantages against
Russia, but in 1911* the mutual advantages to be gained from the treaty were
at Germany»s exoense, Japan's quid pro quo for ridding the 1 acific of
German cruisers, aiding British anti-submarine work in the Mediterranean,
and supporting British claims to German islands south of the equator was
15
British support for Japanese claims to German islands north of the equator.
At the Paris Peace Conference the Japanese, bolstered by the wurilM
assurances from both Britain and France, demanded outright transfer of the
three island groups which they had seized. Only the nitod States offered
opposition. The American delegation realised that the Japanese were not
going to give up their strategically located possessions readily, tally
to any control involving the nited States, An American proposal was Rftdtt
to return the islands to Germany with the reasoning that in German hands
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nited States might be able to acquire part, if not all,, the islands Iron
16
Germany,
resident Wilson was aware of the strategic position of the islands on
the route between Hawaii and the Philippines , but since he favored early
withdrawal from the Philippines, he was wore concerned with Ja;*&nese actions
in China and Siberia* The final disposition of the islands appeared to
safeguard American interests and temper the Japanese demands. Japan was
•riven a mandate from the Allied and Associated Powers to administer the
inlands. The mandate forbade the construction of fortifications anywhere
in the islands and expressly ordered an annual report containing full
information as to conditions in the islands*
The effect of Japan* s receiving the mandate was observed by one naval
writer as being to»
•••surround Guam with a cordon of potential Japanese
strongholds and naval bases. Japan, as mandatory of the
islands, is not entitled to fortify them, but that she
would forego the use of such invaluable bases in case of
emergency is not to be believed* Hostile submarines,
working from a base at Saipan Island, in the Marianne
(Sic) group, would be within a few hours* sail of Guam*
A few hundred miles to the south-west lies Yap, the
administrative centre of the Archipelago.. .The Island is
admirably adapted for the use as a base for submarines
or other vessels operating against the Guam-Manila line
of communications, and so long as it remained in enemy
occupation this route would never be safe...Some 11*00
miles east of Guam lie the Marshall Islands. • .used by the
German Cruiser Squadron...When the Marshall Islands were
in German ownership the beginnings of a naval base is
said to have been further developed, and there is now a
depot for the storage of coal and oil. Similar reports
have been heard in connection with Yap...and I onape, in
the Carolines. Notwithstanding that the military govern-
ment installed upon the first Japanese seisure of these
islands has since been replaced by a civil administra-
tion, they are regarded primarily as military ports, and
Ibid*, p. 91.
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very little information concerning the work in progress
there is allowed to leak out, • .Without in any way
impugning the good faith of Japan, it may be accepted
as certain that these newly-acquired territories will
henceforth occupy a moat important place in her scheme
of naval strategy.^-?
Japanese possession of the former German islands was but one of many
political and military moves by the Japanese between 191i* and 1920 which
bore on the important postwar naval decision to develop American I acific
bases. Japan's occupation of German holdings in Shantung} her "twenty-one
demandsH on China in 1910; the movement of troops into Siberia in 1917
during the Bolshevik Revolution} the demands for a statement of racial
equality at Versailles} the demands for ownership of the German possessions
in the r acific } the belligerency over control of the important trans-
acific cable connecting center at Yap} and the accelerated naval program
of constructing capital ships all contributed to an ever-tightening vortex
whose final stage of maturity meant war with the idted States.
Against this background the Secretary of the Navy in 191; and, in more
urgent pleas, in 1920 asked Congress for additional naval stations on the
west coast since there was "no more pressing problem in connection with the
national defense than the provision of the acific of ample bases. • .for the
maintenance and operation of the fleet..." The Secretary also averred that
the day would never come vhen a powerful American fleet would not be in the
acific. Funds were requested to develop Hawaii, but it was the Navy's plans
for the large-scale development of Guam as a "strongly fortified naval base"
and of an improved secondary base in the hilippines that were "loaded with
international dynamite." Enough of the congressional hearings on the naval
17
Hector C. Qywater, fea-I ower in the acific (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 193U), pp. 266-268^
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proposals leaked out to show the trend of official opinion* Two assumptions
upon which the opinion rested were that the United States still had a
"moral responsibility" for defense of the Philippines, even if they were to
be granted independence, and secondly, that the American people were headed
toward amed conflict with Japan* "On the basis of these assumptions,
American naval authorities could see no justification for congressional delay
in voting the appropriations necessary to retrieve past blunders and to
18
push our military road into the far western Pacific*»
The American naval planners were to be thwarted again in their quest
for bases* The deliberate plans for development of the bases were
inevitably bound to trigger Japanese reaction and further accelerate the
existing naval construction race* Many complex factors combined at this
station to prompt the Harding administration to seek an easier way out of
the costly and explosive predicament. Many congressmen balked at the
expense of further naval base development and ship construction; pacifists
despaired of more war; Anglophiles objected to spending money to surpass
British naval supremacy; strategists hoped to find a way to prevent the
scheduled renewal in 1921 of the Treaty of Alliance between Japan and
Britain; and the politicians hoped to win public support by keeping campaign
promises to limit armaments expenditures* In this climate of thought the
Washington Naval Conference was called in 1921* re-conference approval of
the idea by the British and opposition by the Japanese fortold the inter-
national attitudes at the Conference*
18
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The T4aval Treaties i Four lower and Hine wwr Treaties .
The Washington Naval Conference met in ffcveaaber 1921, Secretary of
State Charles vnne ilighes, who presided over the Conference, presented the
American position on the first day in a highly unorthodox ap; roach. Moving
right to the crux of the unprecedented American proposal, Hughes offered to
scrap all American battleships being built and, in addition, fifteen old
pre-dreadnought battleships, and to abstain from further building for ten
years, fie followed his offer with a presentation of a list of specific
sacrifices on the part of Japan and Britain which the United States would
consider "fairly commensurate." The final level of capital ships to which
the navies of the leading powers would be cut was approximately 5> X>,000
tons for the 'Uited States and Britainj 300,0 tons for Japan and 175,000
tons for France and Italy.
In the ensuing diplomatic maneuvering Japan attempted to get a higher
ratio than the sixty per cent proposed by the mited States. The significance
of the discussions in Congress during the previous winter on the Jnited
States Navy* 8 proposed bases in Hawaii, Guam and the hilippines was not
lost on the Japanese, approval of the plans would mean a definite shift in
American favor in the balance of naval power in the Far Fast, ana under such
conditions Japan would not accept less than seventy P«r cent ratio. However,
if the statu8 quo of fortifications in the acific could be maintained, t:»n
the lower ratio might be acceptable. Hughes knew well the views of the
naval authorities on the subject. "The General Board repeatedly advised
against permitting any considerations of acific naval bases in the
approaching conference. And American naval authorities apparently understood
that their Government* a proposal at the opening session was framed on the
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19
plans as to Quam and the Philippines •" Tho American delegation chose to
put political strategy over naval strategy and without consulting ths naval
representatives agreed to a modified non-fortifioation clause in order to rwt
20
Japan to accept ths sixty per cent ratio* The limitation on fortifications
did not a v\Ly to Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand or the Japanese hone islands*
It did apply to the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Formosa, the Pescadores,
the Benin and Kurlle Islands and other smaller groups* The Mandated Islands
were not included since their fortification was forbidden In the mandate*
A second objective of the Washington Conference, and one which was
mandatory if the United States were to give up its easily attainable
supremacy in capital ships, was the liquidation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty
of Alliance of 1902, Britain, pressured by the United States and Canada, was
quite willing to abrogate the treaty* The trick was to do so without the
Japanese losing prestige or becoming politically isolated* The answer was
the Pour Power Treaty between liritain, Japan, the United States and France*
Various theories have been advanced on the selection of France as the fourth
member* France did consider herself a Far Fastern ?o\-mr and havin^ a fourth
member created the picture that the United States was not joining the old
alliance only to be outvoted by Britain and Jaoan*
In the Four ^owor Treaty the contracting parties agreed to respect the
ri$its of others in "relation to their insular possessions and insular
dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean**" If "controversy arising out
of any Pacific question and involving their said rights" could not be settled
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whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment." There
were no proposed military actions or provisions for enforcement other than
conferring. On December 12, 1921 the treaty was accepted by the delegations
of the four powers and the way was clear for Japan to accept the sixty per
cent ratio*
Another independent treaty, the Nine Power Treaty, was the reaffirma-
tion of the American principles of the Open Door policy. Like the Four
Power Treaty it was a statement of intent to recognise rights and principles
rather than to take enforcement action. The agreement in this case was to
"rear ect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China," to maintain the principle of equal
opportunity, and to assist China "to develop end maintain for herself an
effective and stable government." Signatories to this treaty were; Britain,
the United States, Japan, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal
and China.
Collectively the three interdependent treaties at the time were
considered a success by the diplomats. The Jnited States at the conference
table had received British agreement to naval parity and Japanese agreement
to statistical inferiority. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 was replaced
by a limited agreement which did not prevent Anglo-American cooperation
against the Japanese in other areas of diplomacy, Ja.an and other world
powers subscribed to the "open Door" policy and the costly arms race was
prevented. On the question of the non-fortification clause opposed by
American naval officers, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Colonel
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'The clause in the treaty] leaves us, in my opinion,
in a slightly better position than Japan. Ws trade
certain fortifications which we would never have com-
pleted, for fortifications which they (the Japanese)
would unquestionably have completed* We retain one out-
post of great importance (Hawaii) and they £ive up all
but their mainland.2^
Since the naval ratios set by the Washington agreements applied only to
battleships, the resulting building race in cruiser strength necessitated
conferences to settle that question. A nesting in Geneva ended without
agreement, but the London Conference of 1930 set the cruiser ratio at 10 t 10 $7
for the United States, Britain and Japan respectively, and submarine strength
for the three set at parity. Before the Second London Naval Disarmament
Conference in 1935-1936* aimed at perpetuating the naval agreements, Britain
had conceded submarine parity to Oornuny and allowed her thirty-five per
cent total tonnage in their bilateral naval agreement. France and Italy had
stepped up their building programs. Italy refused to corns to the London
meeting, and Japan, who was refused the parity which she demanded in all
categories, withdrew. The diluted provisions with "escalator clauses*1
rendered the treaty virtually worthless. In December 193b Japan gave the
two years advanced notice that she intended to teminats her adherence to
the Washington Naval Treaty, thus causing it to expire on the same date as
the expiration of the London Treaty of 193C* On January 1, 1937 the
provisions of the naval treaties no longer applied to the nest probable
opponent of the United States Navy.
21
* Colonel Roosevelt ! s Diary, January 29, 30 quoted in Sprout, Ibid.,
P. 251.








The effect of political attitudes on naval tvJLn?:ln :.
The reaction or Secretary of State Stiiwon to the Japanese* aggressions
in 1931 and his subsequent diplomatic maneitvers attempting to salvage the
principles of the ?Gellogg-8rland ?act and the Mine ?ower Treaty have been
22
thorou^ily described by participants and able scholars* How did the
attitudes of the political leaders toward American problems in the Orient
affect naval thinking in the 1930 *a?
The resort to non-recognition of Japanese galas in the conquest of
Manchuria had historical precedent in similar action by Sryan and lanslng in
1915 vhen the United States did not records® the Twenty-one Demands of Japan
on China. Xr both situations tiers was no appropriate military force or
willingness to risk the use of such fo.»oef if it were available*
Outraged as [^resident Hoover] was by Japanese
aggression* he was or>posed# in every fiber of his beins*
to any action which ml#it lead to American participation
in the struggles of the far East** •since he believed that
any policy of embargo or sanctions might lead to war* his
position effectively blocked any governmental sup, art for
economic sanctions* ••• In talcing this position Mr* Hoover
was squarely in line with the whole tradition of American
foreign policy in the Far Sast* !5ven Theodora Roosevelt
had always insisted that American interests in the Orient
were not worth a war* •••&*• Hoover *.. cas so much a man of
peace that he did not like the notion of even unspoken
threats of war*23
Mr. Hoover with his deep pacifist character was certainly not prone to
overthrow the traditions dating to Theodore Roosevelt of not wanting to wage
war in the Orient* He was safe from having to make a decision on use of the
fleet in the Orient since there was m base from which such a concentration
ft
" Stlmson and Bundy, or>« clt* * Ch* EC, (2) A* Whitney Orlswold, The Far
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of ships could operate. That too had been a political decision* The
collection of ships honored with the term "Asiatic Fleet*1 was sent to
Shanghai In 1932 on Secretary Stimson*s suggestion to protect American lives
and property in conjunction vith a similar move by the British, but again*
it was problematical that action would have been taken apinst the Japanese
except in self-defense* Jh "deference to his Secretary of State's urgent
pleading" Hoover accepted "Stimson's suggestion that the American Fleet be
left at Hawaii* where it arrived in mid-February [1932] by pure coincidence*
in maneuvers planned and publicly announced the previous summer* The fleet
duly remained in Hawaii instead of returning to its usual west coast bases*
and it was probably useful in restraining; the more flagrantly headlong
2k
Japanese militarists*" The Fleet was withdrawn the following year to the
Atlantic by the new administration as an act of good will*
In 1932 the Asiatic Fleet had been used in Shanghai to protect American
nationals and property* i^ould the physical presence of the fleet interposed
between the Japanese military and American interests be sufficient to deter
the Japanese in the future from aggressive acts? What order would be given
to the naval commanders if the Japanese did attack American vessels and
property? Was there a limit of acceptable aggression before war was
inevitable? Under which conditions would the United States demand restitution
or begin war using the Far Eastern forces? Would naval farces be withdrawn
in a deepening crisis before Japanese actions would make the withdrawal appear
to be out of fear or would the forces be left to protect American interests
and symbolise American prestige "to the bitter end?"
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remain at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive moves in other
parts of Asia* With the United facilities at Pearl Ilarbor in the 1930**
and the almost complete lack of a supporting train, did the politicians
realise that the fleet was incapable of deploying further west without
risking heavy losses and possible defeat? Did the Japanese consider the
presence of the fleet in Hawaii was a bluff? If the use of the fleet at
Hawaii was to show the intent of the United States not to ignore Japanese
actions in the aciflc, and that there was a possibility of the use of the
fleet in conditions which the United States considered serious, did the
Japanese understand the conditions under which the fleet would be used? Would
the United States "draw the line n clearly and fight if its position were
challenged?
These are but a sampling of the questions asked within the United States
Navy in the early ITXC's* Sane questions were answered in the final phase
of war preparation in 19ltl* Many were never answered, since the trend in
international developments, the national apathy to American invoJsrment and the
political decisions facing the nation's leaders did not permit clear cut
decisions or firm positions relative to Japan* The questions which perplexed
and influenced naval planners in the pre-war period were passe after the
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C'lAPTER TWO
THE CHISF OF HAVAL OPERATIONS AJID SXTKA-SERVIC,:, CiOPKRATION
Introduction.
The Constitution of the United States bestowed upon the individual
elected as President the dual responsibility of being at once the Chief
Executive and the Comnander in Chief of the armed forces* President Franklin
D* Roosevelt brought to that highest office unusual past experience as a
former Assistant Secretary of the Navy* As one y&ry^ close observer noted,
"he probably knew raore about the Mavy than any of his predecessors* Throu^iout
his Administration [he gave] preferential attention to every question arising
in regard to the Navy* lie himself made most of the more important decisions
1
with respect to naval affairs*"
The naval organisation from which the President received advice and
through which his policies were Implemented was headed by a civilian
Secretary appointed by him* The highest military position in the Mavy, the
Office of Chief of Naval Operations, likewise, was filled with the choice of
the President* Through these two personally selected individuals, the
^resident had civilian and military control of the naval forces* By an
Executive Orier on 5 July 1939 the President directed that the Joint Board
(made up of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Amy Chief of Staff and their
top assistants) and other service elements report directly to him on certain
2
matters rather than through the civilian Secretaries* The significance of
1
Cordell Hull, Memoirs (Hew Torki The Macmillan Company, 19U3), p* I£l*
2
Hark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff » Prewar Plans and Preparations
^
a
volwae in the series: United .^tatos Arn$r in World War II (Washington? Depart-
msnt of the Amy, 1950), p. 6*
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the Executive Order was apparent, for It eliminated one civilian echelon in
the decision-making process on certain matters* On those matters the
President ohose to use the military channels only* Military advice* decisions
and* possibly* influence would flow directly between the Commander in Chief
and his military leaders*
The Chief of %iaval Operations was not created as a billet until 1915
and the authority of the officer holding the position was not completely
accepted until World Vfer II* Despite intra-service friction between the
World Wars, the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations increased
so that a siaable staff consisting of functional divisions came into being
to assist him in the administration of the office* The two key divisions
which figured in the external, policies of the Navy were the VJar lans
Division and the Central Division* The Chief of Naval Operations and his
assistants also worked with joint organisations and other governmental
agencies between the nforld Wars* The major joint military organisation was
the Joint Board* or Joint Array and Havy Board, with its subordinate working
committee^ the Joint 'lanning Committee* Another important committee in this
period was the Standing liaison Committee, organised in 1933 at Secretary
of State Hull fs suggestion* Since the problems which prompted the State,
War and Navy Departments to work together in this committee primarily
pertained to Latin America, that Committee will not be discussed*
The purpose of this Chapter will be to describe the parts of the naval
organisation which contributed to influencing the decision makers in American
relations with Japan from 1936 to 19i.il* Specifically, the duties of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Chief of Maval Operations, the lar Plans
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addition to the review of the structural side of the naval organization,
short biographical sketches of selected individuals will be given*
The Changing Naval Organisation* 1739-1919 *
When the Federal Government under the Constitution of 1739 case into
being there was no Navy Department nor necessity for one. The last of the
Navy had been sold three years earlier, and naval affairs were assigned to
the War Department* As a result of naval unreadiness in a quasi-war with
France* a separate Navy Department was established on April 30, 1739*
Almost from its very be inning the Navy Department has been in a state
of change as the various Secretaries, Congress and naval officers sought to
improve the structure within which the naval forces were administered* In
the first of a sequence of five phases, the Secretary and half a dosen
employees were capable of managing the few ships and small Naval Establishment*
Military assistants to the Secretary appeared in the second phase, when in
1315 a Board of Commissioners consisting of three Captains was appointed* A
dispute within the first month between the Secretary and the Captains was
finally resolved by President Madison* The responsibility of naval comnand
retained by the Secretary and the field of logistics, i.e., the buildir ,
3
equipping and repairing of ships, was assigned to the Board. In 131*2 a
major change occurred as the work load of the Navy Department was divided
functionally between a number of Bureaus, each of which was headed by a senior
officer specialist in the respective field. Under this principle, the
Mexican, Civil and Spanish-American Wars were fought*
3
Rear Admiral Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the K&Ty
Department in World tear II (Washington? Department of the riavy, 1959), p. S.
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In 19CC the General Board, the most important of many boards appointed
by the Secretaries, was established* Originally headed by Admiral George
Dewey, its first members wsret the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the
Chief Intelligence Officer and his principal assistant, the President of the
Naval War College and his principal assistant, and three other line officers.
The assigned mission was "to insure efficient preparation of the Fleet in
case of var and for naval defense of the coast, •" After 1915> and the
establishment of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, the General Board
became purely a consulting body ft$ the considerations of matters of general
policy referred to it by the Secretary.
•••Its members have no administrative duties and only
act in an advisory capacity* It recommends to the
Secretary the number and types of ships and aircraft to
properly constitute the fleet and such building program as
may be submitted annually to the Congress* It also advises
with respect to the general policy toward the number of
naval districts, navy yards, operating bases, and other
shore activities •• .The membership of the General Board is
designated by the Secretary and usually consists of the
highest ranking officers* The Secretary may, if he
chooses, select retired naval officers, •••The Board
usually consists of from five to seven members, although
no specific number is designated in the Havy regulations*
Its members are sometimes referred to as the "Elder
Statesmen" of the Navy*1*
In 1909 the fourth phase of changes in the organissation found a Naval
Aids system attempted, due to the shortcomings of the Bureau system in the
expansion program after the Spanish-American War* The primary deficiencies
were in the provisions for making war plans, for planning and directing the
operations of the Fleet and for coordinating the work of the various Bureaus*
Four senior line officers were assigned to advise and assist the Secretary
-inlted States Navy, Senate Document 35, Seventy-fifth Congress, First
on (Washington! 0*^.0*, 1937), Pp* £-&•
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in the fields of fleet operations, personnel, material and inspection,
respectively* Congress did not give statutory approval to the idea and
Secretary Josephus Daniels let three of the Aides be detached without relief.
Upon the advioe of Admiral Dewey, Chairman of the General Board, the Aide for
Operations, Rear Admiral Bradley A* Fiske, was retained*
Admiral Fiske enlisted the aid o£ a Navy veteran of the Spanish-
American War, Congressman Richmond ?• Hobson, who believed as Fiske did that
the office of Aide for Naval Operations should be guaranteed by statutory
authorisation* Hobson, with the full consent of the House Naval Affairs
Committee, incorporated in the Naval Appropriations Bill of 191£« "•••• there
shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active
list of the Navy not below the grade of Rear Admiral, appointed for a term
of four years by the President by and with the advice of the Senate, who
under the Secretary of the Navy shall be responsible for the readiness of
the Navy for war and to be charged with its general direction*"
The Hobson rider was strtclosn on a point of order* 3ecretavy Daniels
did not approve the scope of responsibility proposed for the Aide for Ifeval
Operations because he feared too much military power within the Havy Depart-
ment* In order to placate Secretary Daniels and to get his approval for
enactment, the provisions of the rider were rewritten*
There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall
be an officer on the active list of the ffavy appointed by
the President, by and with the advioe and consent of the
Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy,
not below the grade of captain, for a period of four
years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of
5
Purer, op, oit** p* 109*
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tha Navy, be charged with tha operations of the Heat,
and with tha preparation and readiness of plans for its
uaa in war*6
The bill, with tha revitted rider incorporated, passed both Houses on March
3, 1915 but the Hobson-Fiske group was not satisfied. Tha responsibility of
the Chief of Naval Operations as first written was "for the readiness of
the Navy for war and its general direction" and as finally passed, the
responsibility authorisation had been pared down to being "charged with the
operations of the gleet and with the preparation and readiness of plane for
its use in war*" (Emphasis mine.) The difference between responsibility
for the I'avy and responsibility for the Fleet meant that the Chief of foval
Operations had no specific authority over the Bureaus and the shore establish-*
merit*
In August 1916 Congress further strengthened the authority of the Chief
of Naval Operations qy authorising the rank and title of Admiral for the
position and giving legislative recognition to the force of his orders 1
..•All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations
in performing the duties assigned to him shall be performed
under the authority of the Secretary of Navy, and his
orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary,
and shall have full force and effect as such*?
While the legislative maneuverings were taking place the Office of
Chief of ffaval Operations was quietly getting organised. On :4ay 11, 1915
Admiral William 3* Benson was appointed as the first Chief of Naval Operations
and immediately thereafter he assumed the duties which were then being
performed by the last of the Naval Aides, Admiral Fiske* The psychological
Ibid. * quote from 5 !*•• Code \&2\ (2) Kavy Regulations, 1920,
Articled (1) and Article k33 (1),
7
'Ibid*, p* 110, quote from 5 U»S* Code hZl% {2) Navy Herniations Article
392 (2TT~"
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preesures of possible entry into the European war, the huge ship building
program advocated by ^resident Wilson and authorised by Congress and the
favorable attitude of Secretary Daniels, whose fears of loss of civilian
control were assuaged, all enhanced the spirit of cooperation with the new
CJJO* When war did come in 1917* for the first time in the history of the
nation, one officer was responsible for the operations of the Fleet and war
plans readiness*
The Bureau chiefs, who Jealously guarded their areas of responsibility
as their predecessors had since I8li2, cooperated with Admiral Benson in the
winning of the war) however, the wartime professional esprit de corps soon
faded into peacetime bickerings* the crux of the arguments turned on the
authority of the CNO to control the Chiefs of the Bureaus*
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In 1921 a Board of naval officers was appointed by the Secretary of the
^Savy »to consider and recommend such changes In the interest of «<*flcieney
and economy as may be deemed necessary in the organisation of the Navy
Department*" The recommendation that the CflD have authority over the entire
Naval Establishment was evaded by the Secretary who told the Board to limit
its study to eliminating duplication of effort among the Bureaus and not to
3
concern itself with departmental organization*
A change in 192lt in Navy Regulations, Article 1*33, gave to CNO some of
the authority recommended by the 1921 Board* The change read: "He shall so
coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply of personnel
therefor as to insure maximum readiness of the fleet for war." The ensuing
^urer# op* cit" P« 3-31*
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dispute over the now?? of CNO over the Bureaus cm. the strength of the
article finally reached President Roosevelt in 193k« To get to that highest
level, the question had been examined by Secretary of the Navy Clauds A*
Swanson and by a special board headed by the Assistant Secretary of the tfsery,
^enry T*. Roosevelt, ""resident Roosevelt ruled that the artiele 1*33 should
remain in effect but thatj
In my ^ttdgaent he (the President) would too greatly
delegate this power if he delegated to the Chief of Naval
Operations the duty of issuing direct orders to the bureaus
and offices. . .the orders to the Bureaus and offices should
come from the Seoretary of the Navy.?
Ih Marsh 1°}£ the President reversed his position stated, supra, and in
Executive Order 9096 of 12 Harsh, 191*2 which bombined the CWO and the
Commander in Chief, 0.5 • Fleet into one billet, the following words a?peart
...as Chief of Naval Operations the officer holding
the combined offices as herein provided shall be charged
under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy v&th the
preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the
operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing
forces, and sea frontier forces of the United States Kavy,
and with the coordination and direction of effort to this
end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department,
except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Seoretary
of the Navy may specifically exempt...^
The Executive Order made legal what had been practiced in fact, because,
through necessity, the Chief of Naval Operations had to coordinate the
efforts of the Bureaus in preparing the Mavy for war*
The duties which had accrued to the Chief of Naval Operations by 1?U2
encompassed the responsibility for the operation of the Fleet, the preparation
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fleet readiness far war and advice to the Secretary of the Navy on the
status of forces and prospective requirements* In addition the Chief of
Naval Operations was directed by various orders to "advise the Secretary of
the Navy on all business of the department in regard to insular governments
11
and forei^i relations*** 1* i to act as the Secretary of the Navy "during the
temporary absence of the Secretary* the Under-Secretary and the Assistant
12
Secretary of the Navy" j and to serve as a member of the Joint Army and Navy
13
Board in accordance with General Order No* 7*
The officers appointed as Chief of Naval Operations in the period under
etu^y were?
Hdteiral William H. Standley Ju3y 1933-January 1937
Admiral William D* Leahy January 1937-August 1939
Admiral Harold H* Stark August 1939-vMarch 19l*2
Each of the three CNO's in this period had broad experience prior to
their appointment* All had had duty in the Asiatic Fleet and in various
shipboard and Navy Department assignments* Additionally* Admiral Standley
had been Director of War Flans Division froa 1923*1926$ Assistant Chief of
3«vml Operations* 1923-1930 1 and Commander Battle Force, U.S* Fleet before
becoming GNO* During his period in office* Secretary of the Navy Swanson was
frequently absent* due to illness* and A&niral Standley performed the duties
of Acting Secretary of the Navy* He was a United States Delegate to the
London Naval Conference, held in London* England* durins the period
11
Navy Regulations* 1920* Article Ii33» ?>ara« 7*
M
5 Us Code h23.
13
Organisation of the Office of the Chief of ^ aval operations with
Duties Assigned the Divisions thereunder* a manual dated October 23* l'ffl#
issued within the Navy Department by the T*o, Admiral H*R. Stark (hereafter
cited as CNO Manual)* p. 2j WD Piles*
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December 7, 193£ to Karoh 25, 1?36, and signed the Tendon Naval Treaty on
behalf of the 'liited States. Ite also initiated the Vlnson-lrammel Bill
which provided for establishing, building and Maintaining the (?•&• Navy at
Hi
Treaty strength.
Admiral Leahy had a yrery colorful career prior to becoming CJJD. He
served in the Asiatic Fleet during the Philippine Insurrection and Bosoer
Rebellion, and later was Commander IJaval Forces in lUcaragua in 1912. He
commanded a troop transport in World War I and a Ifeval Detachment for the
protection of Americans in the war between Turkey and Greece in 1921. He
was also Chief of two Bureaus, Navigation and Ordinance and supported the
Bureau Chiefs in their fight against increased C?C authority* Under his
leadership discussions began with the British over possible cooi>eration
against the Japanese and a review of Joint Mar Plans was started.
Admiral Stark was Aide to Admiral Sims in Tendon in World War I when he
met the young Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D* Hooswvelt* ^h®
ensuing friendship lasted through their respective careers* Xh 1930 Stark
was Aide to Secretary of the Navy Claude F. Adams and later to Secretary
Swansea. !&s influence upon the Fresident during his tenure of office is
discussed in iTh&p-car IUne, infra*
Within his own immediate office the CM) on October ?3# 1&0 promulgated
a manual on the organization of his office in which the duties of his various
assistants were clearly stated* The most important of his assistants was the
Assistant Chief of ?Javal Operations (OF 11) whose duties were*
11*
Biographical information on the officers discussed in this chapter
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11-1* Next in authority to the Chief of Naval Operations, and holding
the same relation to Directors of Divisions as the Chief of
Staff of a Comrcander-in-Chief holds to the flag officers under
that commander-in-chief, shall be an officer who will be known
as the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations*
H-2* The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations shall relieve
the Chief of Naval Operations of all administrative details
possible* He shall sign such of the mail and attend to such
routine natters as the Chief of Naval Operations may designate*
11*3* Considers all questions of either a biinistration or policy
proposed by Directors of Divisions, before such matters are
referred to the Ghief of Naval Operations*
ll-'i. The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations is a mpbar of
the Joint Army and ?lavy Board (General Order No* 7)«*->
Officers who held the position of Assistant CNO during the period under
study weres
Rear Admiral William S* ?ye June 1936-June 1937
Rear Admiral James 0, Richardson June 1937-June 1933
Rear Admiral Arthur ?• Fairfield June 1933-July 1939
Rear Admiral Robert L* Ghormley July 1939-August l$lfi
Rear Adniral Royal B* Ihgersoll August 19l|0-January 191*2
Rear Admirals Ghormley and Ingersoll will be discussed infra in their
role as Director of v&r Plans Division* Rear Admiral Richardson preceded
Admiral Kimmel as Commander in Chief U*3* Fleet and will bo discussed in
Chapter Nine, infra* Rear Admirals Fye and Fairfield had no particular
connection with American-Japanese relations in the period under consideration!
War "lane Division (OP 12)
The duties of the War Flans Division, listed below, show two sections
into which the division was separated in 19hP. Irior to that time the duties
were basically the same without the section organisation*
«jgpCN0 Manual, op* cit .. p* 5*
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(aj Policy and iYojects Section t
(1) Development of policies and projects in support of
war piano*
(2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation
of current plans for joint action of the Army and !Javyf
and in the solution of current problems*
(3) Collaboration with other Government departments on
policies and projects affecting national defense*
(h) Study of subjects retmrrod to the War Plans Division
by the Chief of Naval Operations*
(5) Action in advisory- capacity in current administrative
matters referred to the War Plans Division*
(b) Plans Section i
IS
Direction of war planning*
reparation of designated war plans.
(3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory
Plans*
(h) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation
of Joint Basio '-Jar Plans*
(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on
plans affecting national defense*
12-2* The Director of the VJar Plans Division is a member of the Joint
Board (General Order HO* 7)*





Joint Air Advisory Committee
Shore Station Development Board*
12-li* The War nlans Division is non-administrative*
Officers who heV the poeitlon of Director of War Plans Division weret
Captain (later Admiral) Hoyal B* togersoll June 1936-July 1933
Captain (later Vice Admiral) Robert U Ohormley July 1933-July 1939
Captain Russell S. Crenshaw July 1939-October 191,0
Captain (later Acfc&ral) Richmond K* Turner October 19l*0-February
19U2
The officers who served as War ,lans Director had several qualifications
l6
Ibid.. p. 7.
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In carrion* All were graduates or the liavai Academy and courses at the Saval
War College, and all had had several tours of duty in the }Javy Department in
Washington prior to the War Plans assignment*
tJhdoubtecQy Gaptain Ihgersoll had the widest experience in foreign
17
relations prior to becoming T&r Plans Chief* As a Passed Midshipman in
190$ he was one of the young officers assigned special temporary doty to
attend the 3ussian-Japanese Beaee Conference hold at the i'avy Sard, Portsmouth,
Hew Hampshire. lie made the World Cruise with the Battle Fleet in 1908, and
later served In the Asiatic Fleet* In 1913 he accompanied the first Gffl
AoMral Benson, who was Haval Advisor to the American Cosnission to Negotiate
Peace in Paris, France* Ingersoll returned with President WULson»s party
handling oo^nsinications for the President on his trip hone* While Director
of War ^lans Division, he went to London twice* On his first trip in June
1936 he was Technical Assistant to the American Delegation at the London
Naval Conference* In December 1937 he again r.^ent to London to discuss
18
possible cooperation with the British against the Japanese in the Pacific*
Captain Ohormley had a normal cycle of shipboard and chore duty tours
prior to becoming Aide to Assistant Secretary of Navy Theodore P-ooaevelt, Jr.
in 1923-192li and to Assistant Secretary of $avy Douglas Robinson* 172U-1925*
T!e returned again to Washington in 1927 to serve for three years as Secretary
to the General sard* His duties immediately after serving as Director of
19
ar Plans Division were as Assistant CNO and Special Hava! Observer in London*
17
Graduates of the Naval Academy served at that time two years as
Bused Hidshlpman before being commissioned as Ensign*
Of* Chapter Four* p* 67.
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Captain Crenshaw had less experience than his predocessorn had prior to
heading the War ^lans Division, his duties being the normal career pattern.
Crenshaw had been an assistant to Ohorraley in the War Plans Division and,
when the latter moved up to became Assistant Chief of Naval Operations,
Crenshaw became Director of the Division* Since Ghoxaley's new job require
d
thorough knowledge of the Mar Plans, he probably continued to influence the
Division through Crenshaw*
Captain Turner served in various billets as an ordnance expert prior to
entering and completing flight training at 'enaaoola, Florida at the age of
forty-two* He had duty in the Asiatic fleet and in 1932 was Technical
Advisor for Naval Aviation to the American Delegation, General Disarmament
Conference in Geneva, Switzerland* In 1939 he was Commanding Officer of the
USS ASTORIA when that cruiser transported the ashes of the former Japanese
Ambassador, Hirosi Saito, from Annapolis to Japan* During the incident he
made many personal friends among the Japanese, including the future Ambassador,
Admiral Kichisaburo riomura*
Central Division (0? 13)
The Director of the Central Division had the most varied responsibilities
by far of the assistants to the CUD* In addition to effecting liaison with
the State Department, the Division functioned as a clearing house for
legislative, regulative and organisational matters; reports of all types;
matters pertaining to the administration of island governments under $avy
control and miscellaneous matters such as honors and ceremonies* The charge
seems well supported that "[The Central Division] was in effect a catchall
for the solution and handling of any Navy Deparfcmni administrative matter
involving the GNO that could not logically and immediately be assigned to
t
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Irior to the progressive build-up of international tension during the
1930*8, the ^avy Department's liaison with the State Department consisted of
requests for ships and planes to visit foreign ports and requests for
passports for naval personnel and their dependents to travel outside the
country* ' Even after the accelerated tempo of crises after 1936, the liaison
between the two departments was limited*
33-1* DUTIESt
(a) International affairs *
(1) Treaties and treaty interpretation*
(2) Liaison with Department of State regarding i
(a) Naval forces in disturbed areas or areas under naval
occupation*
(b) United States naval ship movements in disturbed areas*
(c) Visits by TJhited States naval vessels to foreign ports*
(d) :iane flights of iMted States naval aircraft in
foreign jurisdiction.
(e) Visits of foreign ships or aircraft to Wilted States
territory*
(b) Legislation* regulations » and organisation*
(1) reposed legislation and arrangement of priority*
(2) Revision and editing of Navy Regulations* formulation
of General Orders*
(3) Review and coordination of bureau manuals and
publications* •••
(U) Courts* boards* investigations* etc** referred to the
Chief of Naval Operations*
(5) Organisation of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations*
(6) Organisation of the Navy Department*
(7) Recommendations and statements concerning the budget*
(c) Island governments *
(1) Assist in the supervision of the governments of the
dependencies of the United States which are under naval
administration.
^Furer* op. oit«* p* 118*
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(<0 ftsports and statements *
(1) Preparation or the Chief of Haval Gyrations • data for
the Secretary's annual report*
(2) reparation of the Chief of Naval ( parations » annual
report* and statement for the Bureau of the Budget and
for congressional hearings*
(3) Handling and routing annual and speoial reports from
Naval forces*
(e) Itiscellmisous *
(1) onors and ceremonies j courtesies to foreign officials
and naval forces visiting the United States*
(2) Recommendations in connection with appropriation
Contingent Navy*"
(3) Weather matters not assigned to specific cognisance of
any Bureau* or Division of Operations*
(U) Matters which can not appropriately be assigned to
another division of Operations*
(£) Such other matters as the Chief of Naval Operations nay
direct*
13-2. In natters assigned to its cognizance* the Central Division is
responsible for necessary liaison and coordination of effort
within the Kavy Department and liaison with other agencies of the
Government*
13-3* The Director of the Central Division is a member of uhe Joint
Economy Board*23-
Offioers who served as Directors of the Central Division, 1936-l°kl* were:
Captain Bruce Livingston Canaga July 193U~October 1936
Captain (later Vice Admiral) olaf M. Hustvedt ctober 1936-July 1933
Captain (later Admiral) Arthur D* Struble July 1938-June 1939
Captain (later Rea^Admiral) Hoscoe S. Schuirmann July 1939-August 191&
The career patterns of the Central Division chiefs were almost as varied
as the duties of the office which they headed* Captain Canaga served in
various fleet assignments* had duty in Scotland and Uemany in 1919* and was
a member of the T7*S* Naval Mission to Brasil from February 1921 to November
1922* Captain Hustvedt received a Master of Science at George Washington
in I9U4 and served in a battleship division which operated with the British
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Grand Fleet in World War X* Captain Struble participated in the Haitian
Campaign in 1919 •
Captain Sohuirraann was ty far the west experienced of the above groqp
when he became Director in 1939* §f that tine he had had duty in the
Asiatic Fleet, in the Sixteenth Naval District at Gavite, Philippine Islands |
and in the Office of $aval Intelligence. From April 1933 to July 1935 ha
served with the General Board, acting as Secretary from September 193k to
July 1935 • He was Technical Adviser at the Naval Conference at London 1935-
1936, and upon his return from that duty he was Administrative Aide to the
Chiefs of Naval Operations, Admirals HUliam 1 • Standley and William D«
Leahy, successively* "The records in the National Archives show that he worked
much more closely with the State Department than any of his predecessors, a
partial explanation undoubtedly being that there was so much more need for
liaison in the years immediately preceding the war*
The Joint Board.
The oldest of the inter-service agencies was established in July 1903
by agreement between the Secretaries of V&r and Navy without statutory
authorisation* The need had always existed to coordinate planning between
the two services, but the Spanish-American war with its overseas operations
and logistic problems brought the urgency of Joint planning to the forefront*
The Board was suspended, strangely enough, in 1913 and 191k by resident
Wilson because "he did not wish it to enter discussions of subjects that he
considered to be the President *s prerogative and that might lead to political
22
repercussions." The Board "renewed itt meetings in ootober 1915, and was
a
Purer, op* cit * t p* 6)*9.
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finally reconstituted by new orders at the end of [World War !]•" ' M
nev charter for the Joint Board specified the membership to bet the Aswy
Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of 3taff and Assistant Chief of 3tafT for
Plans, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval
2k
Operations and the Director of the vjar Plans Division*
Just as the General Board was consultative and advisory to the Secretary
of the Navy, so was the Joint Board consultative and advisory to the
Cemander in Chief* It took no executive action unless required to do so by
higher authority. There were no required meetings of the Joint Board, en
masse, unless there were matters to be discussed* While European armies
aarohed in the initial maneuvers of World War II, there were no nestings of
the Joint Board between October 11, 1939 and February 21, IShp or in the
months of March and August 1?&>. In late 19hP the Board cane to meet mjah
25
more frequently and in July 19lil be&an formal weekly sessions*
The organisation which permitted the Chief of Staff and th<* Chief of
Naval Operations and their immediate assistants not to waste tins in
unnecessary meetings was the working arm of the Joint Board, the Joint
Planning Comlttes* Made up of the T^ar Plans Division Chiefs and their
assistants, the Committee met often, discussed their particular problem with
the other service's representatiTes, reached an understanding and presented
the tentative agreement to the Joint Board* Usually there was no further
discussion in the Joint Board meetings on tentative agreements, since both
2iWatson, op» clt« » p* 79*
rurer, loc« clt »
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servloe chiefs kept informed on subjects by briefing and being briefed by
their Hex Plane officers. Discussions in the Joint Flaming Committee
conferences in reality reflected the views of the Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Maval operations* Disagreements were resolved during Joint Board
meetings or by the President, if necessary* Bfcr Hay 191*1 the work load of
the Joint Planning Committee had increased to the point that another level
in the staff structure was added. The assistants to the War Plans Directors
formed a Joint Strategic Committee to work out details of joint war and
operating plana and to reach agreement if possible, before submitting their
work to the Joint Planning Committee and ultimately to the Joint Board for
approval* "lanning matters other than joint war and operating plans were
normally referred to ad hoc committees of the lannins Committee*
-^ The organisation of the Joint Board was sound and it continued its work
until superseded by Joint Chiefs of Staff in 19h2» The primary mission had
been to coordinate war planning and in this effort it must be considered a
success* Implementation was another matter*
In the foregoing chapter the evolution of the authority of the Chief
of Naval Operations was discussed to show the gradual change in the position
of naval officers to influence foreign policy* In the earlier periods of
the Mavy Department, the Secretary had exercised very positive control over
all components of the naval forces* By the first part of World War II,
Congress and the President accepted extensive control aver the idlest and
supporting shore activities by a single officer, albeit under the authority
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reachod this sonith of control, the President by executive order had directed
that the Chief of Naval Operations end hie Army counterpart work directly
with him on certain natters* Those matters generally pertained to war plans*
As the authority of CM) increased, so increased the n$ed for competent
Staff assistants to help solve the many concurrent problems* The two
divisions of the Office of Chief of Ttaval Operations whose mission involved
working with other governmental agencies were the War lans division and
Central Division* Additionally CNO and his assistants in oommon causes with
the Army formulated plans within the framework of the Joint Board of the
Army and Navy and its subsidiary ooswittees* In the next chapter the plans
so derived will be discussed*
The evaluation of enemy potentialities
,
proposed courses of action and
estimates of own future requirements which emanated from the above discussed
officers influenced in varying degrees the political decisions made relative
to Japan from 1936 to 191*1* The nature and degree of influence in certain





. j 9$ bM IMfe i . • -
.




|M gMN li awn MhM liiMtfaMmB
jl* tan—Qui 1* **m «5> A*» oi
CIAFTER TKRSfS
TIK EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN KAR PLANS AGABS3T JAPAN
Introduction.
Traditionally the period between wars has been used by professional
military men to study past mistakes and successes and to prepare for future
operations* The latter employment finds expression in staff estimates
,
studies and, finally, war plans. Ideally, the finished product would serve
as an exact blueprint for successful operations against an enmw, utilising
forces available which are equal to forces required. Aside from errors in
estimates of enemy and own force capabilities and courses of action, the
ideal is hardly possible because forces required in offensive operations are
seldom available in the peacetime periods which allow for leisurely war
planning*
The war planning by American military officers between the two World Wars
of the twentieth century was generally done within the framework of the Joint
Board and Joint laming Committee discussed in the previous chapter.
Subsidiary war plans by Fleet, Army, Force, Corps and other descending
subordinate commanders were based on the plans generated by the Joint Board.
The one plan relative to a foreign power upon which most of the planning
effort was spent was the Orange 'Ian, which considered action against Japan.
Orange Plan underwent numerous changes between its initial appearance in
192U and final revision in 193$—each change reflecting a change in the
relative power oositions of Japan and the 'Jnited States. Superseded by a
new sequence of Rainbow war plans in 1939, Orange ^lan was never executed as
an operational plan. The investment of time soent on Orange Plan was not
lost, however. Experience in joint war planning and the development of
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strategic thinking on Pacific problem* facilitated the writing of the
Rainbow lans and unified the American Staff in discussions with the British
in early 191*1 over proposod actions in the Pacific.
The Orange Ian.
In the immediate aftermath of World War I* the Joint Board* in an
idealistic General Staff approach* undertook to prepare detailed plans for
action in any conceivable emergency* A color vas assigned as the code word
for each emergency and applied as veil to the country visualised as the enemy
in that emergency. Prance was the code word for Japan and actions with
Japan and Red applied to the British Empire* Blue for the United States was
less war plan than a plan for the national position of the American military
forces in certain contingencies with no particular enemy specified* Most of
the hypothetical situations were highly improbable in the peacetime era of
the early 1920* s* Ifo country menaced the United States* and few were
physically able to do so after the devastations of World War I* Likewise*
the Blue 'Ian was unrealistic in that the skeleton Army of l?21-19ii0 could
n9M9r fulfill its assigned missions without general mobilisation* As
strategic plans* most of the ten or twelve color plans developed between the
ware were worthless* because they bore little relation to contemporary
1
international political and military alignments* The major exception was
the Qranne Flan, for war against Japan* That plan called for moving large
Army units to the -Philippines and extensive naval operations* The color r>lans
were valuable as abstract exercises in the technical process of detailed
"llay S* Cline* Washington Command noet: The Orwrations Division, a
volume in the series* Uniied states Army in World War II (Washington:
Department of the Arwy, 19!>1)
, p. 36*
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military planning. Onus former 'seiutant GO, who, of course, was a
of the Joint Board by virtue of his offie©, saidt
I have always thought that our Orange Man was chiefly
useful as an exercise in War Planning, to train officers in
War Planning aai to serve as a basis for asking for appro-
priations and as a guide for developing our Navy and its
shore facilities. As to actual executing the 0-1 plan I
hope we will never be called on to do that unless the
ufcdnistration fully realises the probable cost and duration
of such a war and unless our people are prepared to support
an expensive war of long duration. 2
There were valid reasons even in the 1920 » a for considering Japan as the
potential enemy in the ; aoific, and therefore a special subject for planning
purposes* A review of the rapid changes in control over the Pacific islands
will show part of those reasons. In 1898 the United States annexed Hawaii
and after the short war with Spain acquired the Philippine Islands and Guam
in the Marianas Islands. Toe next year Wake and part of Samoa were clained.
In unprecedented time the United States hurdled across the Pacific to become
a Far Eastern ower, simultaneously securing a sequence of potential bases
extending all the way frost its west coast to the Philippines.
Spain, shortly thereafter, bowed out of the Pacific by ceding the
remainder of her island possessions in that ocean to Germany, who already
controlled the raid-Pacific Marshall Islands to the east of the Spanish-owned
groups. Germany received the Caroline and Marianas Islands, less Guam,
without serious American objection because at the time Germany posed no threat
in becoming a major naval power in the Pacific. Sven the foremost naval
3
strategist of the day, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, could see "no sufficient
2
Hearings hefpre the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack
, 79th Congress, United States Government Minting Office,
(Washington, B.C., 19U6, 39 vols.), Tart 16, pp m 92U-925, Ltrj Adra. Pdchardson
to Adm. Stark 26 January 19h0. (Hereafter cited as Paarl Harbor Attack ).
3
Of. Chapter One, pp. >9 for Mahan* s theories.
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reason for our opposition*" The subsequent events certainly were not
anticipated* Japan and Britain signed a Treaty of Alliance in 1902 which
the British invoked in 1911i to get Japan to clear the }aciiic of German
cruisers* In the process the Japanese occupied the Marshall, Caroline and
Marianas Islands "temporarily•" The temporary occupation stretched into
near permanency when in 1920 the Leasts of Nations confirmed the former
German islands as a mandate of Japan* Althou#i the non-fortification clause
in the Vkshinston Naval Treaty 1921-22 was to remove offensive threats in
the acific, the mere control of the former German islands gave Japan the
potential to isolate the Philippines and Guam and to sever American lines
of commerce to the Orient* American suspicions over Japanese intentions and
preparations in the islands increased annually as Japan continually refused
visits by Americans or Europeans to the various island groups*
"Strategy- of the Pacific 1* was a topic discussed by the Joint Board in
6
1919 » but not until after the League of Nations had blessed Japan's position
astride the route to the Philippines did The Joint Planning Committee
recommend a war plan* The *fcr "Ian Orange was completed, approved by the
Joint Board and the Secretary of the Navy in August 192U and by the
Secretary of NW on September 3, 192h* According to the Orange plan, the
United States would conduct "an offensive war, primarily naval, directed
toward the isolation and harassment of Japan, through control of her vital
sea communications and through offensive sea and air operations against her
Harold and Margaret Sprout. Toward a New Order of 3sa Power (Princetoni
Princeton University rose, 19U6), p* j£*
$
Cf* Chapter Seven for discussion of attempts to get permission for
American ships to visit the Mandated Islands*
6
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naval forces and economic life, followed if necessary* by such further
action as may bo required to win the war*" The initial mission for the Army
and Navy was to gain superiority over the Japanese in sea power in the
western Pacific* In order to accomplish the mission a major naval base was
required, and Manila was considered the best location for such a base*
Manila Bay and the approaches thereto were to be held by forces in the
Philippines and by the Asiatic Fleet until reinforcerrants could arrive from
the United States* In the original plan £0.000 men were to sail from the
7
west coast within ten days after the start of hostilities* At the time of
the plan the assigned missions for the Army and Navy were beyond their
capabilities* They were to become even more unrealistic as the Army further
deteriorated in the peacetime economy*
The Army planners became increasingly more concerned over obvious
deficiencies In forces available for planned operations* Brigadier*General
Stanley D* Embick who designed the defenses of Corregidor and vas Commander
of Harbor Defense of ianila and Subic Bays, wrote in 1933 while in the
:
;hilippine8, and later reiterated in 1935 while serving in the 'Jar Plans
division, that HTo carry out the present Oram^e Plan—with the provisions
for the early dispatch of our fleet to Philippine waters—would be literally
8
an act of madness*" Corregidor could hold against the Japanese for at least
a year, but the surrounding land around ?4anila and Cavite would fall with
little if any resistance* Smbick's contention was that as long as Corregidor
held, Manila Bay would be denied to the Japanese as a base* but as long as
7
Iouis Horton, American and Allied Strategy in the Far Sast, Military
Review
. December 19lt9, Vol* XXIX. No* 9. p. 23*
Watson, op, cit*. p* lil£*
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the Japanese hold the surrounding area Manila Bay would be denied the
United States as a base*
After the passage of the Tydings-HeDuffie Act in March 193k granting
Philippine independence* the American military and naval commanders in the
Llippines recommended to their respective departments that* if the United
States were going to defend the islands regardless of their independence* an
adequate base be built and forces increased. If the United States were not
going to defend the islands regardless of independence* the recommendation
was that American forces, other than those necessary to internal order, be
withdrawn* The Aragr section of the Joint 'laming Committee* in analysing
the recommendations of the Philippine commanders* maintained that the
question of being able to defend Manila Bay depended upon the ability of the
Navy to guarantee safe passage of troop reinforcements Immediately after the
start of war* If the Asiatic Fleet could not delay the Japanese advance
long enough* or* if the Pacific Fleet were not strong enough to escort
sufficient troops to the Philippines, then the mission of the Philippine
Department of the Army would have to be changed* In other words* the
Philippine phase of the Orange Plan would have to be revised* At this starve*
the Navy apparently believed that it could perform its part of the mission*
And so the recommendations of the Philippine commanders were rejected by the
Joint Board* An awareness of weaknesses was obvious* however* because the
Joint Board stated that forces in the Philippines should be increased to 1$5
planes* 2it submarines and 15 patrol planes and that the harbor defense.
9
anticraft and mobile troop strength be augmented.
9
'Louis Morton* Military Review* op. clt
.* pp. 25-26.
4 i-
0tfAte' *•-. iv 4 bj: ,*d ' '~?"'U— -. r . - I •' ' t w Mft^Btftl
jsbunff&o 1mm tat ip^Hiii inlwtt *rf* .
dtaB ywr •**att ft***«n «to . *mmmk mmmt bm - c mtf •*•*?*#
** ***&*» XAAMktKt ei TU—W MMlf *mt «MMd vMNMt BHi*—/
:..'.
w» -ntt* ffaiMijM—* ilmwuwuiffUi iftw qoo*s* to i«<»at *U» *•&«*$ *? ^r»»<
.'.-•. " v ' .- - .• ; • h v.'.-, ii :.*,. a . t'tf:' ,' ... • •.•• ;* )*.-;>.





'.'.. • v ' ' •:•. . . • ' ••-• ' ' v - , ;-,,>' 1 :ra
yd >.-3 mvtti Mjtitv u>SA »**t.t ic- tatMNHMjif
t»r **« ***** *A » :"..^w fit' ** •**£ -iwnrQ «a> lo aoarfq iiafrnjIflW
•AKftsafti «t* *» *««r -it. &rrt$*d tf'aratfp- XW* arf<#
... ••'.
%H ©tf %mmtmtt «d b£»om mnty&iM l 8N«t 4mU mtotn Mm0 .iatol
A year later In May 1935 Oran.ya Plan was revised again* The change in
the Navy concept uas significant, since It was the strategy ultimately used
in World War II* The Pacific fleet an broach to the Philippines would be a
progressive movement. The first objective, to be undertaken as soon as
practicable, was to seise the Marshall and Caroline Islands tram. Japan in
order to develop advance bases and secure the lines of communications to the
Western Pacific* The next year there was another revision. The earlier
missions of the Army 2nd Navy forces in the Philippines had been two folds
to hold the entrance to Manila Bay, and to hold the Manila Bay area itself
as long as possible. The second part of the mission was dropped* In
addition, the proposed 50,000 troops from the west coast to be embarked
within ten days of hostilities was dropped from the Orange Plan* The defense
force of the Philippines would consist of a 10*000 United States troop
garrison, the Philippine Army and such troops as could be evacuated from
China* These troops were to hold out for six months until the Navy could
open the line of communications across the Central Pacific*
Prior to the last revision of Orange Plan an incident occurred relative
to Presidential interest in the war plans* >.Mle on a South American cruise
in December 1936, President Roosevelt inquired of his Naval Aide, Captain
Bastedo, about the status of the War lans* (In the light of subsequent
history, the question could be considered a harbinger of change in
Presidential emphasis* His first term had been devoted tc social experimenta-
tion in solving the domestic problems of the country* Increased international
tensions and the overwhelming victory of the previous November seemed to turn
10
Ib:'d.» p* 26.
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the attention of the President to wore active interest in international
affaire •) Captain Bastedo directed the President** question to the Chief
of Naval Operations. The paragraph relative to the acific in CNO's answer
indieateo the general nature of the reply to the Haval Aide.
^lan for ijar in the Pacific * This plan requires the
maximum effort on the part of the Havy* Its conception
is that if the United States is attacked by a Pacific
Power, the war can only be terminated and a decision
reached by carrying the war to the Western Pacific*
Practically all detailed planning is confined to this
plan as the Joint Board had decided that war in the
'acific is more probable than war with any- other major
naval Power*^
The "China Incident" of 1937 and the growing military mi^ht and
national mobilisation of fascist Germany and Italy suddenly confronted the
United States military leaders with problems of the first magnitude* The
Navy* so long considered the "first line of deftmse" was numerically a one-
ocean navy* The Anqy was near its lowest ebb and incapable of mustering an
expeditionary force for offensive operations any place. On March 17 , 1937
the Joint Board restudied the current draft of the 3asie Orange Ian in the
H$it of recent events. On November 16, 1937 the Board approved a
reeoawndation by the Axwy Chief of Staff, Cfcneral Craig, to rescind the
plan and to prepare a new plan in line with forces available* A new plan
offered by Joint banning Committee was rejected and on January 19 Mxs two
service authorities on Pacific problems, Major-Oeneral Stanley D* Eabiek and
Bear Admiral James 0. Richardson, were directed to make a further Pacific
study* Their efforts were accepted as a new Orange Ian by the Joint Beard












on 21 February and by the Secretaries of Var and Navy a week later* On
the basis of this latest plan the Navy asked for and received from the
President and Congress authorisation for a twenty percent increase in sise*
The same set of facts that prompted a review of the war plans and their
revision also prompted the Navy to send a representative to London to seek
13
possible British cooperation against the Japanese*
Although the latest Orange Plan related to Japan only* it was obvious
to the planners that the European situation would increasingly bear upon the
American strategic position* On November 12* 1938 the Joint Board instructed
the Joint "lanning Committee
. *to make exploratory studies and estimates as to the
various practicable courses of action open to the military
and naval forces of the United States in the event of
(a) violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or more of the
Fascist powers, and (b) a simultaneous attempt to expand
Japanese influence in the Philippines ••"*
The planners presented their study five and a half months later* They
concluded that Germany and Italy could violate the Monroe Doctrine by
supporting Fascist revolutions in Latin America* The relegation of such
countries to the status of colonies would give to their European exploiters
the advantages of trade, access to raw materials* and military and naval
bases* From such bases the Panama Canal possibly could be attacked* Finally
the planners discounted the German or Italian action in Latin America unless:
(1) Germany believed that Britain and France would not intervene and
(2) Japan were to attack the Ihilippines and Guam and even then only in case
^fotson, op* cit** p* 92*
^Cf* Chapter Four, p* 67 for details of the visit*
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However* to overcome glaring deficiencies in present war plans con-
cerning concerted action by Germany* Italy and Japan* the Joint Planning
Committee recommended that future plans reflect the new possibilities* That
recommendation received immediate approval and action. In less than three
weeks* four of a new family of tentative plans were~ offered by the Joint
v.
Planning Committee to the Joint Board for approval* They were Rainbows 1*
2, 3 and it*
The most limited plan (RAINBOW 1) would provide for
the defense of the Lestem Hemisphere south to the bulge
of Braail (10° south latitude) — the Western iieraisphere
being taken to include Greenland (but not Iceland* the
Azores* or the Cape Verde Islands) to the east* and
American Samoa* Hawaii* and Wake (but not Guam or the
hilippines) to the west* Two other plans would provide
alternatively for the extension of operations from this
area either to the western Pacific (RAINBOW 2) or to the
rest of South America (RAINBOW 3). The directive also
called for modification of the first three plans under the
contingency (RAINBOW k) that Great Britain and France
were at war with Germany and Italy (and possibly Japan)*
in which case it was assumed that the nited States would
be involved as a major participant.
Reexamination of the possibilities under Rainbow k led the planners to
the conclusions that if all the major powers were at war using their current
forces* operations in Latin America would probably be very limited in scope
while operations by Japan in the aciflc would probably be extensive in
scope* The recommendation was made that there be two plans covering Pnited
15
Matloff * ?4aurioe and Ldwin M. fnell* strategic
-'leaning for Coalition
Warfare* I9hl-ljh2 t in the series "nited States Army in World War II*
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states participation with Britain and Franc* against Germany, Italy and
Japan* One plan provided for the United States to furnish armies for a
maximum effort in Europe against Qernany and Italy, while the other plan
called for MOT providing maximum effort in Surope, maintaining the Monroe
Ttoctrine and carrying out "allied Democratic Power tasks in the Pacific •"
The Navy by this time, June 1939$ had had talks with the 3ritish over
cooperation in the Pacific against the Japanese and unofficial agreements had
been reached over cooperative action* The Joint Planning Cownitteo recommended
that the plan for the United States to concentrate in the Pacific be moved
up in priority to the Rainbow 2 position where it mi^it "conceivably press
more for answers'* than plans other than Rainbow 1 would* Part of the
Justification for the change in priority readi
Whether or not we have any possible intention of
undertaking a war in this situation, nevertheless we may
take measures short of war, and in doing so should
clarify the possible or probable war task that would be
involved*1?
A week later on June 30, 193° the Joint Board approved the recommended
change in priority* The revised description of the new five Rainbow plans
readi
a* Joint Army and Mavy Basic Vfcr Plan Rainbow IJo. It
Prevent the violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine
by protecting that territory of the Western Hemisphere from which the
vital interests of the United States can be threatened, while protecting
the United States, its possessions and its sea-borne trade* This
territory is assumed to be any part of the v&stern Hemisphere north of
the approximate latitude ten degrees south*
This plan will not provide for projecting U.S. Array forces farther
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b» Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow Ho* 2t
(1) Provide for the missions in a*
(?) Under the assumption that the United States, Great Britain,
and France are acting in concert, on terms wherein the ifaited States
does not provide maximum participation in continental Europe, but
undertakes, as its major share in the concerted effort, to sustain the
interests of Democratic lowers in the Pacific, to provide for the
tasks essential to sustain these interests, and to defeat enemy forces
in the Pacific*
c* Joint Army and -Javy Basic Mar 3an Rainbow No* 3i
(1) Carry out the missions of the Joint Amy and Navy Basic War
Plan — Rainbow No* 1*
(2) Protect United States 1 vital interests in the Western Pacific
by securing control in the Western Pacific, as rapidly as possible
consistent with carrying out the missions in a«
d« Joint Army and Mavy Basio War Plan Rainbow No. Us
(1) ITevent the violation of the letter and spirit of the Monroe
Doctrine by protecting all the territory and Governments of the Western
Hemisphere against external aggression while protecting the United
States, its possessions, and its sea-borne trade* This Plan will
provide for projecting such <7«S* Army Forces as necessary to the southern
part of the South American continent or to the Eastern Atlantic*
e* Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No* $%
(1) Provide for the missions in a*
(2) rojoct the armed forces of the United States to the Eastern
Atlantic and to either or both of the African or European Continents,
as rapidly as possible consistent with carrying out the missions in a
above, in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany, or Italy, or
both* This plan will assume concerted action between the United States,
Great Britain, and France.1
"
With the definitions of strategic objectives having been clarified, the
Joint Planning Committee had the basis for all future planning until war cams
to the United States in December 19iil* A shifting emphasis in the priority
of developing the five Hainbow plans resulted from changes in the international
situation* All the plans must be reviewed here because of their bearing on
18
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the plans against Japan, Rainbows 2, 3 and 5*
As should bo expected ths security of the Astern Hemisphere received
first priority* Rainbow 1 was submitted to the Joint Board on 27 July 1939,
where it was studied, slightly changed and submitted directly to ?resident
Roosevelt in accordance with his order of $ July 1939* The resident
20
approved the plan orally on lu October 1939.
While the plan was before the President, Admiral Stark, the Chief of
Naval Operations, sent to Under Secretary of State Mr* Welles a meaorandna
dated Hi August*
There is enclosed a secret memorandum relative to the
political aspects of the plan—Rainbow Ho* 1* I believe it
is necessary for your background but feel that since it
quotes joint basic war plans it should be destroyed or other*
wise adequately protected after you have read it*
Part of the enclosed secret memorandum read?
• • .The General Situation under which these plans are being
prepared is as follows: Germany, Italy and Japan, acting in
concert, violate the letter and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine*
Japan, supported by Germany and Italy, violates by armed
aggression vital interests of the United States in the
Western Pacific* It is to be assumed that aggression
initiated by on© or two of these powers will be eventually
supported by the concerted action of all three*2-
The next priority alter Rainbow 1 applied to Rainbows 2 and 3, the two
Pacific area plans. "The Joint Board had directed the Joint banning
Committee in June 1939 to give priority to the development of plans for United
States naval offensive in western Pacific (Hainbow Ho* 2 and No* 3) in the
19
Cf. Chapter TWO, p. 23.
20
CI* ** °P* cit «j p* !>6j (2) Watson, op. cit. , p* 103*
nemo? CNO to Under Sec. State, lU August 19U9j 1WD Files j Al6-3A;arfare,
MiBC*
taRMPPI H irecta*- : ftfft
ll pi
.cawi b w state l» v*»*»,»©3 <sa&ttf ©*
. . sil U *#9»*aA I*©











event of war with Japan*" Yen after war broke in .Europe a few months
later, the strategic thinking continued to emphasise the plans against Japan*
Since Britain and France controlled the Atlantic, and to a lesser degree the
North and Mediterranean Seas, the most likely action to involve the United
States in war would be an attack by Japan in the Pacific* 4 lanning for such
an eventuality was much more complex than planning for Orange plans in the
past. Hot only ware other Democratic Powers" involved in the Pacific, but
additional potential enemies who might act in concert existed in the Atlantic*
Another problem facing the planners was how far the Japanese would
advance and in which directions before the United States and the "Democratic
owers" could take action*
The Navy planners at the outset set up three alternative
hypotheses* The first was that Japan would not have begun
moving southward from Formosa* In that case the U.S. Fleet
might move to Manila Bay, "with certain groups visiting
Singapore, Kamranh Bay, and Jfcng Kong." Ground forces
might be moved to the western Pacific at the same time or
later* The Navy planners thought that these acts might
prevent Japanese moves southward, and hence prevent a war
in the Pacific* The second hypothesis was that Japan had
taken Hong Kong, Kamranh Bay, and begun operations in the
Netherlands Indies, that the United States would react by
moving forces to the far Pacific, and that the Japanese in turn
would begin operations to seise Guam and the Philippines* The
third hypothesis was that the Japanese would already have con-
trol of tlie Netherlands Indies and would have forces in position
to isolate Singapore and take the hilippines* In this case,
as the Army planners pointed out, "the rincipal advantage of
Allied participation will have been lost and the problem
becomes essentially that of an Orange War. "23
The second hypothesis became the basis of the development of Rainbow 2
and 3« "On 10 April 1910 the Joint Board had further directed the Joint
22
Captain Tracy B* Kittredge, JSNR, Tnpublished Monograph on the nited
States Navy in World War II, on file in Navy History Division* Sect* III,
Vol. I, Note 83, p. 2U0.
2\tetloff and Snell, op* cit ., p. 9.
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Planning Committee to proceed immediately with the completion of plana for
an Immediate projection of U*S* forces into the Western Pacific (Rainbow
No* 2) * n The initial movement of forces was planned for Singapore and the
Dutch Saat Indies, to be supported, if the second hypothesis held true,
across the Atlantic, around the Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean* Xo
insure that Singapore would be available to the U*S* Fleet, the Navy
recommended that the British be asked to send a division of capital ships to
reinforce their Far Eastern naval forces* The Navy further recommended that
the British, Dutch and French authorities be contacted diplomatically to
ascertain their proposed actions in the °aeific vis & vis Japanese aggression*
Another explosive political question was whether U*S* forces would be used
2$
to defend the European colonial possessions* ' Before these questions could
be answered events in Europe turned attention from the acific*
In rapid succession in the Spring of 19 >£ Denmark, Norway, Holland and
Belgium fell* France was falling fast in June and within the American
military circles there was genuine fear that the French and possibly even the
British Fleets would fall into German hands* In May, before France had
fallen, the 'resident, Mr* Welles, Admiral Stark and General Marshall hid
agreed that "we must not become involved with Japan, that we must not concern
ourselves beyond the 190th Meridian, and that we must concentrate on the
26
South American situation*" Work was suspended on Rainbows 2 and 3, but
evidently only by the Army, as will be shown shortly. Rainbow h received
top priority —
Jvlttredfre Monograph, loc» clt»
25 26
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To provide for the most effective use of United States'
naval and military forces to defeat enemy aggression
occurring anywhere in the territory and waters of the
American continents, or in the United States, and in United
States' possessions in the Pacific westward to include
Uhalaska and Midway**?
The Plan was finished in May and forwarded by the then Secretaries of War and
Mavy, Harry I • Vbodring and Lewis Compton, respectively, to the 'resident on
June 13* n July 12 the "resident asked the new Secretaries of war and Navy,
Henry L* Stimson and Frank Knox, to read the plan. They resubmitted it on
23
July 26 and the Preeident approved it on August lu* *
In the meanwhile the Navy had continued to work on Rainbow 3* although
in November 19U^ A&niral Stark wrote his ^lan Dog which closely paralleled
Rainbow 5* On November 29 Oeneral Marshall expressed grave concern over the
plan of the Navy (Rainbow 3) calling for holding the Haley Barrier against
the Japanese southward movement* He suggested;
• .•readjusting war plans on the basis (1) that our
national interests require that we resist proposals that do
not have for their immediate goal the survival of the
British Umpire and the defeat of Germany} and (2) that we
avoid dispersions that might lessen our power to operate
effectively, decisively, if possible* in the principal
theater — the Atlantic. Such a basis might provide
a* that our naval threat should be continued in the
Pacific so long as the situation in the Atlantic permits*
b* that, so far as Malaysia is concerned, we should
avoid dispersing our forces into that theater, we should,
however, assist the British to reinforce their naval set-
up in the Far East by relieving them of naval obligations
in the Atlantic* This would provide a more homogeneous
force for lalaysia and would, in effect, concentrate rather
than disperse our naval eetabllsJawnt*^




Watson, op* cit** pp* 121-122.
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the war described In Rainbow 3* it will not be through my doings * but because
those In niftier authority have decided that it is to our best national
30
interests to accept such a war*" >ther evidence of the CN0 ( s tenseness
over possible Japanese action in the Fall of 2$k0 to take advantage of the
European situation is shwi by a memorandum exactly a week earlier to CJeneral
Marshall} "Over here we are much concerned with the possibility of having a
31
war en our hands due to precipitate Japanese action* " One of the largest
areas of doubt was British intentions. Those doubts were soon to be resolved
in the forthcoming American-British meetings in January.
The discussions with the British in early 19U1 are described in detail
in the next Chapter* During the conversations, claiming on Rainbow plans
was suspended* The American position during the conversations was basically
that found in Rainbow £* and as soon as the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations had approved the ABC-1 Report a new Rainbow $ was ordered*
The first draft was completed on April 7 and three weeks later it was
submitted by the Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board for approval*
On May Hi the Joint Board approved Rainbow 5 and ABC-1* On June 2 the two
plans were sent to the President* the Secretary of the Navy having approved
on May 28 and the Secretary of War on June 2* The "resident read the
documents and returned them without approval or disapproval on June ?• The
Presidential military aide offered this explanation:
* The President has familiarised himself with the two
papers j but since the report of the United States British
Staff Conversations* \DC-1* had not been approved ^ the
British Government* he would not approve the report at
this time j neither would he now give approval to Joint Army
and Navy Basic War HLan-Rainbow No* 5* which is based
^Ibid** p. 122* 31Ibid., p. 121*
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m the report ABC-1, However, in case of war the oapers
would be returned to the President for hie approval*^
The general assumptions and the concept of war of the Joint Rainbow 5
were Identical with those of ABC-1. The Army and Navy each wrote a
supporting Rainbow $ plan for the guidance of their respective forces. The
33
Navy Rainbow 5 plan was promulgated on May 26, 19U1. ' Many of the tasks
assigned were by now familiar, since some had been in the orange Ian and
all were in general terse in ABG-1.
The °aclfic Fleet was assigned the task of diverting
enemy strength away from the Halay barrier Ijy the denial
and capture of positions in the Marshall*, and by raids on
enemy bases and ocraminioatione* The Pacific Idlest was
also to defend Wake, Guam, Midway, Samoa, and other
American island*, as well as "prepare to capture" the
mandated islands and establish an advanced base at Truk*
These moves would be necessary preparatory steps to the
mintenanc* of the line of communications between the
United States and the Philippine Islands, and the
establishment of American naval superiority in the Western
Pacific****
The defensive strategy in the Pacific and the plan to exert
effort against the European enemies first, precluded any reinforcements
being sent to the acific* Hainbow £ reflected that defensive thinking* The
preceding Orange Plane had been unrealistic for want of forces* The Rainbow
plans were by comparison quite sophisticated in that deficiencies were
recognised and planned for in the period until the United State* could
mobilise and build up the supplies of materials to support .its allies end
itself.
32
" temo: Col. Scobey to CNO, 9 June 191*1 j HHD File; Misc* 1.
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The Savy Basic v/ar ""Ian-Rainbow Se* $ is found In earl Harbor Attack^
-art 18, pp. 287£-?9liO*
3UMorton, Military Review, op. pit
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The evolution of war plane In the ye rs between the two world wara had
one continuous feature* War with Japan was considered the most probable war
the United States would fl^t* H/ork continued on Orange ^lans and their
revisions until changes in the balance of pouer in Europe raised new threats
to United States and Western Hemispheric security* In the new circumstances
Japan was even more a potential enemy, for her relative and actual military
power in the Pacific had increased and she had gained possible (later actual)
allies in Europe • The shift to the folnbow group of plans placed the
probable war between Japan and t3ie United States in the perspective of world
conditions* Even considering the more immediate threat of Germany and Italy
to national interests in 1939* the second and third priority plans* tlainbows
2 and 3* related directly to action against Japan, tfith further changes in
the military picture in Europe in the Spring of 19hP$ the decision was made
to concentrate on defeating Germany by assisting Britain* War with Japan
was still considered hi$ily probable* but it would havo to be defensive*
The offensive plan against Japan, Rainbow 2 and 3* were finally cancelled
on 6 August 19?4l» Rainbow 5* vjhich encompassed the whole war effort, was
the plan with which the United States entered the war* "ot until h May 191*2
35
^r® ft******** 1 and h cancellod* " Although the strategy in the vranst Plans
of progressively advancing through certain island groups to defeat Japan was
ultimately used in the Faci£ic, Rainbow 5 was the plan adopted, ^miany,
not Japan* had hiiciest priority on the list of onemles.
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THE WMuUriDi OF BRITISH-AMERICAN COOPNATION IN THE PACIFIC
Introduction.
The period immediately proceeding 1936 (the point of departure for this
paper) was narked by extreme economic doldrums, social pressures resulting
in governmental experimentation and general military inactivity. After
World War I the Jnited States had rejected "foreign entanglements" by
refusing to join the League of Nations* In the subsequent search for peace
without using force the United States gave up a position sans pareil in the
ship building race to overcome the British naval supremacy and in a complete
reversal led the way to drastic naval sera; ring and limitations. In the
same search for peace by treaty, the I nited States joined with France in
promoting world acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 to "renounce
way as an instrument of national policy. n
"^-Xhe journey down the idealistic path to peace led past rlgnpcets
which iniicated that all was not well with the world. The »SM »!»• of
Manchuria, Ethiopia and the Rhineland served as evidence of how the r~si:jg
military power of Japan, Italy and Germany would be used. How to act
effectively against incipient political/military power diametrically op? osed
to national interests without generating public hysteria or negative reaction
is a problem inherent in a democracy of elected officials. (Fear of
lie opinion vis a vis unpopular actions has dampened if not deterred many
.tioal decisions.)
im course of action against i jntial enemy is the obvious alignment
of allies. If pi*: ere done ii RMMMt between the military groups of
the United States and peselMUl allies, national tritettn war lane might
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thereby be derived. Future collective military action might tlien be
executed almost immediately after political approval of such plane*
A review of the study of War r lans in the prece-ding Chapter will show
the relative readiness of the Navy for certain action against Japan and the
pitiful impotency of the Army to defend the continent much less field the
expeditionary force to move through the Pacific Islands. It is no small
wonder then that the Navy should desire to investigate the possibilities of
British cooperation to complement its own courses of action against Japan}
or that the Pr<@sldent should desire to deter further successes of opposing
ideologies by naval action if possible or that there should be similar
desires in Britain for cooperation against an enemy in common.
This Chapter is devoted to the review of the growth of British-
American cooperation from simple exploratory talks in London in January
1936 to full scale cooperation as World War II involved first the one then
the other of the English-speaking opponents of Japan.
Background.
The relationship of the British and American Navies has varied in
extremis from open hostility concomitant with the birth of the latter to the
nicest sense of cooperation in the two world wars of the twentieth century.
British naval tradition, organization and tactics transposed to the
embryonic American fleet remained from colonial days a latent common bond.
The American Navy, through lack of funds and national apathy deteriorated
into insignificance after the victories of 1812. In fact, the omnipresent
British Fleet and its excellent system of world wide bases, while protecting
the Empire lines of commerce, also provided the bulwark behind which the
onroe Doctrine and American Far "astern policy matured with no seriour
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outside challenge*
The changing political and military balance of power in Europe in the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century I'ound the British naval
supremacy effectively challenged by a modern German fleet* The innovation
of submarine warfare aggravated the seriousness of the international position
of Britain* The British retaliated with blockade measures* American
commerce and American lives quickly became pawns in the game* The diplomatic
exchange of notes between the ' nited States and Germany and Britain over the
first submarine warfare campaign did bring about a cessation of sinkings
without warning in April 1916* However, shortages in American anti-
submarine forces and the ?tevy in general left -resident Wilson with a weak
hand in hiw coercive attempts to force Germany and Britain to respect our
neutral status* His proposal for a conference to end the war was rejected
by both sides* He concluded then that it was necessary to provide naval
forces sufficient to take care of our rights as neutrals* independently*
since the Allies did not want the mited States in the war on its own terms
and the Germans were not ready to compromise* He therefore persuaded
2
Congress in August, 1916 to vote a large naval building program. The program
came too late to influence the Germans* In February 1917 the second
submarine campaign started "to isolate England by sea despite any effort the
1
Cf. Ernest R* May, The World War and American Isolation 19IU-1917
(Cambridge: Harvard University ress, 1959)* 'art II, p. 113ff. for an
excellent discussion on German-American relations relative to the first
submarine campaign*
2
The program called for construction within three years of ten battle-
ships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, sixty-seven
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3
United States night make."
The General Board anticipated the outbreak of war and on February 1*,
1917 recommended to the Navy Department a possible w.r program with the
following points t
(a) mobilize fleet and start patrol work and mine sweeping;
(b) dock and repair all ships; (c) increase personnel of
navy to 150,000 and Marine Corps to 30,000 officer
personnel being increased in proportion; (d) rash to com-
pletion all vessels building or authorised and build up
aviation forces as rapidly as possible (e) take possession
of all vessels of the Central Powers and remove all enemy
aliens who might do harm; (f) arm merchant vessels; and
(g) prepare plans in cooperation with the Allies for
offensive operations against the enemy.**
^arly in 1917#the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill,
discussed with American Ambassador Walter Hines Page a visit to London by
an American Admiral. Rear Admiral William 5. Sims, Head of the Naval War
College, chosen for the mission, left for t ondon with no instructions and
re; ortedly with this admonition from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Villiem r. Benson
t
Don*t let the British pull the wool over your eyes* It
is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of
the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the
Germane.^
Sims with an aide, Commander J.V. Baboock, traveling under aliases a£
3
Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (Hew York: G. •
?utnam»s Sons, 191*8), pT3o7u
HDonald W. Jtltohell, History of the Modern American Navy (New Ycrkt
«lfred «. Knopf, 19lt6), p. 199.
Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, feet. Ill, Part A, Chp. 10, p. 209.
Siting Ba Morlson, Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston*
Houghton HLfflin Company, 191*2), p. 338.
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S*W* Davidson and V.J. Richardson, respectively, arrived on April 9.
Sins was amazed to be informed most confidentially of the true gravity of
the submarine situation from Admiral Jellico* SinkL' gs of merchant ships
had reached 5^0,000 tons in February and aliaost 600,000 tons in March, and
were then progressing at the rate of nearly 900,000 tons for April — three
f
or four times the amounts which the public had been led to assume* The
10
urgent call for destroyers was answered slowly but gradually the increased
number of American destroyers and the system of convoying merchant ships
urged on the British Admiralty by .admiral Sims proved the telling difference
against the submarine and Germany 1 !? attempt to negate Britain's naval
supremacy*
The flag secretary to Admiral Sims during his tour as the Senior
American Naval Officer in Jliropean waters was Tdeutenant Commander fftrold R*
Stark* Stark had brought his command, a flotilla of torpedo boats, from the
Asiatic Station to help the British in the Mediterranean and English Channel*
His experience in working with the British under wartime conditions would
prove valuable twenty-four years later when he was the Chief of Naval
Operations*
The interim period between world wars found both British and American
naval officers attempting to balance forces under the treaty limitations on
7
The British conferees to the ABC meetings in Jan. 19U1 came as members





Knox, op* cit., p* 38?*
10
The Navy Department was inclined to disbelieve the urgency for the
destroyers and did not order the first ships to be fitted out until the iiith
of April* As late as July 5th only thirty-fair destroyers had arrived at
Queenstown* Ibid., p* 38f.
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siae and new construction in their respective navies* with little contact
existing between the two services except at the conference tables.
r-re-5 earl Harbor 7 laraiing.
~arly in 1937 the Joint Board restudied the draft of the joint Army
and Navy Basic Ian Orange which dated from 1928. Hie shortcomings,
especially in the non-existent Army ex editions ry force and, in a more
limited sense, the naval requirements, were obvious to the planners* The
Navy, aware of British interests and responsibilities in parts of the
western Pacific and the possibility of future cooperation against a militant
Japan, decided to conduct private conversations with the Admiralty*
Actually the conversations were to have a two-fold purpose* to find out what
could be done if the TJnited States and Britain found themselves at war with
Japan and to take up with the British the question of getting out of the
qualitative limitations of the sisse of battleships which had been stipulated
12
in the London Treaty of 1935 and 1936*
The individual chosen to go to London was Captain Royal £• Ingersoll,
chief of War Plans Division, (Op* 12). The mission had much more
significance than the visit of one Captain to converse with his British
counterpart* Not only was Ingersoll briefed by his naval superior, Admiral
William D. Leahy, the Chief of 'Javal Operations, but he also was called to
13
ti» White House for a Presidential briefing. L?;on his arrival in London,
Ingersoll was taken by the American charg^ d« affaires to the Foreign Minister
U
v;at8on, op. olt.. p. *.
12
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rtr. Anthony rien, who had cancelled a post-Christmas holiday to sec
Ingersoll. Ingersoll told Mr. Eden that U.S. Navy plana of action in the
Pacific were based on certain assumptions about the dispositions the British
might be able to make and that the same was probably trie about their plans.
-A President Roosevelt and Admiral Leahy thought the time had cone "to carry
natters a stage further by exchanging information in order to co-ordinate
our plans more closely." Ingersoll was free to disclose the American
dispositions under certain eventualities and desired to learn what the
British dispositions would be under like circumstances. In answer to a
question from Kr. Men relative to possible courses of action now or in the
future, Ingersoll replied that the discussions which were to be held
between himself and the Admiralty rtwould be limited to future incidents
against which joint action might later be taken, /but that/ no move could
be made at all in the Pacific, unless full preparation had been made for
every eventuality, including war. M Ingersoll thought the technical examina-
tion between the two countries should come first, after which any considers-
Hi
tions on political decisions should be easier. The technical talks were
held with Captain Thomas Phillips, Ingersoll «s opposite in the War Plans
15
Division of the Admiralty.
Ingersoll noted hia impressions during his visit in a diary report to
the Chief of Naval Operations!
Mr. ilden appeared more interested right now in immediate
gestures to impress the Japanese than he was in long-
range planning. ..British not counting on any aid from
Hi
Anthony Sden, Memoirs a Facing the Dictators (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1962), pp m 619-620.
earl Harbor Attacks art 9, p. U273»
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•t<.B8it 9 France or Dutch.*British interested in Manila
as base. Fear Hong Kong too vulnerable from land attack
.••British do not believe the Japanese would attempt
to take the Philippines while occupied in China and
believed they are safe if the British Fleet were at
Singapore and the nited States Fleet were at Hawaii or
to the westward thereof.. .Their fleet should start for
Singapore and curs for Hawaii to arrive apj roxiraately
the sane tins. Should blockade be decided by the
government they would hold a line roughly from
Singapore through the itetherlands rast ladies past &»w
Guinea and New Hebrides eastward of Australia and New
Zealand. ••Admiralty would provide communications codes
and ciphers for use in coordinated conraunications...
Admiralty believes that a show of strength by the two
fleets nay be necessary, even if there are* no
hostilities with Japan, in order to bring about peace
terns between China and Japan which will continue the
rinciple of the "open door. "16
A The official "Record of Conversations" of January 12, 1938, signed by
Captains Ingersoll and -hillips agreed to recommend cooperation in case of
war with the Japanese, the British basing a fleet at Singapore and the
17
United States concentrating a fleet at earl Harbor.
Admiral Leahy, CM), took speoial cognisance of the British statement of
intentions as understood by Ingersoll* In a letter to the two key fleet
commanders he stated
i
In the event that the .nited States and British Govern-
ments should, at some indefinite tine in the future,
decide that parallel action by the two governments in
regard to their Far Eastern policies (including naval
operations) is necessary, certain assumptions must be
nade in order to adopt existing Orange Plane to the
changed situation - that is Blue and Red against
Orange,. ./detractions from the assumptions found in
enclosure""to basic letter7...Should the British
Government decide to sen? a naval force to the Far
East it would send the force as a single tactical
16
Memo: Capt. ingersoll to CND, Jan. l?3oj NJC File: Correspondence
British-ilS Conversations in London 1938-1939.
17
Pearl Iforbor Attack, art 9, p. u275, (?) S.E. Korison, Vol. Ill,
op* oit
., p« k9*
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unit and its strength would bo sufficient to engage the
Japanese Fleet under normal tactical and strategical
conditions. ••In the event of a general Iiiroi>ean war
resulting , it would almost certainly be necessary for
the British to effect a considerable reduction in their
naval strength in the Far East* With the reduction of
British strength in the Far East under such conditions
there would probably be required direct tactical
cooperation between the United States and British Fleets
in the Pacific...Should the British Governra<int send its
fleet to Singapore , the advance of the United States
Fleet to Truk or some other position in the sane general
area can be assumed as the first phase of operations of
the nited States Fleet, after the decision is made to
dispatch the United States Fleet beyond the Hawaiian
Islands. • .Should parallel action be decided upon by the
two governments, it can be assigned that the British
will withdraw their garrisons in North China and the
major units of the British China Fleet to Kong Kong or
Singapore and that such withdrawals would probably be
timed with the movement of the British Main Fleet to
the Far Eaet.^8
-^. Less than ayear later the assumptions were invalid as regards the
British ability to send a fleet to Singapore. The European situation had
again drawn as a powerful magnet the major units of the British Fleet to
European waters. What could have been suspected by even an amateur
strategist studying the deepening crisis in 1939 9 was confirmed by informal
talks in Washington in June 1939. The British Iteval Attache, Captain L.C.A.
St. J. Curzon-tfowe and Commander T.C. Hampton of the British Admiralty met
with Admiral Leahy and Read Admiral Robert Ghormley, chief of War lans
Division.
Commander Hampton stated he was enroute to duty in
Asiatic Station and had been sent by the Admiralty to
inform the Chief of Ilaval Operatlone that the situation
in Europe and the Far East had changed so much during
the past one and one-half years that the Admiralty now
18
„
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desired to inform the Navy Department that in view
of the threat of Germany and Italy against England
and Franc* that the European situation demanded the
presence in European waters of all capital ships
and most of the other vessels of their Fleet, so
that if Japan threatened, the British would not be
able to send the force to the Far East thr.t had
been contemplated in the conversations with Hear
Admiral Zngeraoll* It is the present intention
for the British to maintain a portion of their
Fleet in hone waters and the remainder, except
part of the China Detachment and the Dominion
Forces, in the liastera Mediterranean. That in
case of war in which Japan became involved, they
would concentrate on Italy, the supposed weak link,
and as soon as Italy could be reduced, naval
forces would be available to send reinforcements
to the Far '^st, if and when the Defense Council
so desired* At the present the Admiralty is
inclined to believe that Japan is less likely to
join Germany and Italy than she was one and one-
half years ago*
Admiral Teahy said of course he could give
his personal views only, that he could not ooroait
our Navy Department to any definite agreement, that
he did not know what action Congress would take in
case of trouble, nor could he discuss any other
action other than "parallel action"**.m case of an
European war in which Japan is involved, with the
United States neutral, we would doubtless send most
of our naval forces to Hawaii, ••«**
Admiral Leahy reacted with a message to his fleet commanders directing
them to change their War Flans to reflect Britain's inability to send a
20
large force to Singapore due to the world situation*
A year after Commander Hampton* s visit to Washington, the "phoney war"
in Europe which had remained nearly static erupted into devastating action*
The German war machine appeared more and more invincible, as Mr* Winston
Churchill became the new Prime Minister* Referring to himself as the
19
Hemo by RADM Ohormley on informal conversations 12 June 1939 found
in File cited nl8.
20
" Letter QB to CHJC B and CINCAF, Change to Serial 218 of 2 Feb. 1936}
Serial 286 23 June 1939, found in File cited in nl8*
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"Formr %*?.! Person" ho had renewed his corresy*>ndeno<5 with I resident
Roosevelt, On !4ay 15* 19hP he apprised Roosevelt of the seriousness of the
situation and listed his immediate needs t
First of all, the loan of forty or fifty of your older
destroyers to bridge the gap between what we have now
and the large new construction we put in hand at the
beginning of the war, This tine next year we shall
have plenty* But if in the interval Italy cones in
against us with another one hundred submarines, we nay
be strained to breaking-point. Secondly, we want
several hundred of the latest types of aircraft, of
which you are now getting delivery* These can be
repaid by those now being constructed in the United
States for us* Thirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and
ammunition, of which again there will be plenty next
year, if we are alive to see it* Fourthly, the fact
that our ore supply is being compromised from Sweden,
from Horth Africa, and perhaps from Northern Spain,
makes it necessary to purchase steel in the United
States* This also applies to other materials* We
shall go on paying dollars for as long as we can, but
I should like to feel reasonably sure that when we can
pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same*
Fifthly, we have many reports of possible German
parachute or air-borne descents in Ireland* The visit
of a Jnited States Squadron to Irish ports* which might
well be prolonged, would be invaluable* Sixthly, I am
looking to you to keep the Japanese quiet in the
Pacific, using Singapore in any way convenient*•»
There was also fear of the Japanese going into the Netherlands East
Indies if the Germans took the Netherlands* The Joint Army and ftavy Board
then recognised that the "nited States was the only power in a position to
restrain the Japanese aotion in the Netherlands ast Indies* In connection
with the studies of possible cooperation with the Allies, the Naval Attache
in London was instructed by the Hoard at this time to obtain full information
as to facilities that might be available at Singapore for a naval detachment,
21
winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston a Houghton Mifflin
Company, 19h9), ?v 2lt-25j K2) Watson, op. cit*, p. !07j (3) Katloff and
Snell, op* cit* a p* 20
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should the American GoVGrrwwmt decide to rapport British and Dutch
22
resistance to any further Japanese move to the south. The Admiralty
expressed a strong desire that the ' nited States Government guarantee the
23
Netherlands rast Indies, The Naval Attache in London reported on 17 May
191*0 a proposal by the Admiralty that the United States send naval forces
to Singapore but while Japanese intentions seemed obscure, Admiralty f-taff
Officers pointed out that, if Japan moved southwards, they could easily cut
2k
British lines of communications between Australia and India*
As the defense in France crumbled the British position became even more
precarious than Churchill had indicated to Roosevelt* Since Roosevelt had
declined the request for the desperately needed destroyers by averring that
Congressional action was needed and "pointed to the concentration of the
25
American Fleet at earl Harbor" in answer to the plea for the American use
of Singapore, the Admiralty increased the discussions on how to favorably
influence the Americans* To this end a special committee headed by Sir
Sidnty Bailey was appointed on June 15. Five days later the Naval Attache
was advised that informal conversations between British and American Staffs
26
either at London or 'Washington were to be proposed* The Bailey Committee
held meetings from 20 June to S September 191*0 examining "each of the major
technical aspects of future naval cooperation*" It recommended at the
22
Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. Ill, Part C, Chp* 12, p. 267*
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July 15 meeting that cooperation with American naval authorities should
conform closely to the 1917-1916 precedent.
^The pressure for naval cooperation was also exerted through the regular
diplomatic channels. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington,
with a recollection of the fruitful services of Admiral William f. Sims, as
a Special Naval Observer in London in 1917 » suggested to resident Roosevelt
in 19U0 the sending of another senior American Admiral, and the idea so
impressed the resident that he discussed it with Secretary of the Navy
Frank Knox and Admiral Stark. On 12 July they proposed Rear Admiral Robert
L. Ghormley, the Assistant Chief of Jteval Operations and former head of War
28
I lans Division, who was already fully informed on the past conversations.
Roosevelt while briefing Ghormley prior to his departure for London
informed him that he "still was not convinced that the United States would
be forced to intervene as a belligerent in the war against the iSuropean
axis, or would be forced to fight Japan in the Pacific to prevent continued
29
Japanese expansion.n In addition to Ghormley, the President decided to
send for a shorter period of time an Army representative, General George V.
Strong. A third member was selected to represent the air arm, Major General
30
Deloe C. Pmrnons of the 0-HQ Air Force.
The trio arrived in London August 15 and were joined by the U.S. Naval
Attache, Captain Alan G. Kirk and the T.S. Military attache, Colons!
27
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Raymond E. Lee. The meetings with the British which ensued were referred
to as "The Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee" although the
discussions covered many natters of Joint planning and possible cooperation,
particularly on the part of the two fleets* The American delegation
repeatedly stressed that they were present as individuals for discussions
and recommendations, but this did not deter the British from "fielding
their first military team" or from speaking with complete candor. In the
British group were Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea
Lcrdj General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General ftaffj and Air
31
Chief Marshall Sir Cyril L.N. flewall, Chief of the Air Staff. It was
Sir Cyril Hawaii who gave the crux of British strategical thinking at the
time i
...That in our plans for the future we were certainly
relying on the continued economic and industrial co-opera-
tion of the United States in ever-increasing volume. ]*>
account, however, had been taken of the probability of
active co-operation top" the Jnited States, since this was
clearly a matter of high political policy. The economic
and industrial co-operation of the United States were
fundamental to our whole strategy. 32
-J£- Discussion relative to the Far Sast pointed up the fact that the
earlier British assumptions were admittedly invalid relative to possible
Japanese action. First, it had been assumed that the threat to British
interests would be seaborne} secondly, that a fleet could be sent to the
Far East. The Japanese now threatened to expand through the southeast in
such a way as to make land invasion of Malaya possible] and the British were
obviously in no position to send a fleet to the Far Fast. At this juncture,
31
Ibid., p. lllij (2) S.S.Morlson, Vol. I, op. cit ., p. 1*0.
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Matloff and Snell, op. cit.
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important as Singapore and tfalay were, they could not be supported at the
33
cost of the security in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, 0m British
position impressed the American delegation then and was to prove an area of
3k
disagreesnt later.
Generals Strong and Amnions continued on in London through the height of
the German air blitzkrieg which was to have brought England to her knees.
Impressed by the British coolness and determination under heavy attack, they
returned to Washington the Inst part of September confident that Britain
would stand—at least for the immediate future* Admiral Ghornley stayed on
35
in London as a Special Ifeval observer,
H
Admiral Ohormley conferred almost daily with tho Bailey Committee.
The Committee, on the assumption that the United States Fleet would be con-
centrated in the Pacific, had recommended that strong forces should be moved
into the Southwest acific and China Sea, in order to restrain Japanese
movements to the South, and particularly into the Netherlands East Indies.
Admiral Ohormley, in commenting on this recommendation, reviewed the
problems that would be involved for the lilted ftates Navy moving such
detachments across the Pacific. He pointed out that the First Sea Lord and
other officers of the Admiralty Naval Staff had themselves suggested that
the Royal Navy was not sufficiently strong in the Atlantic. Assistance from
the Jhited States Tfevy would probably be required in the Atlantic, in
33
Ibid
., p, , 22-23 J (2) Watson, op, cit ,,, v m ill*.
31*
Cf, p. 89, this Chapter and Chapter KUR, below.
Matloff and Snell, op. cit
., p. 22 and Morison, Vol. I, op, cit. , p. uJ.
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Samuel B. Morison, Ihe Battle of the Atlantic September lg3?-KqKl^.3 ,
Vol, I in History of United States Naval Operations in World %ar : : (Boston:
tittle, Brown and Company, I9h7), p. al.
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addition to whatever action night be taken in the ^acific* Admiral Ghormley
referred to the existing strength of the nited States iJavy in the Atlantic*
ft large proportion of these naval forces would probably be needed to
cooperate with the British in the "tlentie although this would depend upon
developments in the relations with Japan and on the attitude which the
administration and uublic opinion might take, should the 'Jhited States enter
the war*
The revised text of the Bailey Committee reports were sent by Admiral
Ghormley to Admiral Stark, with a record of the discussions which had been
proceeding since September 17* The Chief of Naval Operations* in a
despatch of October 2, suggested that the I&val Attache should return to
Washington to be available for consultation there while these proposals were
under consideration* This was confirmed on October 10 when Captain Kirk
received orders to proceed to Washington for such discussions early in
December. In mid-October Lord Lothian revived the proposal for Staff
39
conversations, this time on a "comprehensive" basis, and two days later in








Cf Watson, op* cite, p. 119 nGO. Lord Lothian presented the Prime
Minister^ proposal for £taff conversations to Mr. Roosevelt on LU etober.
First favoring the proposal, Mr* Roosevelt reoonsidered the matter, perhaps
in the light of the 191*0 election campaign (both candidates promised that
no American boys would go abroad to fight), and on 2? October returned the
memorandum to Lord Lothian without action*
iiO
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Oft November 12, Admiral Stark's memorandum, rlan Dog, a cumulation of
the national strategic position and possible courses of action, was
submitted to the Secretary of the Navy, with copies to General Marshall,
Admiral Ghormley and Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief United rtates
U2
Fleet. The concluding two paragraphs of Ian Dog emphasised the
importance of staff talks with possible allies as the point d'appui for
military decisions*
;jb important allied military decision should be reached
without clear understanding between the nations involved as
to the strength and extent of the participation which may
be expected in any particular theater, and as to a proposed
skeleton plan of operations*
Accordingly, I make the recommendation that, as a
preliminary to possible entry of the iMted States into the
conflict, the United States Army and Navy at once undertake
secret staff talks on technical matters with the British
military and naval authorities in London, with Canadian
military authorities in Washington, and with British and
Dutch authorities in Singapore and Eatavla. The purpose
would be to reach agreements and lay down plans for
promoting unity of allied effort should the nited States
find it necessary to enter the war under any of the , -
alternative eventualities considered in this memorandum*
The Navy then on both sides of the Atlantic was eager for more serious
discussions and it was the Army which agreed to the proposals* General
Marshall gave credit for the proposition and the setting up of the forth-
Uk
coming meeting to Admiral Stark* Likewise it was Admiral Stark in the
rlan Dog paper who set the tenor of the American position in the Army-Navy
"Dog" was the phonetic word for the letter "D»i the fourth plan
considered was 'Ian Dog. Cf* Watson, op. cit*, p. 116 n7°.
a2
The original rlan Dog, Memo MB to Sec. $av., pp-12-CTB of ttov. 12,
1S>U0 is in the Roosevelt Library, Ityde : ark, New York.
US
A copy of Plan Dog is found in Appendix A.
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conferences held before the Meetings with the British, '^Basically, that
position was that we mist help Britain defeat Germany in the Atlantic for
our own safety»s sake, and avoid unlimited war in the racifie. "The full
national offensive strength would be exerted in a single direction, rather
16
than be expended in areas far distant from each other* n v If it became
necessary to wage war with the Japanese, it would be fought in a containment
sense, limiting the area of offensive operations to the holding of the
Malay Barrier severing lines of communication and raids*
The proposed position of the TJhited States as advanced by Admiral Stark
was not completely acceptable to the other factions in the decision making
scheme. The President in no way committed himself to the theory of
strategy outlined in Flan Dog. Whatever he had had to say to Admiral Stark
relative to his memorandum in mld*?tovember apparently did not become a
1*7
matter of record. The Army planners, on reviewing the proposal for
possible limited action against the Japanese by denying them the use of
Malaysia, went on record -
...that, so far as Malaysia is concerned, we should avoid
dispersing our forces into that theater. We should, how-
ever, assist the British to reinforce their naval setup
in the Far East by relieving them of naval obligation in
the Atlantic. This would provide a more homogeneous
force for Malaysia and would, in effect, concentrate
rather than disperse our naval establishment.^
( Admiral Stcrk himself was not satisfied with the present knowledge of the
16
Admiral Stark in Flan Dog, p. 10.
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I oonsidar it essential that ue know a great deal wore
about British ideas than we have yet been able to
glean.**9
The President authorised conversations between representatives of the
50
American and British staffs to explore the problems raised by Stark* Stark
instructed Admiral Ghormley, whose exploratory conversations in London had
reached the limit of their usefulness, to make arrangements with the
British for serious staff conversations to begin in Washington early in the
new year* Regarding British ideas of American naval deployment in the
Pacific as inacceptable, Stark instructed Ohormley to inform the Admiralty
that anyone they sent to Washington "should have instructions to discuss
concepts based on equality of considerations for both the United States and
British Commonwealth* and to explore realistically the various fields of war
cooperation*" Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea r ord,
answered this himself, assuring the Chief of Naval Operations that the ideas
already expressed by the Admiralty were not to be regarded as "an
51
unalterable basis" of discussion* n December 2, Admiral Ohormley
announced the names of the British staff who were to come to Washington in
January.
The announcement of the British acceptance of the invitation to converse
in Washington lent urgency to the determination of an agreed military
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tecefciber 21 on its study and offered a tentative draft of a joint memorandum
53
to the "resident from the Secretaries of State, War and ilavy. Hot
unexpectedly it emphasized the primacy of operations in tlie Atlantic. "Our
interests in the Far East are very important* It would, however, be
incorrect to consider that tliey are as important to us as is the integrity
of the Western ifemlaphere* or as important as preventing the defeat of the
British Commonwealth* The issues in the Orient will largely be decided in
Europe*" The final proposed recommendations from the Secretaries to the
President as drafted by the Joint Planning Committee were;
~^ 1. A rapid increase of Array and Havy strength,
and abstention from steps which would provoke attack by
any other power.
2* R decision not willingly to engage in any war
against Japan*
3* If forced into war with Japan, restriction of
acifio operations so as to permit use of forces for a
major offensive in the Atlantic* Acceptance of no
important Allied decision save with clear understanding
as to common objectives, as to contingents to be
provided, as tp operations planned, and as to command
arrangements*-**
Mr* Hull declined to approve the proposed recommendations since he
doubted the propriety of his joining in recommendations to the President
55
concerning technical military statements. Out of the conference over the
State Department's acceptance of the policy, a long overdue change in
upper echelon liaison became effective* #r* Hull suggested, and it was
agreed, that the three Secretaries would meet each Tuesday on national
53
Memo JIG to J3 21 Dec. 191*0, part of JB 325 > Serial 670, quoted




., p. 123, (2) Hatloff and Snell, op. cit., o. 28.
-,: -
K ••. • X. :..."> Si\£.l • |fi ItM .'• . • » feat***
iu






. : ..J ; i .-.: IMMJI'
oaktano© oj .twrHHWflt
til 5sbin* £ *auaa£
att e* eaiiitfa'xaag «(6r mo** immllilmiMioe *nq XaaJS mtt »•«
' ftjH "/; I .& 1 1 / p 1 5 . | i.*. I
lo «c.
>1 atOM^ 'LC f
£w iaw wn/ Jbaca
a* i* «« «rc





MM MltfjMq «** wvcri j :* M it
; ..-» » . » >x
•4 Mala HMd#a
RBB)JkBjB1 M I -




. • - • ' " •'•'''• ,: * Mlmivni wuU t44 #ajH
rflrOtB
i '.V..
>q */uf lo aan
Jbeio/jp tOTd XaJfcra? m
.
«62-
Defense matters* thus superceding the Liaison Committee of Mr. Welles and
the military representatives.
The written record does not show the rationale leading to the event,
but it is reasonable to assume that the calling of the three Secretaries*
Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff to the White House on January 16
was prompted by the immediately past discussions on national and military
policy. General Marshall made a memorandum record of the conversations as
he remembered them the following day*
v Yesterday afternoon the resident had a lengthy
conference with the Secretaries of State* War and Navy,
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of
the Army. He discussed the possibilities of sudden and
simultaneous action on the part of Germany and Japan
against the nited States. He felt that there was one
chance out of five of such an eventuality* and that it
might culminate any day...
He discussed the publicity we might give our
proposed courses of action-in relation to the hilippines*
fleet* continuation of supplies to >reat Britain* etc..
He devoted himself principally to a discussion of our
attitude in the Far Fast towards J&pan and to the matter
of curtailment of American shipments of war supplies to
England. He was strongly of the opinion that in the
event of hostile action towards us on the part of Germany
and Japan we should be able to notify Mr. Churchill
immediately that this would not curtail the supply of
material to England. He discussed this problem on the
basis of the probability that England could survive six
months and that* thereafter* a period of at least two
months would elapse before hostile action could be
taken against us in the Western Hemisphere. •• .there
would be a period of eight months in which we could
gather strength.
General Marshall then recorded the final directive from the resident
i
That we would stand on the defensive in the I acific
with the fleet based on Hawaii; that the Commander of the
Asiatic Fleet would have the discretionary authority as
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as to his direction of withdrawal—to ths "ast or to
Singapore} that there would be no naval reinforcement of
the Philippines j that the itovy should have under con-
sideration the possibility of bombing attacks against
Japanese cities*
That the Navy should be prepared to convoy shipping
in the Atlantic to England, and to maintain a patrol off-
shore from Maine to the Virginia Capes*
That the firm/ should not be committed to any
aggressive action until it was fully prepared to undertake
it; that our military course must be very conservative
until our strength had developed; that it was assumed we
could provide forces sufficiently trained to assist to a
moderate degree in backing up friendly Latin-American
governments against fes&i inspired fifth column movenents*
That we should make every effort to go on the basis
of continuing the supply of material to Great Britain*
primarily in order to disappoint what he thought would be
Hitler 1 s principal objective in involving us in a war at
this particular time* and also to buck up England*-'
?
Meanwhile the Joint Planning Committee at the suggestion of Rear Admiral
Richmond t . Turner had been directed on December 11 to draw up instructions
for the Army and Havy representatives for holding conversations with the
58
British staff due to arrive the next month* The report was evidently
submitted to the Joint Board initially on January 13 and again with additions
59
on January 21* After criticising most of the leadership in Britain during
the recent past, the basic report gave a general evaluation of suspected
British proposals t
•••It is believed that we cannot afford, nor do we
need* to entrust our national future to British direction*
because the inited States can safeguard the North
American continent, and probably the Western Hemisphere*
whether allied with Britain or not*
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tailed States Array and Navy officials are in rather
general agreement that Great Britain cannot encompass
the defeat of Germany unless the United rtates provides
that nation with direct military assistance, plus a far
greater degree of material aid than is being given nowj
and that, even then, success against the Axis is not
assured*
It is to be expected that proposals of the British
representatives will have been drawn up with chief
regard for the support of the British Commonwealth*
Never absent from British Hinds are their post-war
interests, commercial and military* We should likewise
safeguard our own eventual interests*
It is understood that the British military staffs
have recently been engaged in the preparation of a new
"appreciation" of the military situation of the British
Commonwealth* It is possible that this appreciation
may now have been completed* This should be made to the
United States representatives.,.*
In order to avoid commitment by the President,
neither he nor any of his Cabinet should officially
receive the British officers; therefore the Joint
1aiming Committee recommends that the British
representatives be informally received by the Under
Secretary of State, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the Chief of Staff...60
The accompanying enclosure to the basic report on the forthcoming
conversations contained agenda items and a clear statement of nited States
intentions* It was approved verbatim by the military chiefs and evidently
forwarded to the President via the service Secretaries, for on January 26
the President sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy with minor
changes recommended
t
I think this procedure is all right* In Appendix
II - paragraph one -
I would change the word "allies" to the word
"associates*"
In the last line of paragraph two I would substitute
the words "be compelled" for the word "decide."
Letter Jl C to JB, JB No. 325 Serial 6?U, 21 Jan. l^Ul; WD| Piles.
Director, V'FD Special File. The date on citation n$9 was 13 Jan. 11.
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In paragraph five, section B, I would sake the last
few words read "or nayaTLyin the Mediterranean regions."
Tne sane change is suggested in the last line of
Section D. F.D.R. x
The statement of the American position as finally given by the two
service chiefs contained the Roosevelt changes;
2. As understood by these two officers the purpose
of these staff conversations Is to determine the best methods
by which the armed forces of the United States and the
British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied
with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war,
3« The American people as a whole desire now to remain
out of the war, and to provide only material and economic aid
to Treat Britain* So long as this attitude is maintained it
must be supported by their responsible military and naval
authorities. Therefore no specific commitments can now be made
except as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans
which may be envisaged must for the present remain contingent
upon the future political action of both nations* All such
plana are subject to eventual official approval by both govern-
ments.
J&, It* The present national position of the United States is
as follows i ^Defend the Western Hemispheres Aid the British
Commonwealth against Gennanyj and oppose by diplomatic means
any extension of Japanese rule over additional territory^
5>. If the U.f . Government decides to make war in common
with the British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff that:
a. The broad military objective of the United States
operations will be the defeat of Germany and her allies, but
the nited States necessarily must also maintain dispositions
which under ell eventualities will prevent the extensions in
the western hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and
military power.
b. The objective of the war will be most effectively
attained by the nited States exerting its principle military
effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions.
c. The TTnited States and British Cosnonwealth should
endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war or attacking the
Dutch.
d. Should Japan enter the war, the nited States
operations in the mid-; acific and the .Far 3ast would be con-
ducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its
principle military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the
Mediterranean.
61
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e. As a general rule the Exited States forces
should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under
their own commanders, and in accordance with plans derived
from the Tnited States-British joint plan.
f • The United States will continue to furnish
material aid to Great Britain but will retain for building
up its own forces Material in such proportions as to
provide for future security and best to effectuate United
States-British joint plane for defeating Germany."2
The selected parameters within which the conversations were to take
place were indicative of the keen appreciation of possible political
repercussions from any agreement. The descriptive tern applied to the
conversations by Ingereoll In London and Stark in r Ian Dog, and through
their completion in -Jarch 121*1 was "on technical matters ," and the
connotation of "technical" was a V9ry restrictive "military." Considerations,
the nature of which required obvious decisions by the heads of government,
were "political" and ruled out of the purviaw of the military planners.
Although joint military plans, perse, have political significance when
executed or made public, as in a threat to use same, joint preliminary
planning may be readily accomplished in a strictly "military" sense. nier
certain stated assumptions, with no political decisions required^ military
representatives may draw up quite intricate disposition plans, comoand
arrangements, tasks assignments, etc.. Such were the rules to be followed
in the joint talks with the British. As added warranties to guarantee the
maintenance of the "military" status, no member of the government was to be
63
present and no Cabinet official would formally receive the visitors. Though
62
Appendix II to letter cited n60.
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Originally Trnder Secretary of State Hr. Welles was to welccae the
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the military services were each represented by senior officers, they were
not the highest in any case, so the requirement for approval by higher
authority was taoitly understood throughout the talks* The American military
chiefs absented themselves after the initial meeting*
The flexibility enjoyed by the military nlanncrs in this case wrs
unique* In essence they could make r lans which were not binding on either
side and yet were detailed enough to be the basis for effective cooperation
when approved by their respective political superiors* * The planners likewise
were not bound in the scope of their conversations to a rigid policy
osition which would have been inherent if the participants included
political representatives or the senior military leaders*
ABC-1, Amsricaii-Dritish Conversations, Jfrraary 29 § 121*1 to March 27, lftkl *
nited States Representatives t
Major-General S*D* '3sbick, ^XKy representative on the ermanent Joint Board
Defense ( Canada- Mited States)
Brigadier-General Sherman Files, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Brigadier-General L*T. Gerow, head of the Army War lans Division
Colonel J*T. MeHarney, an Air officer
Rear-Admiral R.L* Ghormley, Special Naval ' bserver in London
Resr-Admiral R.S* Turner, head of >iavy War lane Division
Captain A.G* Kirk, Assistant to R3DM Turner and former Ifeval attache in
London
Lt. Colonel O.T* feiffer, U.S. Marine Gome
British Representatives i
Rear-Admiral R*H* Bellairs, head of the British Delegation
Rear-Admiral V*H* Danokwerts
Major-General E.L. Morris
Air Vice Marshall J.G. Slessor, of the British [Purchasing Commission in
Washington
Captain A.W* Clarke, Assistant Haval Attache in Washington
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Secretariat !
Lt. Colonel V*P« Soobey, ",S. Army
Coomander UR. McDowell, 'J.S. Navy 6U
Lt, Colonel A.T. Cornwall-Jones, British Array
On January 29, 19hl the Chief of !feval Operations and the Chief of Staff
welcomed the British delegation in a room set aside for the meetings in the
Main Navy Building in Washington* In addition to presenting the American
65
position which had been approved by the President the American military
leaders stressed the urgency for secrecy, especially in light of the lend-
lease bill which was then being discussed in Congress, The British replied
that they came as a corporate body representing the British Chiefs of
Staff, that they had corqplete freedom to discuss the general strategic
position and to consider dispositions in the event the United States should
66
enter the war. Both sides accepted the necessity of confirmation by their
respective Chiefs of Staff and Governments of any derived agreements.
During the interim period between the announcer*nt on December 2 of
the British intention to corns to Washington and their departure from
Britain, neither admiral Ghormley nor Brigadier General Raymond Lee, the
'. S, Military Attache in London was able to get any advance information on
67
the British position. The British explanation was logical and simple —
it would jeopardise the security of their war plans to give the information
at that time. The long list of questions posed by Ghormley and Lee
6k
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solicited information desired by their respective War Plans Divisions in
Washington, The list included questions on British strength and
capabilities in the different areas of the world, on the relative importance
of those areas in their strategic thinking and what their proposed courses
of action would be under certain conditions. The questions were answered
in detail and made available to the Americans after the party left Britain,
In their opening talk the British gave a clear summation of their views and
three propositions of general strategic policy*
The ^iropean theatre is the vital theatre where a
decision cmat first be sought.
The general policy should therefore be to defeat
Germany and Italy first, and then deal with Japan,
The security of the Far Eastern position, including
Australia and Ifew Zealand, is essential to the cohesion
of the British Commonwealth and to the maintenance of
its war effort, Singapore is the key to the defence of
these interests and its retention mist be assured,""
The first two propositions were in direct accord with American feelings;
the retention of Singapore certainly was not; The British repeatedly had
told Ajaerican representatives since Hampton's visit in June 19b0 that they
were unable to send najor forces to the Far East, Their proposition
amounted to an open invitation for the United States to defend Singapore,
\ The policy to retain Singapore in the face of mounting Japanese power and
the British raaneuverings to gain American acceptance of the idea became
formidable obstacles upon which the meetings almost foundered. The British
saw Singapore as more than just a military base. For political, economic
and psychological reasons it was a symbol of British Commonwealth unity
and security in the Far East, Thus for many reasons it was part of British
strategic thinking, and they never were to give up trying to make it part
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of British-Araerican strategic plans*
Churchill^ message on U> May 191*0 might bo considered one starting
point in the Singapore controversy, though to be sure Singapore had been
discussed with Captain Ingersoll in January 1939. Roosevelt had wisely
dodged the offer "to use Tingapore in any way convenient. n ' robably as a
compromise the American fleet had been ordered to remain at Pearl flarbor
69
shortly thereafter. ' on k October 191*0 Churchill a^ain wrote Roosevelt
mentioning the possibility of war with Japan over the re-opening of the
Burma Hoad and the fact that Japan had joined the Axis Powers.
••••X know how difficult it is for you to say anything
which would commit the nited States to any hypothetical
course of action in the Pacific. 3ut I venture to ask
whether at this time a simple action might not speak
louder than words. Would it not be possible for you to
send an American squadron, the bigger the better, to
pay a friendly visit to Singapore? There they would be
welcomed in a perfectly normal and rightful way. If
desired, occasion might be taken of such a visit for a
technical discussion of naval and military problems in
those and Philippine waters, and the Dutch might be
invited to join. Anything in this direction would have
a marked deterrent effect upon a Japanese declaration of
war upon us over the Burma Road opening. '°
Admiral Stark opposed the suggestion and even the reinforcement of our own
71
Asiatic Fleet because of the situation in the Atlantic, and the President
again agreed with his naval advisers.
With such a past history of British proposals on Singapore, it was not
surprising that the American planners would be wary of similar proposals at
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the Washington meetings. At the sixth Plenary Heating on 10 February 1?U1
the Far Saltern sit nation was the chief subject discussed* The British
again emphasised their concern at the position of Singapore. They urged
that the United States should take early action both to keep Japan out of
72
the war, and to assure the defense of Singapore against a Japanese attack*
The proposal at this tine was that the United States should send four heavy
73
cruisers, an aircraft carrier, planes and submarines to Singapore. The
next day the British represented a detailed paper* "The Far East —
7U
Appreciation by the \'.?C. Delegation." At the same time that the American
military was being presented the paper Lord Halifax, the new British
Ambassador, was communicating the substance of the same paper to Secretary
1$
of State Oordell Hull.
The British paper on the Far East pictured Singapore as a symbol of
British ability and determination to protect the Dominions and colonies
and their trade with Britain. The loss of Singapore would greatly weaken
the hand of the political leaders in Australia, Hew Zealand, India and
China who believed in the value of British friendship. The British
representatives admitted that even if Singapore were lost Australia and New
Zealand could be held and the Japanese kept out of the Indian Ocean, but
insisted that Singapore was a necessary "card of re-entry" when the
European war should have taken a turn for the better. Without the base at
72
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Singapore, a successful attack would have to be launched against the
Japanese across the thousands of miles from the nearest base. In short,
the British stand on Singapore was based "not only upon purely strategic
foundations, but on political, economic and sentimental considerations
which, even if not literally vital on a strictly academic view, are of such
fundamental importance to the British Commonwealth that they must always be
76
taken into serious account* M What the British could not say specifically
and what was obvious to the Americans was that the prestige of the British
Empire in the Far Fast and at home was at stake*
the seriousness with which the British held to the Singapore position
is shown by two key statements in the subject papers
(a) The security of the Far Eastern position, including
Australia and Hew Zealand, is essential to the
maintenance of the war effort of the Associated Powers*
Singapore is the key to the defense of these interests
and its retention must be assured* •••
(b) If Singapore were in serious danger of capture, and
the iiited States still withheld their aid, we should
be prepared to send a Fleet to the Far €ast, even if to
do so would compromise or sacrifice our position in the
Mediterranean*
One loss of Singapore, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff
• ..would be a disaster of the first magnitude, second
only to the loss of the British Isles* »7
On February 13 the Army and Navy representatives met to discuss the
British paper* Rear Admiral Turner had prepared his replyj
Giving the background for the British proposals,
ReefAdmiral Turner said that when the Japanese, some
2j years ago, began their movement to the southward,
the President and Secretary of .State more or less
_g
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ccmsiitted the United States Fleet to actions in conjunc-
tion with the British forces in the Far East, when
Rear Admiral Ingersoll engaged in staff conversations on
this subject in ! ondon, the British proposed that the
nited States send their whole fleet to Singapore and
that the then combined nited States and British forces
should start a campaign against the Japanese. In this
war the British are unable to send a strong force to
the Far last, but still would like the nited States to
send their whole fleet, together with a large nited
States Army, to engage against the Japanese. It was
not until the last staff conversations that they modified
their requests for ^enforcements to a force of four
heavy cruisers, aircraft and submarines.
The general discussion which followed developed the following points
»
(a) That a concerted drive was being made by the British
to influence the United States into accepting the
British point of view in reference to the Far East
situation.
(b) That the United Kingdom, while accepting the United
States* Staff Committee's decision not to send the
Pacific fleet to the Far East, continues to push their
requests for united States • commitments in that theater.
It was suggested by Major General Tmbick that it
was the duty of the United States Committee, as military
advisor to the resident, to present to him sound
military opinion with reference to the Far East 75
strategic situation with a suggested course of action. ••
At this juncture the American delegation became quite perturbed upon
learning of the Halifax-Hull discussion of the British military paper on the
Far Fast. To have their own Secretary of State learn from a foreign
diplomat about the controversial Singapore question was embarrassing, for
the Americans had rigidly adhered to the "military" nature of the talks by
not informing the State Department of the nature or progress of the joint
meetings. To have the same unilaterally originated paper used in pre-
liminary military talks discussed at the highest diplomatic levels violated
a cardinal premise upon which the conversations were to take place. A
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protect was offieially registered with the British delegation that the
action appeared to the Africans to be an attempt to secure political
7°
pressure to influence their decision on Singapore. Before condemning
the British action, it should be remembered that the British military group
in Washington was the best source of military information and strategy the
British Ambassador had in this country and, conversely, the Ambassador was
the highest government representative in the area to whom the military could
refer* The exchange of information between the British representatives in
Washington was certainly understandable} the use to which the Ambassador
put information so gained was the crux of the objection.
The British delegation replied to the protest and their answer was
discussed by the ftivy Section of the U.S. Staff Committee on 20 Februarys
Rear-Adrairal Ohormley referred to the Itote by the
United Kingdom Delegation in reply to the Declaration of
the Jhited States Staff Committee (serial 011$12-7),
stating that he thought this reply had clarified the
situation to the point wherein the plenary conversations
could be resumed.
/one Navy member/ stated his conviction that the
nited Kingdom Delegation should give assurance that not
only would no further mted Kingdom Delegation papers
be oommunicated to the State Department, but that in
addition, none of the nited Kingdom Delegation points
developed in the course of the Staff Conversations
should be presented orally to the State Department
through diplomatic channels. These Staff Conversations
are on a purely military plane, and when concluded will
have been the basis for sound military decisions
representing, in the considered judgment of the combined
membership, the best measures to be undertaken for the
successful prosecution of the war. However, until such
joint decisions are reached, the presentation by British
diplomats to the 'nited States State Department of any
matter under discussion is ex-parte, tending to induce the
latter to arrive at incorrect conclusions which would be
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diffioult to change, since the Tnited States Staff
Committee is not now furnishing the State Department
with its own views.°°
Further open conflict over Singapore ceased in the Washington conversa-
tions after the American representatives presented "The U.S. Military
osition in the Far ^ast" on 19 February. t£iile admitting that the loss of
symbolic Singapore would be a serious blow, it did not follow that serious
blows always lead to final disaster. The security of the fforth Atlantic
and the British Isles was the common basis of American-British strategy,
and it was up to the British to do the best they could to take care of
their interests elsewhere. The ignited States coal was to eliminate the
61
German threat to the security of the North Atlantic and the British Isles.
Admiral Stark, C3K), had been kept informed of the
various stages of the discussions. He felt that the
whole question of policy to be followed by the United
States in the Far Fast should be submitted to the
^resident. In view of the disagreements of the Jnited
States and British Delegation as to the strategic
concepts which should govern any plan for combined
action in the Far East, it seemed necessary that in
any policy discussions between the State Department and
the British Foreign Officer, or between the President
and the Prime Minister, the views of the American Naval
Staff should be clearly understood.»*
It soon becane apparent that Admiral Stark's views on the importance
of defeating Germany first continued to enjoy resident Roosevelt's
approval. The Ian Dog concept was the touchstone of the n 7.S. Position"
given to the British on 19 February and
CO
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The resident Informed the Chief of Ifeval Operations,
and the Chief of Staff, of his approval of the position
adopted by the American uslegation in the Staff Conference*
He farther agreed that this position was in conformity
with the CW) memorandum of the 12th November 1?U0, the
conclusions of which had, in foot, been accepted by the
Army and %-xvy Joint Board, by the Secretaries of War and
the Havy, and by the President. •*
Singapore had become a dead-letter in the ABC effort* The final report
of the Staff Conversations, called »BC-lt was finished on ?ferch 27, 191*1.
The basic report reiterated the general policy positions of the two
Governments, dealing almost exclusively with the Atlantic conflict* The
two key paragraphs pertaining to Japan are significant. The first
mentioned neither Japan nor Singapore though the actions of the former and
the Importance of the latter had recently been argued*
The security of the United Kingdom must be
maintained in all circumstances* Similarly, the United
Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain disposi-
tions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the
ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations*
h cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the
retention of a position in the Far rast such as will
ensure the cohesion and security of the British Common-
wealth and the maintenance of its war effort* §5 (emphasis
mine*)
The second paragraph was the only subdivision of ten which mentioned
Japan under a headings n lans for the Military operations of the Associated
Powers will likewise be governed by the following
s
w
(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the
war on the side of the Axis owere, it would still be




The official title wast T.S. Serial. GXl5l2-12(R), B.U.S. (J)(UD30j
Cf. rearl Harbor Attack, r art 15, PP. U*85-l5Ul.
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forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese
intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the
Military strategy in the Far Sast will be defensive*
The United States does not intend to add to its
present Military strength in the Par ISast but will
employ the United States I acific Fleet offensively in
the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic
power, and to support the defense of the Ilalay barrier
by diverting Jatianeae strength away from Malaysia.
The Pnited States intends so to augment its forces in
the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British
Commonwealth will be in a position. to release the
necessary forces for the Far Sast.^" (emphasis mine.)
A.nnex 3 to ?BC-1 was a United States-British Commonwealth Joint
Basic War Plan. Forces and tasks were assigned by areas and by countries.
rider tasks assigned American Naval Forces in the Pacific weres
(a) Support the forces of the Associated lowers in
the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the
Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of posi-
tions in the Harshalls, and through raids on enemy com-
munications and positions.
(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or
destroying vessels trading directly with the enemy.
(c) Protect the sea communications of the Associated
owers within the Pacific Area.
(d) Support British naval forces in the area south
of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.
(e) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers
within the Pacific Area, and prevent the extention of
enemy Military power into the Western Hemisphere, by
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land
and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land
positions in that Hemisphere.
(f) Prepare to capture and establish control over
the Caroline and Ifcrshall Island area. '
In the Far ~n&t the American naval tasks were generally trie same as
in the Pacific Area, i.e., raids, destroying communications and attacking
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Ibid., pv li491-lii«2.
"7Ibid., pp. 1511-1512. The I acific Area was N of 30°?J &.W of li*0°E,
R of the equator and E of 1^0 S, E of the equator and E of 180° to South
American coast and 7u v*.
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•vessels. A "Special Command Relationships 11 section was included which
would promote more plans and disagreements in the future*
30* The defense of the territories of the Associated
owers in the Far fcst Area will be the responsibility of
the respective Commanders of the Military forces concerned*
These Coosnanders will nake such arrangements for mutual
support as nay be practicable and appropriate*
31. In the Far Bast Area the responsibility for the
strategic direction of naval forces of the Associated
Towers* except of naval forces engaged in supporting the
defense of the T hilippines* will be assumed by the British
Naval Commander in Chief, China* The Commander in Chief*
United States Asiatic Fleet* will be responsible for the
direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the
defense of the Philippines*
32* The British naval Commander in Chief* China* is
also charged with responsibility for the strategic direction
of the naval forces of the associated powers operating in
the Australia and New Zealand Area***"®
The guide lines for conversations between the British and American
Commanders in Chief in the Far East were given here* How they were
followed will be discussed in the next chapter*
The associations of the British and American Navies had reached one
high point in World War I when the United States supported Britain in the
defeat of Germany* Certainly another high point was the agreements reached
in ABC-1* Discussions had covered strategic concepts* objectives and the
exchange of information on forces to meet those objectives* A basic war plan
had been produced and general tasks assigned primarily to defeat Germany
using American forces should the United States be "compelled to resort to
war* w> The problems in the Pacific were not so neatly resolved. The thinking
there was defensive with each Government responsible for the defense of its
own territories* Despite the positiveness of the American position on the
Ibid., p. 1$16.
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Singapore question in February and the fact that there would be no reinforce-
ment of the Asiatic Fleet, latitude was still given for discussions on
89
mutual support between the on-scene Commanders in Chief*
The evolution of cooperation in the Pacific between the British and
Americans was not complete with ASC-1 but it had reached a "point of no
return*" The United States was irrevocably tied to Britain in two oceans)
in the <m& to defeat positively an European enemy, while in the other the
action was to be defensive against the Asiatic enemy* „ In both areas the
use of the Navy was most important, and in the Pacific beyond Hawaii it was
the only American force ready for us* How the two navies would cooperate
in the Far East will be discussed in the next chapter* ABC-1 immediately
90
became the basis for United States War Plan Rainbow 5> and the matrix against
which future agreements in Singapore would be compared and rejected*
39
Cf. item 30 n38, p. 93, supra*
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Cf. Chapter Three supra for discussion of Rainbow 5*
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE QiJEST FOR A COOPERATIVEMB AGAINST JAPAN BT THE
AMERICAN, ER3T2SH AND DtJTCH MILITARY COMMANDERS IN
THE FAR EAST
Introduction.
In Chapter One the provision* of the Four Power and the Mine Power
Treaties were discussed* The nited States hoped that those treaty provisions
would eliminate the necessary for military alliances and action in the
Pacific* The idealistic dream of peace without force was shattered in 1931
when Japan successfully conquered Manchuria without Occidental military
opposition* As the militant attitudes and power of Japan increased, the
need for collective action grew* but the rapid shifts in military and
political power in Europe in the late 1930»s did much more than Japan's
actions* per se * to change the status quo in the Far akst* The diminution
of British and French naval forces in the Orient* to augment their home
XL
forces against Germany* increased the relative strength of Japan much more
quickly than her economy or shipyards were capable of doing in an arms race*
The strategic position of the United States forces in the Far East was
known to every Admiral in the !lavy, for with few exceptions most senior
officers had had a tour of duty in the China Station* Admiral Stark was no
exception* In his I Ian Dog written in the Fall of 1$k0 on the problems of
national defense* the decision was made that the best course of action for
the united States was to help Britain in her Atlantic struggle* and* if
forced to fight Japan, to fight a defensive war in the Pacific. Sven a
defensive war required forces* and the -Pacific and Asiatic Fleets combined
were numerically less than the Japanese Fleet. The only hope to bridge the
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difference in naval strength was to join with other powers in a cannon
cause against Japan*
In addition to the rhi.ippine Islands, the rich Dutch East Indies and
strategic Singapore se«med likely objectives for the Japanese. The Dutch
and British therefore were logical allies since both had something to fear
from the Japanese and both had naval forces in the Far East* The holding
of the Malay Barrier against further expansion to the south by the
Japanese was one of the strategic principles in rlan Dog and later became
part of ABC-1. The American goal was to encourage the Dutch and British
military commanders in the Far East to adopt a strategic plan of action
based upon holding the Malay Barrier and reflecting the willingness of the
nited States to cooperate in the plan if she should be compelled to resort
to war with Japan*
This chapter will give the background* participants* significance and
results of conferences at Batavia* Singapore and Manila in the quest for
cooperation against the Japanese*
Background*
Military commanders on duty in peacetime on foreign stations* have one
mission in comment to protect the lives and property of their respective
nationals* For centuries in the Far fSast the foreign nationals" have been
Europeans. Dutch merchants* among the first of the Europeans in the Orient*
established a highly profitable trading monopoly through the Dutch ^ast
India Company in the first half of the seventeenth century* The twentieth
century found them still in possession of the richest islands in the
Pacific* appropriately still bearing the name of the original company. The
British* operating through a rival company in the same era, developed
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roercantile enterprises throughout the Orient* The Straits Settlements, with
Singapore at the tip ot the Malay eninsula, and Ifong r ong, off the China
ooast near Canton, were strategically located in the mainstream of world
commerce* Both Britain and the Netherlands traditionally kept units of
their fleet in the Far Hast.
Since 178u American traders had ventured to the Orient from their own
east const but there was never a serious attempt at conquest of territory
or the establishment of bases to support military forces operating in the
area* Commodore erry, after "opening" Japan in l651i. proposed a naval
base in the Bonin Islands, Formosa or the 3yukyus only to have his
1
suggestions negated by President ierce* American naval units operated in
the Far fast, without a naval base, as the East India Squadron, 183$
J
2
Asiatic Squadron, 1866j and Asiatic Fleet since 1902 (except 1907-1910).
The annexation of Hawaii by joint congressional resolution, approved by
President KcKinley on July 7, 1898, set a new precedent for American extra-
continental expansion* The imperialistic-minded politicians, influenced
3
by the theories of Captain Alfred T* Mahan, i*S* Navy had their appetites
whetted. The Treaty of Paris in December 1898, following Admiral Dewey's
victory at Manila the previous May, ceded the Philippine Islands and Guam
to the United States* The American flag and frontier advanced across the
Pacific in record time as the United States suddenly possessed potential naval
Cf. Chapter One for Commodore erry»s part in the "opening" of Japan.
2~
Samuel E* Morison, The Rising Sun in the acific, Iy31-April 19u2 ,
Vol. Ill in History of United States Naval Operations In World War II
( Boston t Little, Drown and Company, 1&8), p. 28 (2) Cf. Chapter Six for
discussion of Asiatic Fleet*
3
Cf* Chapter Cue for Hahan's theory on the influence of sea power*
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bases from the west coast to the Orient. Concomitant with the military
interest in the westward movement were commercial and religious interests.
The announcement by John Hay of the "Open DoorM Folicy in Cliina in 1899*
followed by the modernisation of the U.S* Navy under I resident Theodore
Roosevelt in the next few years* enhanced the American position in the
Pacific* By 1905 ten new battleships and four armoured cruisers had been
added to the fleet* and in 1908 part of the new fleet sailed around the
world to serve visible notice on other powers of the new might to protect
the new oversea possessions* However, a number of cross currents hri played
on the expansionist momentum. The hope of the Hague Peace Conferences of
1899 and 1907 led many pacifist and cost-conscious congressmen to question
the wisdom of a large naval expeditures when we were at peace with the
world. A disorganised array of prominent figures argued against any foreign
committments or possessions. The aura of possessing far away islands was
severely dimmed by the expenses incurred in putting down the Philippine
Insurrection.
What to do with 7*100 islands and islets populated by a mixture of
Orientals speaking sixty-five dialects with customs and culture foreign to
any previous American standards? The Americans, unlike their neighboring
British and Dutch colonisers* did not have the propensity to exploit their
stronger position. Once opposition to the American government had ended
throughout the islands* limited self-rule was allowed under residential-
appointed governors-general* A Philippine Assembly, the lower house of the
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As If to shed the cloak of oversea responsibility and the stigma of
having "possessions" unnecessarily, Congress passed a bill granting
independence to the Philippines over the veto of President Hoover in January
1933 only to have the bill rejected by the Philippine Legislature* The next
attempt fared better and the Tydin/>s«*?cDuffie Act of 193U was passed and
approved by the Onited States Conferees and the Philippine Legislature. The
Act provided for a ten year transitional period after -which the TJhited Stated
would abandon all military installations in the Islands* The questit a of
future naval bases was left open, however* with the proviso that the resident
could negotiate with the Philippine Government for naval bases within two
years of the date of recognition of independence*
The Washington ftaval Conference of 1921 contained a non-fortification
clause prohibiting the building of defenses in the :1iilippines* After the
eviration of the agreements in 1936, the United States did not see fit to
build defenses in an area which would be given its independence in a few
short years or to invoke unfavorable reaction from Japan* Consequently* the
Asiatic Fleet had no secure base from which to operate* However, the fleet*
or a part of it, spent a few months In Philippine waters each year and Mild
courtesy visits to Japan. Singapore* Hanoi. Hong Kong, Batavia and other Far
6
Eastern ports* On October 30, 1936 the perceptive Admiral R*S* Tarnell
T^ouis Morton, The Fall of the li^llppinee , fourth in a subseries: The
War In the Pacific (Washlnrtont office or the flhlef of Military History,
Department of the Army, 19535, P* 2u
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Commander of the Asiatic Float* Xn his first report to the Chief of
Naval Operations on lovewber 17, 1936 he made this observation relative to
our position in the Philippines i
• •• The subject that the British intelligence officers
and others seened more concerned with than any other in
their conversations with oar officers related to the
future status of the Philip ines. They asked if we
really intended to leave the I hilippines to its political
fate and withdraw all United States protection from that
gateway to Singapore and India* Sons senior officers
expressed an opinion that the Japanese menace could only
be met with yitish^JUaerioan cooperation an£ that the
Japanese projected "southward expansion poHcy* could be
prevented by a strong naval base in the Philippines plus
the Singapore base* Opinion was also expressed that they
thought it very doubtful that the tTnited Ststec would
leave its only sure foothold in the Far iSast after years
that have been spent in building up trade and ocsraerce*
Such opinions were probably advanced for the purpose of
drawing forth the opinions of our officers* Of course*
no one had definite information as to the eventual
political independence that has been granted by the
Tydinge-McDuffie Act*
The British interest in the Philippines is not raerely
academic for various British intelligence officers have
travelled throu>$iout the Philippines within the last to*o
years*. •' (Enphasis nine*)
After three years as Conmander in Chief U*S* Asiatic Fleet* during which
he witnessed first hand the Japanese push into China after the 1937
"incident,* Admiral Yarnell reached the following conclusions which he passed
on to the Chief of Naval Operations!
% 1* lis should never engage in a war single-handed
against Japan if at all possible. Traat Britain* France*
and the Netherlands are virtually Interested and should
take part *
2. "in case of a single-handed war* we cannot aove
our fleet to Eastern waters !ue to lack of a base*
3* I do not believe our governasnt will sv^r build
a first class Naval base in the Philippines*
7
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U* \fe can never compete with Japan In transporting
• I* troops to the Par 5ast*
5* The war should be a Haval war, - cruisers,
submarines, and aircraft operating against lines of com-
munications** (Xtsphasis mine*)
Vlthin weeks of the Tarnell report, gupr*, another outspoken Admiral
reported to the Chief of Naval Operations after inspecting bases In the
Pacific* Admiral Ben Moreell, chief of the Bureau of I'arda and Docks
commented j
• .When we consider that the total cost of these three
major bases [earl Harbor, Guam and Cavite] approximates
the current cost of running the national government for a
period of about two weeks, the modesty of the sum involved
is apparent* The maintenance and operating costs of those
bases would be a permanent burden, but the presence of
these bases would enable us to reduce to some extent, the
costs of operating existing bases*
It is ogr belief that as lone as nature breeds men of
ability and without scruples, and provides them with
millions of willing followers, Just so long will we have
the elements essential to international disorder* Our only
protection is a willingness and ability to maintain our
rights by FORCE , To do this we must be prepared to go in
whole-heartedly and energetically; halfway measures are of
no avail, and, in some eases, worse than worthless. <m
should get in w get out*?
A quick review of history will show that the United States did not "get out"
and did not begin to "g t in" until it was too late*
In February 191/3 Admiral rtark wrote a long letter to Admiral Thomas C*
Hart, who had recently became Commander i •. Chief of the Asiatic Fleet* In
addition to general advice on War ftans, strategy, and the use of the limited
forces, the letter @ave the first indication found in the records of Admiral
Stark's views on the cooperation with Jther powers urged ty Hart's predecessor,
8
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Hiso*
o
ieraoi Hear Admiral Horeell to CNO, IS Aug* 39} MID Filet A16-3/FP
: .




• *to( Mid la MtMM - MflMMl Ml tt MM iMmUmi
9MMV lo 4MB9 £m3q4 t-:: »' .,%
•
KiliMlBirium r«r.^ -iA" tm mho ,*ooV
.x
r
••vra ,,. " XMMlMfc.. :•••' <•-.':. ..*» '-:. -"••
wi«tf Is &*»©<•> > iriBXiB bos MNttmwWMr «fl
a*4m wee oi «9dMJV o# •* wli&mr
10 MS MMJNHf •*»*«£ &* 'nflft-C &# *M«# !#£•'
VMf * m • HMkC M ^'.- :! r c... - - -.*-. I MftwtfJl 1> - ; x^.' (Ml
tmd ii f iMif i dm tdtM conftjplir iv «
ni 4| o# b«soBi"j«na ad taw *•*
lo <>t«j imwum ^WlCad reUtalfrtwiMMi ftr -*r
**9 ftllWlta





v p.« ;; -.-.; •>;• 5 : " >;• .vi ••: Mji m MMI
MMmrfT XMcMUL oa fa4$%S. $ncu & Wwr jfcutfft XffJMhA C
>!**£«* td*r so l«tfO it <MlmwMBO «M»o«f ^r&u&rx bad wt* ,*i*H
bWi&t£ 1 €>SW «tt ta* ,v
^ -107-
Admiral Yarnell.
...You know Harry Yarnell thinks we should never
percipitate (sic) anything in the astern Pacific unless
the principally interested powers (United States-Freneh-
British-Dutoh) act in concert. The possibility of getting
such concerted action appears to ne to be improbable
during the present unpredictable state of affairs in
rope. \m have been turning over in our heads whether
you could use Hongkong, Singapore, "-forth Borneo, or
French or Dutch possessions, bat there is no indication
that any of then would be available...-
$y September l?uO France and the Netherlands had fallen before the
German drive, and with Britain fighting for her very survival, fear that Ja an
would take advantage of the opportunity to move south was well founded. The
Joint lanning Committee in a report to the Chief of Naval Operations and
Chief of Staff reported i
.../F/here is no assurance that Japan will not,
within the next few months, move swiftly either against
the Dutch East Indies or against the Philippines or Quern,
especially if the Japanese Government should become
increasingly embarrassed by embargoes from the united
States to Japan, and at the same time should become
convinced that despite protests by the United States it
was only throwing a bluff and would back down in the face
of a serious situation. •• .Within the near future, the
tilted States may be confronted with the demand for a
major effort in the Far East, an effort for which we are
not now prepared and will not be prepared for several
years to come. If, in the near future, we should be
confronted with the necessity of armed opposition to
Jar<an, in the face of the potential threat in the
Atlantic, that effort probably will be limited to the
employment of minor naval surface and air forces
operating from Singapore and Dutch East Indies bases,
plus the interruption of Ja; anese shipping in the
eastern Pacific.11
In line with the thoughts on cooperative action in the Far East against
Pearl Harbor Attack, "art 16, p. 2Ui6.
11~"
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the Japanese tireat Admiral Hart»s Assistant Chief of Staff, Commander F* •
Thomas, went to Singapore for preliminary talks with the British in
12 13
October, and received a copy of the British Par "astern Var I Ian. Mean-
while in London Admiral Ohormley, the Special Havel Observer, who was
Ik
conferring with the Bailey Committee and other Admiralty members reported
the British to be e^ectant of active American participation in the war now
that the resident had been reelected* They talked about the defense of the
Malay Barrier and an "alliance between themselves, us,, and the Dutch, without
much thought as to what the effect would be in airo^e." Admiral Gtark, who
wrote the above information to Admiral Hart continued:
.,./J?/e have no idea as to whether they /Ehe British/
would at one© begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or
were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese* ..Furthermore,
though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will
resist an attempt to capture their islands, X question
whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only
Singapore, were attacked*
Ihe Navy can. ••make no political commitments* There-
fore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied
war* However, as I told you in my despatch, you can
perform a useful service by laying with the British and
possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of
cooperation, should we be forced into the war* I rather
doubt, however, ttet the Dutch will talk freely with yo .
If they do my idea would be that you would explore the
fields oft Command arrangements, General objectives,
General plan of cooperative action, including the
approximate naval and military deployment..*The naval
part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war
is about completed, and will be on its way to you within
a short time* We are hoping to send naval attaches to
Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Ballkpapan, and Ceylon]




Pearl Harbor Attack, T art 16, p* 2Uh9<
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via air transportation* .*
A month later the Chief of Naval Operations forwarded two copies of
Rainbow in to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet stressing the "possible
eventuality" of war with dermany, Japan and Italy and directing that high
priority be ;*iven to operating plans and the preparations of vessels, air-
craft and personnel*
• • .One of the assumptions >f the plan is that war would
be fought with the United States, the British, and the
nutch Colonial Authorities as Allies* Staffs conversations
with the British, of a limited nature, have been under-
taken in London and Washington, but as far as concerns an
allied operating plan and command arrangements in the Far
East, the only useful staff conversations would appear
those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might
be able to hold with the British and Dutch Supreme War
Commanders in that region* It is believed that you may
be able to hold such conversations with the British*
There is considerable doubt as to the extent of the
conversations which may become possible with the Dutch,
owing to their fear of repercussions in Japan*
'feu are, therefore, authorised to conduct staff
conversations with the British and Dutch Supreme
Compandors, with the specific understanding that you
are in no way committing the United States Government to
particular political or military decisions, and that
the purpose of the staff conversations is solely to
facilitate joint operations should war eventuate under
the approximate conditions shown in the Assumptions of
"Rainbow 3% It is requested that these conversations be
conducted in secretj in particular the most extreme care
should be taken not to permit the Japanese to become , /
aware of your attempt to establish contact with the Dutch*
In December 19bP Captain W*R* Purnell, Chief of Staff to Admiral Hart,
had attended a British-Dutch meeting at Singapore* In January Purnell
conferred with Vice Admiral C*K* < • Helfrieh and his staff at Batavia on
possible joint defensive action against the Japanese* the Dutch feared an
n33 supra *
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Attack by the Japanese and were highly- desirous of support* That supj cr^ "id
not appear to be forthcoming from the British authorities at Singapore whose
interest, one Dutch committoenail remarked "causticrJ.ly," dwindled as the
17
scene moved eastward from Singapore. Captain Furnell's report continued:
•••I asked what steps would be taken by the Dutch
in case of Japanese attack on Singapore, Captain van
Staveren replied that the British and Netherlands govern-
ments have not given each other guarantees of mutual help*
He also stated that the Singapore Conferences had made a
proposal to the two governments, that if the Japanese
moved in force south of the 6° North parallel, the
British and Netherlands East Indies forces would be free
to attack them without further declaration of war. The
Netherlands Government has rejected this proposal; they
did not know yet the decision of the British Government.
The Dutch were much concerned over two points,
namely, in case of a Japanese attack against the Nether-
lands iast Indies coming through the Sulu sea,18 what would
be our action; and what would we do about the protection
of shipping from Netherlands East Indies to our West Coast
in case of Japanese-N.E.I. war, the nited States remaining
neutral?
To the first I replied that we would guarantee the
neutrality of the Philippines to the extent of attacking
with all forces available, would notify them as well as all
other nations of serious breaches of neutrality, and would
probably maintain a benevolent neutrality toward Dutch and
British. To the second X replied that I thought a war Zone
would be prescribed and that conditions would be the same
as new exist in European Voters. As an entirely personal
view I also stated that I believed tne United States would
take the necessary steps to protect shipping, or secure the
materials, if the loss of these materials would seriously
hamper united States production. Asked at this point if I
thought the 'nited States would go to war with Japan if
she attacked the Netherlands East Indies, I stated, 1Q
emphasising it was my own personal view, I thought she would. '
17
' Watson, op. cit
., p. 392, (2) Cf. nl$ infra for Captain f urnell»s
report used by Watson.
18
Cf. earl Harbor Attack, Fart 16, p. 2208 for discussion of ABM
Hart's aTtempt to close the Sulu Sea.
19
Report by Capt. urnell, Batavia talks lO-U* Jan. i*l, Encl. »C" to
Lifts CINAP to GND, Serial S 5, 18 Jan. 1*1; fflD File; AHDA-ANZAC Correspondence
19U-1&2.
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The Dutch authorities reciprocated by furnishing Purnell with "copious data
on such matters as thair own sea and air strength* facilities, ports, bases,
20
and storage*"
In mid-February when the question of defending Singapore was warming
up the American and British staff conversations in Washington, anther
British-Dutch meeting In Singapore was announced* The record does not show
that a United States representative was invited, but since Arierioan coopera-
tion was so urgently being sought in all quarters, there must have been an
invitation* On ffcbruary IS, the Chief of Naval Operations sent Commander in
Chief Asiatic Fleet a directive to attend:
Under conditions of uteaost secrecy iritiah and Dutch
Staff conversations will be held in Singapore beginning
February twenty-eecond K You are directed to have your
representative participate in these conversations with
powers to a#ree to a Joint Plan of operation of ISnited
States British and Dutch forces but without making
political commitments 1 Agreements are subject to your
and my approval 1 Tcr. sa should be approximately in
accord with your previous instructions and tnolud*
provisions for a common acceptance of equality of poli-
l»l eooncrdc and military control and be based on the
use of only the forces now at your disposal X Strategic
plans adopted should be fully realistic X Tour
representative will express my view that British and
Dutch strategic arrangements which depend for their
efficacy upon intervention by the United States would
not be sound since there is doubt that Congress would
declare war in case Japanese aggression against powers
other than the Unitod States X In any ease a delay
nil^ht ensue pending final decision of the issue I I
recognise that this places you in a difficult position but
more definite instructions can not now be given you* 23.
Two weeks later Admiral Hart reported to CNO the disappointing results
of this latest attempt to develop a definite agreement without American
20
**tS0Il» QP* clt«* p* 392*
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guarantees of cooperation* That which the naval leaders sought and did not
ret was a strategic plan of operations against the Japanese in which the
United States would participate if it should he "compelled to resort to war
against the Japanese*
The results were disappointing* The conference was
for the purpose of makia an An fto-rnrbch-A-tttralian plan,
- the first step* The conference not only (Udn'tHSet
beyond that step, but did not - in o\xr estimation - even
complete the step* It was a big gathering, with separate
representatives of Array, IJavy and Air arms for the British,
and Australians i Army and llavy for the Dutchj many officials*
They made certain agreements, subject to the approval of
their respective governments, for cooperative action, but
didn't really get down to cases nearly enough* ••They all*
except for some Dutch promises, have altogether a defensive
attitur% on the water as well as on shore, - even after
they sat as much Royal ?3avy reinforcement as they can, at
the present stage, have any hope for* Their navies are
now intended primarily for hoarding their own ship lanes -
not at all for going after the enemy1 ••••Nov upon our making
a definite commitment toward participation, I am convinced
that we can get the Dutoh and British local navies (not the
Ansacs) to do most anything we say, IP iney feel that their
own sea supply and reinforcement lines are reasonably
secure, - because of our own, or the Royal Navy's, effort*.
•
please think over the advisability of this Fleet's making a
!fetherlands East Indies cn&se just as a matter of peace- 22
time course, something that has been done in former years*
'
The disappointment expressed by Admiral Hart and reechoed in ttaahlngton would
prove to be the rule rather than the exception relative to other Singapore
talks
•
Adtairal Hart's letter reporting the lack of progress being made in the
Far Sast planning scheme arrived as the ASM. "Ian was nearing completion*
The Far 2ast agreements had been sought to complement the Washington talks,
and the unfavorable report prompted Admiral Stark to attempt corrective action*
Copies of Fart's letter were sent to the President and Secretary of State in
^TlttCECAF to Cm, h Mar. 1*1 1 M 311.3CAF/926 3/2.
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th© belief that a word from each of thorn "?say do much toward gettiag th©
British, the i>uteh, the Australians and th© Hew "ealanders together." The
Navy would do what it could toward this eM* Stark's roeiaorandum to the
President continues -
...It la now many, many weeks since I directed Admiral Hart
to hold conversations out there and do all he could to have
a plan ready — just in case* Regarding HarVs Netherlands
East Indies cruise, no immediate decision required, but I
like the iV- p ovided it is properly timed**.* I say I like
the idea, because I think it the most positive move we could
make, it is in line with our war plans, so if war were to
break, we would be sitting with our surface ships where we
want them* In this connection I might mention that somotizae
ago Admiral Hart asked permission to pay a visit to Hongkong
with his flagship* Like the above, I thought it would have
been a good move but deferred to State IJepartraent's objections*
Regarding AMltl Hart*s proposed Netherlands East Indiee
visit, we will of course make no recomr-iesidation to you without
lor consultation with th© State Department, whose views you
•tfould want. » » [handwritten at and] Secretary has Tj&d and
roved»23
^The agreements in the Report ABOl were readied with the full approval of
Admiral Stark and General Marshall, who, though not in attendance at the
nestings, kept currently informed on the staff conversations* As a result
of the accord with the British in Washington, "the Joint Planning Cosimittee
were given a new directive for the preparation of the Joint Basic Plan -
Rainbow No* 5>, based upon the report of the United States British Staff
Conversations, Dated 27 March 191*1 (ABC-1) and upon th© Canadian-United States
Basic Defense Plan No* 2 (ABC-22),"
•••Steps were immediately taken by Admiral Stark and
General Harshall to implenient the ASO-1 agreement, both by
arranging for detailed planning in conformity therewith
by War and ^Tavy apartment Staff and Gomniands, and by
taking action immediately on th© points suggested in the
letter of transmittal of 29 March 19&U Instructions were
lansdiately sent to the military and naval commanders
(General Douglas rlacArthur and Admiral Thomas C. Hart) to
*kfeme* GNO to ^resident} HA, loc» cit*
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coaplata arrangements with the British and Dutoh Commands
for a Far Eastern Staff Conference at Singapore at as
early a date as possible.
On April 2 leneral Marshall sent by courier a complete copy of ABC-1
to Major General George Orunert, commanding general of the Philippine
Department • The purpose in sending the copy was to permit advance planning
with Cowaander in Cliief Asiatic Fleet and Coisamander Sixteenth Naval District
(Manila). Grunert was specifically ordered net "to discuss" the natter with
the British or Dutch. On April k the restriction m\ "to discuss" was
revoked by a message from Marshall that a conference had been called in
2*
Singapore. a parallel message from CNO to CUBAF was sent on April 5t
IN SINGAPORE ON 18 APRIL I STAFF COHVIIISATIOK WILL CONVFJI
OP R—RCTHTATTv'ES OF US A TTRALIA I J\LAM>
THE T!HIT!-D KINGDOM AND N3THHIUNDS FAST IKDIP
PREPARING FLAMP FOR THE CONDUCT OF HXLITAKr I IN
THE FAR EAST IN ACCORDANCE KITH RHPOW US
BRITISH OOSTBRWBB, TWO GOPIES OF WHICH ARE KMOtffS TO I
BT OFFICER MESS^NOER X XOU ARE DIRECTED TO ARRANGE
TRANSPORTATION FOR R WTATIVE OF OOMOEN PHILIPPm
DEPARTMENT AfID TO SEND XOOB R" STATUTE BUT THESE TWO
•JID NOT DEPART UNTIL Altai IDtf HAVE HAD TUB TO STUDT
REPORT WHICH SHOULD RiSACH YOU BY THE liiTH X YOUR ATTENTION
IS INVITO TO PARA 31 &MNEX 3 X SUBJECT TO m APPROVAL ARE
AOmwmS RHACKiSD X?6
The conference in Singapore lasted from 21 to 2? April with the nited
States represented by Captain Purnell, who by now was a familiar person at
Far Hast conferences; Colonel A.C. McJ3ridge, Assistant Chief of Staff, U.S.
Military Forces Philippines j Captain A.H.R. Allen, • . ;&val Observer
2U
Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. IV, Pari A, Chp. 1U, p. 372 (2)
Kittredge is incorrect in calling General MacArthur, the military commander.
Major General George Granert was the military commander until MacArthur's
recall to the active list on 26 July 191+1 •
25
Watson, op. cit., p. 39l*.
26
Despatch: OHO to CINCAF, S Apr. hX% NHD File} saws as n 1? (2) Of.
Pearl l&rbor Attack, Part 1$, p. I$l6 for ara. 31» Annex 3.
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27
Singapore and his Army counterpart, LT. Ool. F.G. Brink. The British
representatives were the ranking 3riti»h officers in the Far £*at, Air
Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander in Chief, Far Sast and
Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey T^ayton, Commander in Chief China. The ensuing ADB
reflected a decidedly British position, possibly due to the
26
influence of the much acre senior British officers. Tiie official ADB
report was not received in Washington until June ?; however* the British
Military Mission received from London a telegraphic summary of the report
and circulated it to the American delegation on Hay 6«
The information in the summary on the recommended defense of the
Philippines was the first major fault found with the report. It prompted the
American military chiefs to inform the British Military Mission of their
reaction without waiting for the complete report. Commander McDowell,
American Secretary for Collaboration to the British Joint Staff Mission, was
instructed to inform the British Mission in Washington that
•••The Jnited States intends to adhere to its decision not
to reenforce the Philippines except in minor particulars,
such as the addition of several minesweepers and a few
torpedo boats. • .The principal value of the position and
present strength of the United States forces in the
Philippines lies in the fact that to defeat them will
require a considerable effort by Japan and nay well
entail a delay in the development of an attack against
Singapore and the fotherlanda East Mies. A Japanese
attack in the Philippines might thus offer opportunities
to the Associated ; owers to inflict losses on Japanese
naval forces, and to improve their own dispositions for
27
Cf. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, pp. 155U-1555 for list of delegates.
Complete ADS Report loc cit
.j pp» 15>51-l58U.
Cf. p. Il6ff infra for American objections to British positions.
29*"
Matloff and Snell, op. clt
., p. 66, n9. (2) Watson, op. cit., pp. 3?5«
396.
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the defense of the Malay Barrier. • .The Chief of Naval
orations and the Chief of Staff do not acree that
stone Kong is likely to be altogether a strategic
liability* rather than an asset. The possibility cannot
be dismissed that Hong King wight, as in the case of the
Philippines, perform a ureful service in containing or
delaying Japanese forces that night otherwise be employed
in a more decisive theater...As regards ABB (sic), the
Chief of Maval Operations and the Chief of rtaff regret
that they must reject this paper in its entirety, as
either being contrary to the commitments of ABC-1, or as
relating to matters.which are the sole concern of the
British Government. 3°
The dissatisfaction over the ADB Report registered in June with the
British Military Mission in Washington was just a preview of a longer,
stronger and more detailed denunciation a month later after the American
military staffs had had time to study the full report. A joint letter from
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of ftaff directed the Special
Naval and Military Observers in London to inform the British Chiefs of Staff
that the United States was unable to approve the ADB R*r *t for "several
major, as well as numerous minor particulars. The major differences may
be summarised as follows
t
(a) Statements requiring political decisions were included in the
report} specifically} that an attack on one of the Associated overs would be
considered an attack on the other powers (para 6 and 8)j counter-attacks on
Japan would be recommended in the event of certain listed Japanese actions
(para 26) j a call for increased assistance to China (para 76).
(b) The creation of a new intermediate command not envisaged in ABC-1.
The "Eastern Theater" and Commander in Chief, Far iSastern Fleet had not been
planned in ABC-1. The Jnited States had agreed to British naval strategic
30
Letter j CDR L.R. McDowell, Sec. for Collaboration to Copt. A.W. Clarke,
RN, Sec. BR Mil Mission, 7 June ills HHD Filet sane as n!9 supra.
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diract.ion of naval forces not en&aged in the defense of the fhilippines*
There had been no agreement to the use of U*S* forces by the British outside
the Far East Area*
(c) The strategic importance of the Netherlands Kast Indies was not
appreciated*
(d) After the arguments over the importance of the defense of
Singapore during the ADC-1 conversations and as a concession to British
insistence in the final writing of the Report* the following was included
as part of paragraph 11(b) t
*A permanent feature of British strategic Policy is the
retention of a position in the Far Sast such as will
insure the cohesion and security of the British Caramon-
wealth and the maintenance of its war effort."
In addition paragraph h of the ADB Report had listed as the most important
interests in the Far Saott (a) the security of sea cotanunioations and (b) the
security of Singapore* Tot, in spite of the importance repeatedly stressed
by the British of the Malay Barrier to the seciarity of Singapore and the
whole Far East, only three of forty-ei^it British ships in the Far iSast were
assigned
• • .to operate in the vicinity of the ' ialay Barrier* No
British vessels whatsoever are committed to the naval
defense of the Barrier against Japanese naval forces
advancing southward* nor to offensive operations designed
to close the passages of the Barrier to the passage of
Japanese raiders* All British naval forces are assigned
to escort and patrol work* most of them at great distances
from the position which the British Chiefs of Staff have
asserted to be 'Vital*" It may be pointed out that the
naval defense of this position is entrusted* by the ABB
Report* solely to United States and Dutch forces* •••Since
the eventual despatch of a strong British Fleet to the Far
Sast is considered problematical, the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Chief of Staff a<tvise you that* until
such time as a plan is wolved whereby British naval forces
take a predominant part in the defense of the British
position in the Far East Area* they will be constrained to
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withdraw their agreement to permit the 'nited States
Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction
in that Area.
\^ The incongruity between the British position in Washington that Singapore
sine qua non to their Tar Eastern security and the British position in
Singapore of assigning none of their ships directly to support th t theory
was undoubtedly the major provocation for American rejection of the ABB
Report.
(e) The assignment of '?.S. naval aviation units to British control
was in violation of paragra h Hi (f ) of ABC-1.
(f
)
There was no strategic plan in the ADB Report. Although American
and Dutch forces had clearly defined tasks, those tasks assigned the British
could "be approximately deduced only from the deployment proposed in
Appendix l. w
The Report was completely unacceptable to the American military chiefs.
This instant failure, immediately following the concordance of strategic
considerations in ABG-1, and the history of past failures to get the Far
Eastern military commanders of the Associated owere to agree on a strategic
plan of action against the Japanese, induced the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Chief of Staff to suggests
If farther conferences are to be held in Singapore for
drawing up an operating plan for the Associated Powers. ••
the conference would have its work simplified were its
deliberations to be guided by an agenda which had been
agreed upon in advance between the United States, the united
Kingdom, and the Government of the Netherlands East indies... -^
Before another Singapore meeting could be scheduled or the need
arise for an agenda, the British Chiefs of Staff attempted, after the Atlantic
31
; earl Harbor Attack, Vart 15, pp. 1677-1679.
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Conference In August, to salvage the ABB Report by bringing It in line with
32
AB0~1* I October 3 the Hevised Report, designated ADM, was rejected by
the Africans*
• 1 1 f t]ou are informed that we have given very careful
study to the Admiralty's proposals for a new Far East Area
agreement, as shown in AT>B»2* While the proposals have
net some of our objections, we do not feel that the
fundamental defects have been eliminated* In fact, I am
inclined to think that the ADB agreement not only is not
an advance on the ABD-1 Beport, but that it actually
represents a retrograde step*
Vhile neither the Army nor the s'awy has reached a
final decision, at the present time they are inclined to
beLieve that, until such time as a really practicable
combined plan can be evolved for the Far Sast Area, it will
be better to continue working under an agreement for
coordination of effort by the system of mutual cooperation*
The various Commanders in the Far East Area are exc!ranging
ideas and are establishin/: technical procedures required
for cooperation* Therefore, failure to issue a plan for
unified command will not greatly retard progress* We feel
quite strongly that the defense of the I&lay Barrier is
primarily a concern of the British and Dutch* Hy sugges-
tion would be that the British Chiefs of Staff in London
give this matter their earnest attention, and endeavor to
pimptapo an effective campaign plan that will have real
teeth in lt*33
Admiral Turner in his letter rejecting ADB-2 mentioned to the British
representative that "the military situation out there has changed considerably
since last Spring, and will change more after the U*S* reenforcements, not?
3U
planned, arrive in the Philippines*" It was more than just planned
reenforcements that changed the desperate strand of pessimism found in 1939*
1910 to a fiber of hopefulness and finally restrained optimism* The dynamic
32Matloff and Snell, oq^ oit»* p* 7
33
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personality and confidence of General Douglas KacArthur* recently recalled to
active dutf to command U.S. Army Forces In the Far Saetj the mobilisation
and intensive training of native Philippine troops; the enthusiasm for the
offensive power in the newly proven 3-17 bombers which were to be flown to
the Ihilippine* In increasing numbers; and additional patrol planes, submarines
and torpedo boats for naval use in the Ttoilippinea all gave substance to the
belief that within a few months the Philippines could be defended against a
Japanese attack regardless of ether agreements In the area*
While t*e United States was accelerating efforts to defend the
Philippines* the British were re-exaninating their plane for defense of their
interests in the Far S&st* The Special Havel Observer in London told the
Chief of Naval Operations by despatch en October 2$ of a most important
decision made by the British*
admiral ^hllllpt former Vice-Chief Jfeval Staff with
FADM Pallieter as Chief of Staff and additional able staff
officers are going at once direct to far-Seat in Irince o"
Wales as Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet* Hemisphere
Defense Plan Five and early repairs have enabled fritlah
to plan early dispatch of battleships to Kastem Fleet to
eventually bring total out there to Six* Only 8 destroyers
available of which h are modern* Admiralty feels that ATB
is dead and that A30-1 is sound and that what is needed is
strategical operating plan which can be drawn up in Lrnden
or .Washington* but better In Hardest* Such a plan might
require use of Manila as an advance base for ADB naval
forces and development of adequate air routes throughout
(sic) area for concentrating of air-forces* Admiralty
believes disadvantages of Manila due to proximity to
Formosa and possible effective air attacks disproved by
present war* It is apparent that British are taking
prompt steps to meet Japanese threat by sending able
officers to theater of possible operations* by desiring
to make sound strategical plan and by re-enforcine naval
forces there-in heavily* These forces however deficient in y*
destroyers, submarines and strategically located secure bases*
^Despatch* 3PEHAV0 L0ND0H to CNO. #1922 of Oct* hlj HHD Filet
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Th» informal message of the Special Jiaval Observer to Admiral Stark was
soon followed by an official latter from the First Sea Lord^ Adnlral Pom** to
Admiral Stark
t
..•X do not consider that either ADB-1 or APB-2 meet the
new conditions (change of government in Japan) and I would
suggest that the need for a conference to draw up strategic
operating plans for Far Eastern Area based afresh on ADC-1
has now become urgent.. .If you arree in priwiipla to the
abandoning of further discussions on ADB-1 and ADB-2 and to
holding of a fresh conference on basis of A3 -1, we can
then proceed to discuss the agenda* • #36
Admiral stark replied the next day, November 6, through the Special
Naval Observer in London i
• ••The Chief of llaval Operations agrees that the m«&
exists for prompt action "by both limited Kingdom and United
States, in pursuance of this idea* Ans^r is reenforoing both
land and air forces as rapidly as practicable and training
Philippine Army intensively* Mavy is reenforoing Asiatic
Fleet with 12 modern submarines 3 of which departed Hawaii
2kth instant, remainder departed November Uth. Also has
delivered 6 TflfB to Asiatic and may send 6 more. GEO believes
that AT© should not be revived as ABC 1 is an adequate ssajor
directive 'which should be laplamented by a sound strategical
operating plan drawn up between British IXitoh and TJ.S* Navies
and between British and Dutch Air Forces and US Army Air
Forces* Admiral Hart and Admiral Laytcn have agreed on the
framework of various plans but these have been unrealistic
because Admiral Layton is practically without naval forces*
Due to the Intricacies of the problem it seems preferable
for the tJ«$« and UK naval forces and the three air elements
in the Far Ssst to coordinate operations bv the method of
cooperation and not by unity of command**'
Stark approved the move by the Chief of Naval Staff in creating a new
position, Comriander in Chief iSastem Fleet, Mi that capital ships were being
sent to the Area and suggested that the British consolidate their naval
36
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forces under one flag officer. In answer to a query on the use of Manila by
combined naval forces, Stark replied that Lusson was suitable for light naval
forces and air elements but limited facilities and supplies precluded use
by heavy naval forces* The United States was willing to assign eight
destroyers to supplement the British capital ship force "if the U.S. is then
at war with Japan* tt
Five days later on November 11. the U*S* Chiefs of Staff suggested to
the Admiralty via the Military Mission in Washington the holding of new
conferences In Manila* the three senior officers who could reach a
strategic agreement* Vice Admiral Phillips. WSt Admiral Hart and General
39
MaoArthur* would attend* Admiral Phillips visited Manila on It—6 December.
terminating his visit without having reached an agree?*»ent because of the
sighting of a large Japanese force proceeding towards Malaya* Phillips
hurried to his flagship, the ^rince of Wales at Sinjjapore and together with
the battle cruiser Repulse moved in position to intercept Japanese landing
parties* Without protective air cover both ships were quickly sunk by
Japanese aircraft* The loss of the only allied battleship and battle cruiser
west of Hawaii was staggering. but to British~Ameriean cooperation the
loss of Admiral Phillips was just as great* In the opening hours of the
game it was he who had talked with Captain Ingersoll in London about American
cooperation In the very area where he gave his life shortly after an eleventh
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The period of pre-war conferences was over. The attempts to derive a
plan of action against the Japanese expansion had failed one after the other*
the reasons for the failures were many* From an American point of view the
countries involved were too concerned with their own interests, commerce*
and position* National Jealousies were very ouch in evidence* But before
criticism becomes oppressively heavy* let it be remembered, that the delegates
were military men whose agreements had to pass the approval of their
respective governments* Restrictions placed on them before a conference
limited their scope of agreenent* The U.S* naval representatives were given
reasonable scope* considering the ?*rand strategy of defensive war in the
aciflc and* until the last phase* the position of not reenforcii*: the
Asiatic Fleet* Consequently* the American representative had little to
offer the collective force until the United States were at war* To the
planners in the Far East this nebulous support was not enough* Whether that
support if definitely promised and used collectively with other Associated
Powers would have withstood the Japanese will mymr be known* for the plans
of action which were often conceived but never born could mrer be tested*
•-wife *• *•**«• **< odJ*iw» —m&* «** *«*«& !*»••*• Btfq
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CHAPTER SIX
THE ASIATIC FLSST IN JAPANESE AURIGA!} luOATIOI©
Introduction
Bach of the major Suropean powers which had interests in China had naval
unite stationed In the Far East} originally, to protect their respective
nationals and their property from pirates; in the twentieth century, to
protect against the prevalent war lords during China^ civil unrest and to
restrain the participants in the Sino-Japanese war from aggressive acts in
the 1930 «s« The Japanese Havy, which was victorious over the Chinese in
139b and the Russians in 190', was observed by American naval personnel in
the Far Kast for years* In the llanchurian and Shanghai Incidents in 1931
and 1932, respectively, the American naval officers had the opportunity to
witness Japanese units in action first-hand* In fact, no other tour of duty
in the United States Navy afforded a better chance to observe the operations,
equipment and personnel of the most probable enemy than a tour in the Asiatic
Fleet*
The term "Fleet" in "Asiatic Fleet" was misleading* The American naval
units stationed in the Far East were far from being the balanced force
possessing capital ship offensive capability usually connoted in the term
"fleet*" In 1935 the Far Eastern naval forces of the United states were
called the Bast India 3quadront in 1366 the title was changed to Asiatic
Squadron and after 1902 the collective ships in the Far Kast were called the
1
Asiatic Fleet* It was a simple matter or >iastige to call the ships a fleet
and temporarily to promote its Cocroandar to four-star Adniral rank with the
Samuel B* Moris on, Vol. Ill, The Rising Sun in the Pacifio* op* cit «*
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title* Commander in Chief Asiatic Sleet, in order that he would be of
equivalent rank with his British, Branch and Japanese counterparts* His
fores in the late 1930»a consisted of approximately fifteen destroyers,
twelve submarines* two cruisers* five snail specially built river gunboats
and a few auxiliaries* In addition to the vessels* the Comander in Chief
Asiatic Fleet controlled the Fourth Regiment United States Marines stationed
in the International Settlement In Shanghai and a Marine brigade acting as
the legation guard in Peiping*
After the renewal of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937* the United
States Navy became much more actively involved than Just observing the
Japanese* Naval units in the performance of their duties of escorting unarmed
merchant vessels* of protecting American property and nationals* acting as
communications stations for the Sabassy and Consuls and making routine moves
between ports met the Japanese face to face with increasing frequency* In
December 1957 the river gunboat WlkX was attacked by Japanese aircraft and
sunk* As the fighting intensified and advanced up the Yangtse Valley in 193d*
it threatened to over-run American naval units located on the river* On one
occasion the fighting did pass by the gunboat TOJKX5ACY* leaving it in
Japanese occupied territory* Still another gunboat* the TOTJILA, providing
communications for and located only a few hundred yards £*om the American
Embassy in Chungking was bombed but not hit* On the bl$i sea the Japanese
on at least two occasions complained through diplomatic channels of American
affronts or violations of international lift* The creation of incidents to
show the American marines in bad li<*ht in * eiping and Shanghai seemed to be
part of a deliberate pattern of Japanese actions to fores American naval
units* marines* commercial interests and missionaries out of China*
The relations resulting Iron such incidents as mentioned above often
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involved the United States State Departe&ent, the Navy Department, the
Japanese Foreign Office and the senior Japanese and American naval commanders
in China* Seme of the incidents will be described, not for the history of
the event itself but to show the interplays of negotiations to reach
mutually acceptable solutions between the Japanese and American naval
commanders and within the diplomatic structure in Washington and Tokyo. The
relationships of the United States Kavy to the Imperial Japanese Navy in
China are particularly interesting for they covered the full spectrum of
relations from confiding the details of classified operations to the sinking
and bombing of vessels.
Relations between Admiral Harry Yarnell, Commander in Chief "slatio Fleet,
and Japanese Military Forces in China .
When the Japanese renewed military operations in July 1937 against the
Chinese war soon spread to the area of Shanghai near the International
Settlement. When Japanese aircraft dropped occasional bombs in the
International Settlements and in the same period had strafed a group of
British horsemen in a Shanghai park, the outspoken Admiral Yarnell issued
an order to the Fourth Marines in Shanghai "to open fire in self-defense in
case of attack by ^airplanes/"* 3y releasing the order to the press he
created a reaction in the State Department that can best be told by that
Department 1 s own records. Max Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division wrote
s
I called on Admiral Richardson at the Navy Department
in reference to Admiral Yarnell <s telegrams to the Navy
Department—concerning instruction Issued to American
Marines at Shanghai authorising the Marines to open fire
in self-defense in case of attack by ^irplanes/--! told
Admiral Richardson that Mr. *tU had asked me to call
... .It was not necessary to raise the question as to
the merits of the order issued by Admiral Yarnell but
that the Secretary of State felt that the giving of
publicity to such an order operated to create serious
embarrassment to the Secretary of State in the moderate%
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VZotaooROo Xavoa rt«ii:natu iii*.»B3fl#^JS* *o£a)»a odtf fcao oc aaaooqat
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eourae which he was endeavoring to follow in foreign
relatione* I said that admiral Richardson wae aware of
public sentiment. . .and of the effect of sensational
newspaper reports in regard to such orders*. .that such
publicity played into the hands of the critics of the
course which the Administration was pursuing* I
referred to the fact that when Admiral Yarnell had
issued certain previous orders and sensational publicity
in the American press had resulted* the President in one
instance had spoken to the Secretary of State in regard
to the matter* I told Admiral Richardson that in view
of all these various factors Mr* Hull felt that* if
Admiral Yarnell could not be directed to refrain from
giving publicity to such matters* Mr* flail would lay the
whole matter before the President for decision*
Admiral Richardson said he appreciated Mr. Hull's
position in the matter* and that he thought that Admiral
Yarnell did not take into account public sentiment in
this country and the effect upon the public here of
publicity of this type* Admiral Richardson said that. ••
he would speak to Admiral Leahy*. .with a view to the Ifevy
Department sending a telegram to Admiral Yarnell directing
him not to give publicity in regard to such matters •
Mr* Hamilton continued his story the following day:
On October 29* Admiral Leahy telephoned me and said
that he had discussed the matter with the Secretary of
the Mavyj that the Navy Department felt that Admiral
Yarnell had a great many trouble(s) (sic) of his owni
that the Navy Department did not wish to send him an
instruction along the lines which we wished to have sent}
but that the Navy Department would send a message if the
State Department Insisted* Admiral !,eahy offered to
come to the Department to discuss the matter with me* I
suggested that I refer the matter to Mr. Welles*
I then told Kr* Welles of my conversation with Admiral
Leahy and stated that the Navy Department did not view the
matter as did this Department*
the next morning* October 30, Mr* Welles spoke to the
President over the telephone in regard to the matter and
the President stated that in his opinion the Jtevy Depart-
ment should send a telegram to Admiral Yarnell asking
Admiral Yarnell to endeavor to avoid publicity in regard
to such matters* Kr* Welles thereupon telephoned to
Admiral Leahy and Admiral Leahy said that the Navy Depart-
ment would send such a message* -*
2
Memo: of Conversation: Mr* Hamilton and Admiral Richardson* 26
October 19371 NA793.9UAW5.
3
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The American Consul General in Shanghai recorded the last step in the
process of silencing Yarnellj
admiral Yarnell told me this morning that he had
received a message from the Ifevy Department in reference
to his recent order to Marines to defend themselves if
attacked. •••The Admiral stated that he had replied
pointing out that the order is based on a ?Javy regula-
tion of long standing that naval forces must defend
themselves if attacked. He remarked that he considered
it necessary to let both sides know thrt the Marines
have their orders, and that was why he had allowed it
to be given to the press. In the future however it
looked as though he would have to keep such things out
of the press.**
On December 21, 1937 the Commander in Chief Japanese Fleet in China
issued a letter to the European and American naval commanders that "it is
the desire of the Japanese navy that foreign vessels including warships will
refrain from navigating the Yangtze except when clear understanding is
5
reached with us." The joint letter from the America, French, British and
Italian Commanders said in replyi
With regards to the movement of warships we will of
course notify the Japanese authorities on the river of
intended movement whenever practicable and will in any case
be particular to give information of any intended movements
through the Kiangyin barrier for the present. We cannot
however, accept the restriction suggested by your letter
that foreign men of war cannot move freely on the river
without prior arrangement with the Japanese and we must
reserve the right to nove these ships whenever necessary
without notification."
Pour days after '-drairal Yarnell had reported the above exchange with
k
Despatch! American Consul General Shanghai to Sec, State #1365,
Enclosure Ifo. 57, 20 April 1938, note of 1 November 1937j MA 793.9U/13068.
5
Despatch! CINOAF to CJO, 002U 183U, 21* December 1937f MA 793.9U/1179U
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the Commander in Chief Japanese Heat in China, the Secretary of the Nary
informed him that hie "continued presence •••in Shanghai is thought to be
7
desirable fron the political, and diplomatic point of view," but by March
the tensions -round Shanghai had eased so that by order ot the resident
8
this instruction was cancelled*
It was not long after his release from the geographical restrictions on
his moYements that Admiral Yarnell was back in the middle of another
controversy with the Japanese and State Department* He informed the American
Ambassador to China who promptly relayed to the Secretary of State that he
intended:
• ••to visit Nanking and Wuhu about 21**25 June in
U5S ISABEL* Future presence of the 'nited States Haval
vessels in area Wubu-Hukow will depend on whether
American nationals that area are in need of assistance*
Due notice of movements of Jnited States Men of War will
be given Japanese and Chinese authorities •••While due
care will be taken to avoid unnecessary exposure in
dangerous areas, assistance to American nationals in
evacuation of such areas is paramount mission of Navy
and will be followed. It is not considered that warning
given by Japanese Ambassador relieves that nation in
slightest degree of responsibility for damage or injury
to Tnited States naval vessels or personnel* With
reference to suggestions contained in second letter that
Silted States naval vessels should be made more dis-
tinguished "such as painting the greater part of the
vessel scarlet or in other colors" this suggestion cannot
be considered. United States naval vessels on Yangtae
are painted white with large American flags painted on
their awnings. ..^
whether Mr* Hull reacted to the Ambassador* s message or to the press
7
De«patehi SEOHAV to GINCAF, 0026 131*0, 28 Decepfcer 19375 ^ 811.30
AF/370.
o
Memo: }fcmbeck to State Department* 7 Haroh 1938 j RA 811.30 AF/uQ3.
9
Telegram* American Ambassador China to Sec* State* f?286, 12 June 1930;M 793.9U/13197.
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releases is immaterial; hie reaction was immediate. His message ma
for Tarnell more than for the Ambassador in Hankow.
Newspapers carry today Jnited ross story dated
Shanghai June 12 with sensational headlines such as
DffS Tarnell defies Japan VI J ..•There Is a strong
element of public opinion in this country which is
opposed to the running of any risks of American
embroilment abroad and which advocates collate with-
drawal from any and all points of danger in the Far
"ast, with insistence especially upon removal of all
our armed forces. Any publicity suggestive of a
bellicose attitude on the part of our people, whether
official or unofficial , in China, simply plays into
the hands of such elements. •• .in the light ^of the
above, the Department questions the advisability of
Admiral Tarnell making a visit to banking and Wubu
at a time when active hostilities are imminent or in
process immediately above Wuhn, Navy Department has
no indication what would motivate such visit. •• .this
telegram is being repeated to Shanghai and will be
shown to Acteiral Tarnell,^ ( In pencilled note at the
bottom t "Agreed upon in conference Admiral I.eahy if-ZH
/jfasdltonyT& egg ^Stanley !*>rnbeoj£7f*)
Admiral Tarnell did not go to the V&hu area, but remained at Shanghai,
History undoubtedly would have been more colorful had Tarnell 's flagship
been trapped by Japanese river operations instead of the "J.S.S. M3NQCAGX.
The Sinking of the Pansy.
As the Japanese approached Hanking in the Fall of 1937 the American
Ambassador was advised by Chiang Kai-shek* a foreign office to evacuate. On
November 2? the Azabassador and most of his embassy staff departed on the
U.S.C. MM up the Yangtse, while the D«6«8« :- KM1 remained in Hanking to
evacuate the remainder of the embassy staff. Mr, Grew notified the Japanese
Government of the PMKPi planned movements on December 1, 1937 • Ml
December 12 the FANAT carrying embassy personnel and escorting three
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American oil barges was bombed and strafed by Japanese aircraft despite the
weather being clear and sunny and the large American flags at the masts and
painted on the awnings. The attack sank the I ANAY and two oil bargee,
wounded eleven officers and men, and killed two sailors and a civilian.
On order of Admiral Yarnell the ;nited rtates held a Court of Inquiry
in Shanghai into the facts of the sinking while the State Department on
orders from the President demanded "an apology, indemnities, punishment of
officers involved and assurances that similar incidents would not happen
again. n~A The findings of the Court of Inquiry were sent by the State Depart-
ment to the Japanese Government on December 23, on which date the Japanese
accepted the four demands originally ordered by the !'resident. Indemnities
of $2,2lU,00C were paid by the Japanese on request of the State Department
after agreement with the Navy Department on valuation of the various items
11
in the claims.
The U.S.S. MDNOCAGY Ifeisode.
Second only to the PA HAY case in volume of messages, and perhaps
exceeding the PA&AY case in amount of resulting negotiations, was the
incident involving the U.S.S. MD!fc)CACY. «s the Japanese advanced up the
Yangtse in the summer of 1936 the area of active fighting approached the
city of Kiukiang where the SONOGACY was located. On July 17, 1938 Ambassador
Grew in Tokyo telegramed the Secretary of State that the Japanese were quite
worried over the presence of the HTiNUCAOY near Kiukiang.
Bill, op. clt., Volume I, pp. 559-562 j Samuel Horison, Vol. Ill,
Rising Sin in the acific, 1931-April 19^2
p
op. oit., pp» 16-18. Gf.
Foreign gelations, Japan 1931-19ul , State Department, 19U3, Volume I,
pp. 516-5>&3 for documents exchanged on /MAY sinking.
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YJhile they are taking all precautions to prevent the
recurrence of any untoward incident, having in Rind the
extremely unfortunate PANAX case, the Japanese naval
authorities request that in view of the intending heavy
fighting in and around Kiukiang, the M0N3CACY be for the
present withdrawn upriver to ;tenkow....The Japanese (one)
requested the tf)N0GAC?'s withdrawal, (two) desired the
M010CACY to be especially narked or otherwise be made
distinctly recognise. i from afar (and from high aloft).
The M0NOCAC1 did not wove since there were o number of missionaries in
the area and on American oil installation nearby. Ten days later the
MQNOCACY witnessed the capture of Kiukiang by the Japanese, in the course of
which a Japanese gunboat approached the HP80CA0Y, rendered honors and
13
departed back down stream. It was the last friendly act by the Japanese
to the HOHDCACT for weeks. The harbinger of future treatment came with a
letter from the Japanese Senior Naval Officer Kiukiang denying permission
to contact the American nationals in the Kiukiang area or to move the vessel
14
to the Standard Oil installation nearby. The next day the Japanese Navy
representative at Kiukiang informed the HUNOCACY that he would like
to cooperate, but his orders came from the Japanese Army command at 'banking
and the future movements of the MONOGACY were in the hands of higher
15
authority at flanking. Admiral Yarnell, Commander in Chief Asiatic fleet,
by this time was rery perturbed over the treatment of the HONOCACX, little
realising that much worse treatment was yet to come. His message to the
12
Telegrams Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of State, 1? July 193oj NA
811.30 A?A60» ( T ach of the citations which follow are from the same National
Archive file 811.30 AF. Only the snb-designation of the particular document
will be given as long as the source is NA 811.30 AF.)
13
J.S.S. OAHtfto CINCAF, 2? July 1938; A68. (The .5.S. MUD was
located at Nanking and acted as a relay between the Commander in Chief Asiatic
Fleet in Shanghai and the Japanese Naval authorities in China located in Nanking.
"*0AffJ to CIKCAF, 1 August 1938i A77 .
15
'QMS to CIHCAF, 2 August 1936; A?G.
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Japanese naval comiander at Nanking read;
Fighting Is now over•.••It is obvious duty demands United
States gunboat promptly .gain touch with American nationals
and assist them in every way? fuel also required* Request
Admiral ikawa issue necessary instructions in order for
,
MOKDCACY to proceed installation not later than Friday•••*"
The Japanese Army's authority over naval ships 1 movements was
reemphaslsed in the Japanese Navy's answer to Admiral Yarnell's message* The
message relayed by the QAHU at Nanking readt
Rear Admiral Kueaga* Chief of Staff Third Fleet* strongly
objects any shift of berth of MOHOQACT at th^s time. .
.
Expressed sympathetic understanding cur desire contact
nationals and promises active cooperation to secure that
end as soon as possible but refused to state date* Hear
Admiral Kondo reported 31 July from Kiukiang that movement
M9NDCACX from present berth to city would interfere with
Japanese operations and that consent of army should also
be secured* •••Reiterated Japanese desire that third power
ships be withdrawn from Hankow area*1?
On the next day, August 5, a Commander Tanaga stated that the Japanese Navy
had no objection for the AOHOOACT to berth at the Standard Vacuum Oil
installation but that the Mavy would not "agree to her doing so until
permission had been obtained from General Hata in Shanghai because of
•previous unfortunate experience in /tanking* >ff (The ?ANAT sinking*} The
Japanese Army's answer was forthcoming* The T^IDCACY was refused permission
to shift berth to the oil installation on the grounds that the new location
would "permit close observation their transports anchored that vicinity and
other military operations
*
w The United States flavy representative in Hanking
"made a strong protest against military attitude on grounds we had no real
^QAHu- to CIWCAP, 3 August 1933 j A&U
17OAHU to CINGAF, h August 1?33| A33.
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interest In their military operations, 's*ere deeply conscious of our neutral
status, and that their illogical objections to our reasonable request were
incompatible with their repeated official protestations of respect for
American ri^its and interests in China, " Since they had allowed the
IONQCACY. to contact the American nationals by letter, the Japanese Navy
representatives considered the matter settled except "to try to obtain
permission from military headquarters for the MONOCACT to#«.get fuel and
19
then return to present anchorage* n
y_At this stage Admiral Taraell had almost exhausted the peaceful courses
of action he could follow in the China area to get the Japanese to cooperate
on the M3H0CAC7 question* On August 15 he called upon the "lavy Department to
enlist the help of the State Department*
Necessary on account shortage fuel provisions and for relief
personnel >$DN0CAC7 proceed Shanghai••••Japanese admiral
refuses permission to vessel to pass down river, this
passage cannot conceivably Interfere with the Japanese
military operations* Commander in Chief reluctant to brine
about incident by directing PDHOCACY to proceed without
Japanese consent* Request State lepart^ent take matter up
with Tokyo in order secure assent to MONOCACT passage to
Shanghai*20
The Secretary of the Havy relayed Tarnell's message immediately to the State
Department for appropriate action* In the Secretary of State's instruction
to the Ambassador in Tokyo the American position was given on control of the
river by the Japanese by virtue of their possessing a captured boom across the
river*
190AHU to CINCAF, 6 August 1938) A86.
*°CINCAF to CNO, l£ August 1933} /$02,
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. . .it would appear that the position or the Japanese
authorities in regard to the rl£ht of foreign ships to
traverse this eection of tho river is that having them-
selves out a passage through the boom at Matung, the
authorities have a right to close that passage to foreign
vessels* This Government of course cannot admit any such
,'it or the validity of the basis invoked in support of
that asserted right*
Please urgently approach the Foreign Office in regard
to this matter and ask that prompt instructions be dven
by the Japanese Government to the end that the opposition
of the Japanese military authorities to the proposed
passage of the U.S*S» MOHOGACY be withdrawn and appropriate
facilities be extended the vessel in connection with its
movement throu^i the passage*21
Messrs* Hull and Grev still operated under the long established basis of
international relations that responsible governments either controlled or
were held accountable for the actions of their military forces* They soon
found out that in the existing arrangement in the Government of Japan* the
military oomranders in China had the authority for ultimate decisions in the
China area* A report of this development reached ;fcshington on the same date
via two routes* Ambassador Grew reported on his efforts to the Secretary of
State on August 19
1
Our informal efforts to obtain authority for the
MDNOCACI to proceed to Shanghai have proved abortive*
We were advised that •••it is not•••the intention of the
Japanese Government to intervene in the exercise by
Admiral Oikawa of the discretionary powers vested in
him».,I therefore took up the case this afternoon directly
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made strong oral
representations, basing my approach upon (a) practical
considerations and (b) legitimate rights, and ••• that I
could not believe that the Japanese Government would leave
entirely to the discretion of one of its subordinate
officers the decision in a matter involving one of the
primary rights of the United States•••after our initial
representations the Japanese Government had iisnediately
consulted Admiral Oikawa•••his reply•••could be summarised
as follows* (a) the necessity of js&litary operations rmA&r
^Secretary of State to American Kmbassy Tokyo, IS August 193^j Ibid*
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compliance with our request difficult at the present tine
but 0T9ry effort will be made to comply at the earliest
possible moment j (b) the Japanese navy, on request from us,
will be glad to cooperate by furnishing Japanese vessels
or, if necessary, planes for the supply or transportation
of provisions or fuel for the &)NQCACT and for the
transportation of mails or personnel* .*I reemphaslsed the
Importance of principle at issue...! interpret this as a
categorical refusal and while fully appreciating the
seriousness of the issue here involved I think that there
can be no doubt but that we have exhausted diplomatic
resources .22
On August 19 Admiral Yarnell learned from Japanese naval sources in
Nanking that decisions concerning the ?ONQCACY would be^ made in China*
Admiral Oikawa offered the logistical support for the ?#)&>CACY mentioned in
the Grew telegram above and reiterated previous objections to the gunboat's
moving downstream as follows
s
1. Movement would interfere Japanese naval strategy and
tactics in manner not free to disclose but requests
Admiral Yarnell to accept his personal assurance of this
as fact | 2* Banger from chance mines and unfavorable
American reactions and repercussions to possible injury
therefrom} 3* Possibility mistaken identity and firing
upon American vessel passing through hostile waters by
"excited Japanese gun erewj" U* Matung barrier prise of
war through which as a Japanese controlled barrier we have
no more right to expect free passage than we had through
same impenetrated barrier under Chinese control. •••
[Admiral Oikawa] earnestly requests that Admiral Yarnell
realise his desire to cooperate to the limit of his ability
short of giving his consent to MONOC&CY passage which must
be withheld for time being because of undlsclosable
tactical considerations***
The attempts to put the negotiations concerning the M3N0GACY into the
diplomatic system had failed and Admiral Yarnell *s bargaining position was
back to that of four days earlier with two new developments bearing on the
Telegramt American Embassy Tokyo to Sec* State, 19 August 1933 J /5>17<
230AHU to CINCAF, 19 August 1933| /S19*
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situation. In the first, Admiral Oikawa's hand was strengthened considerably
by the Japanese Foreign Office deferring ultimate authority to the Japanese
military forces in China* Admiral Xarnell had no Immediate countemove, since
he had just exhausted the possibilities of diplomatic assistance in obtaining
a clearance for the MONOCACT to move* The second development was the
assertion of cooperation and understanding by the Japanese Admiral to Admiral
Yaroell* The Japanese restrictions on the freedom of movement had not changed*
Their forces controlled the passage through the boom at Mature in the river
and in this ease possession equaled ten tenths of the law* The offer of
Japanese logistical support to the MONOCACI had possibilities, and Admiral
Yamell recognised that the future of the JCNQCACK necessitated his
cooperation with the Japanese naval commanders on the Tangtae* Be informed
the Navy Department the next days
unless you direct otherwise reference QAH0 [message] of
yesterday will reply Admiral Oikawa that while cannot
relinquish any right of free navigation Yangtae River
by our vessels am prepared recognise special situation
now existing below Kiukiang and will delay sailing
MONOCACY until later date* Will accept Japanese offer
transportation fuel provisions personnel since we lack
any information of military operations now taking place
near ttatung boom and conditions in river* Consider it
advisable retain MONOCACT Kiuklang until Japanese coopera-
tion for her passage down river is secured. ••*«
As the fuel supply of the JONQCACY approached its very end. Admiral
Tarnell commented to the Chief of Naval Operations that? "Before informing
Japanese Admiral that MQ8DCACY must proceed Shanghai prior ten September due
shortage fuel and provisions request your view*" ' The Corfraander in Chief
Asiatic fleet was informed the next day that the Navy Department "desires that
2k
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you again discuss with Japanese corciand on ths Yangtse the necessity for the
OSS MONXACY to either proceed to Shanghai or to obtain ooal from mill
belonging to Anderson Myers, and that you -very much prefer having the MQNOCACY
proceed to Shanghai* request escort through Matting boom at the same tins for
26
subject vessel* n
In the 2fer Eastern Division of the State Department the problems of the
KONOCACY were also being discussed* hi a memorandum of August 30, Hamilton
briefed the Secretary of State t
The Navy Department has just informed me that Admiral
Leahy has an appointment with the President at lltlS this
morning* If you are still at the White House at that time
you and Admiral Leahy may care to speak to the resident in
regard to the question of the U3S Monooacy proceeding to
Shanghai* •• [The records in the archives do not show the
subsequent development of this suggested conversation*]
It is our belief that the Japanese will continue to
object to the Monooaoy proceeding down the river to Shanghai*
Admiral Yarneli has no information in regard to the situation
near the Matting boom* Should the Monocacy decide to proceed
down river in face of Japanese objections; the Japanese could
easily prevent the passage of the rtonooaey through the boom*
A Japanese pilot mirht be needed for pilotage through the
boom* There would also be danger from mines*
m view of the foregoing* we do not believe that the
issue or issues involved warrant (a) insistence on our part
that the Japanese withdraw their objections or (b) the
sailing of the vessel in the face of Japanese objections*
Moreover, in view of the fact that we believe that a further
approach to the Japanese would be unsuccessful, we suggest
that no such further approach be made* Also, if by the
time the Monocacy has exhausted its supply of fuel and
provisions the situation on the river remains unchanged,
we suggest that Admiral Yarnell*s recommendation that he
accept the Japanese offer for transportation of fuel and
provisions be approved*2?
Admiral Yarneli informed his representative in Hanking tot "Gall on
Admiral Oikawa and tell him due to low provisions and fuel most necessary
26
CNO to CINCAF, 30 August 1938; Ibid*
27
Memo: Max Hamilton to Sec. State, 30 August 1938; /S63 1/2
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H3N0CACY leave r for] Shanghai by 10 Septcstor»,***?hataver the reason given,
the fact remains the channel is open through Matung and the passage down
river of one small vessel surely could not inoonveniance operations* Also
inform him the JTNOCACY was refused access by the Japanese military to coal
28
at Anderson layers mill*"
Admiral Yarnell's message setting September 10 as a deadline for the
WOHQCACY to move down river prompted Admiral Oikawa* in a most unusual show
of trust in Admiral Yarnell'a integrity* to confide in the Americans the
difficulties experienced by the Japanese in their river operations and to
show the Inconvenience of moving the MOSOCACY at the time*
The Japanese Adsiral is anxio x -ou more fully
understand his position and states therefore that he is
Impelled to discloss information most of which he considers
most secret and requests precautions be taken to prevent
leaks to Chinese or third powers* Have swept only narrow
channel between Wuhu and point l£ miles above Xiukiang*
more than TOO mines destroyed and numerous casualties
sustained by their ships •••Below Kiuklang and at 6 locations
pointed out on clwrts Chinese detached units very active*
necessary above Wuhu that all ships proceed in convoys with
destroyer escort* all convoys subject sniping and indirect
fire of Chinese field and heavy artillery located inland
from river* Congestion in river oausod by operation of
hundreds of large ships and thousands of small craft above
Wuhu* presents serious problem which would be complicated
by psssags even small gunboat* m addition passage down of
MDBOCACY would undoubtedly be followed by similar British
demands for Cockchafer and passage up of reliefs and ships
of third powers and proportionately increase difficulties j
states his belief Japanese foreign office has never
questioned fundamental right third powers to free navigation
of Yangtse but Japanese navy does claim control passage
through barriers by virtue their capture and military
nature* •• Z9
Admiral Yarnell answered the following dayt
28
CrdCAF to QAHU* 31 August 1933j /S73.
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(Jive my regards and thanks to Ad&iral oikswa for
courtesies and frankness of hip confidence which will be
respected and also convey to hia my regrets that ho has
been unable to assist in the passage of the Monocaoy down
the river at the present also tell bin that in view of
his consideration and friendly attitude I am willing to
accede to his wishes and hold the USS *f>NDCACT at
Kiukiane for the time bsing«3°
Meanwhile in Washington liaison between the working levels of the State
and 'lavy Dspartments showed agreement that the Navy Department "would send
no reply to Admiral Taroellt in other words, the Havy Department would leave
Adairal Tarnell free to accept the Japanese offer to transport mil, supplies,
31
and possibly personnel* n Admiral tarnell accepted the Japanese offer to
aupport the M0H3CACT, and on September 3 the flow of provisions upstream began
from Shanghai for the fONOCAOY. The first shipment of 16,000 pounds of naval
32
stores, motion picture films and mail was shipped via BUM STBSHIO KARU«
A few days later HIJ& AOTKI HAJITJ departed Shanghai with 68 packages
refrigerated provisions, ships service and medical stores and one bag mail
for the M01DCACT*
33
Coal continued to be a critical item for the HOKOOACT* The USS oAHU was
ordered to "inform Japanese naval authorities that while periodic access to
Anderson Myers coal pile now permitted M3NXACY had no adequate equipment Tor
transportation this fuel, SNQ Kiukiang agreed to deliver fuel but yesterday
stated navy has no facilities and unable arrange army to do so* Request that
^Ihjd*
3l""
Memo? ffM,M,H.» (Initials of Hex Hamilton) to State Department,
3 September 1933j /£6It.
Despatch} Jiavy Purchasine: Officer Shanghai to MGNOGACT, 8 September
1939j /566.
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arrangements bs mads supply gunboat with coal about 2$ tone p«r weak*" So
coal vaa added to the shopping Hat of supplies belli:; delivered by the
Japanese*
Farther cooperation In Kiukiang was evidenced by a report from the
MONOCACY that arrangenents had been made with the Japanese Amy "for
K7N0CACI officer [to] visit various missionaries to ascertain their needs and
explain method of obtaining sane from Shanghai* All contact since 6 August
35
has been by letter through Japanese*" The following day* September 27*
two months since the Japanese had taken Kiukiang* a MQlbCACY officer
"accompanied by army officer and Vice Consul visited Americans in city* they
comfortable* no actual food shortage at present except staples becoming
3$
scarce* believe they now understand how obtain material from Shanghai*"
Late In September the American Consul General in Shanghai reported to
the Secretary of State the completion of one of the most interesting airlifts
of the Sino-Japanesc War*
Qm September Hi twelve sailors relieved from duty on
the MOHOCACY were returned to Shanghai by Japanese airplane*
On September 2h two officers and thirteen men replacements
were flown from Shanghai to Kiukiang and on September 25
two officers and thirteen men relieved from duty on I43NOCACY
were returned to Shanghai by Japanese plane* this completes
the transfer of the USS MOUDCACY personnel* J '
The lONOCACY episode pointed up a number of factors which would bear on
future Japanese-American relationships over the Asiatic Fleet forces* First.
Itespatoht Commander Yangtse River Patrol to OAKV* Ik September 1933?
/*79.
35
MOBG&r. to COMYAUOPAT, 26 September 193Bj /608*
36
KWOGACT to caHXAHQFAT* 27 September 1938| /613*
37
Telegram j American Consul General Shanghai to See* State, #1267.
26 September* 1933 3 /6C9*
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the Japanese military forces in China were the ultimate authority on relations
with third powers where military operations were involved* Second, the
Japanese Army held higher authority than the Japanese Navy and was prone to be
less cooperative with the Asiatic Fleet* Third* the Japanese were meeting
unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance which necessitated heavier Japanese
effort than had been planned* Convenience to third powers would have a low
priority* Finally* t!» Asiatic Fleet forces had to rely upon diplomatic
repreeentations to a government whose authority over its Army in China was
limited at best* The safety of American naval vessels and cltlsens and
the security of property were in the hands of the Japanese military forces
in China* In 1936 the Japanese still needed American oil. machinery and iron
for her war machine so limited cooperation with the Asiatic Fleet was to
their national interest*
Admiral Yarnell •s letter to the Secretary of Navy upon his being
relieved as Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet contained his evaluations of the
effectiveness of American foreign relations in the Far East and his military
iion for strengthening the hand of the diplomat*
During the present controversy, the rights of Americans
in the Par East have been upheld vigorously by the State
Department* Had our notes been addressed to a government
which retained control over its armed forces* sons recogni-
tion of our rights might have been obtained* Xt is difficult
to see how our position and policies could have been stated
more clearly or more positively* It should be recognised
however that the Tokyo government is generally impotent to
deal with or give decisions regarding affairs and incidents
in China* In many cases it is entirely ignorant of what is
going on* •••The Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet has
recommended that for every note writte> there should be
some increase in the TJhited States armed forces in the War
East* When dealing with a nation whose policies are
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determined by a ruthless military clique which worships
the sword and understands nothing but force, such a
procedure may have merit**3
Relations between Admiral Thomas Hart and the Japanese Naval Forces In China*
Admiral Hart, who relieved Admiral Yarnell as Commander in Chief Asiatic
fleet in April 1939, was as opposed as his predecessor to Japanese restrictions
on movements of his units* Tensions over movements of the river gunboats
continued, but fortunately for both sides there was nothing to compare with
the MQNOCACt ease* On April 27, 19hp Adadral Bart reported to the Chief of
Ravel Operations}
we are again having troubles with the Japs when
Classford wants to move his gunboats. One such case it
on right now* ;* are giving In on those points to an
extent that irks me considerably* I sometimes feel that
we are not taking stands which are strong enough* But
1*11 have to risk my personal reputation as lone as the
respective eases are in themselves unimportant* Don't
want to have an "incident" over something which does
not amount to much, p«r se*3°
Admiral Hart in reviewing his first ten months of his assignment restated
the fact that delays in moving the gunboats were almost always caused by
requests by the Japanese Navy at the insistence of the Japanese Azmy* He
further believed that "their Army and Navy in Central China did not want any
discussions of [delays] by the respective eapitols«***Our record during the
ten months that I have been here is that in every instance we have had our
1*0
way, though quite frequently having to delay a bit to get it*"
38
Letter* Admiral Yarnell to Secretary of Navy, Al6-3(190) 20 July 1939;
HA 793*9fcAS339.
39
•"Letter! Aasniral Hart to Admiral r>tark, 27 April 191*0 J HHD Filei
KA-EZ*
1*0
Letter* Attodral Hart to Admiral Stark, 7 June 19l*C>$ ' .d*
«ir! vkn o* •*!»¥ *»*«




.. tJ iPMB IM
*•*»*•* AwiwslM* •** *o itMno* n*f inn iW a«*«^v* fl ***>*
*» i»w ^ r«*wc «i t*i *» V* ****** •*** ****
m %*w*m!t v*n ** *"* •* •** w<l •*** tflB* "*
A year after the JCNOCAGy incident another event involved Asiatic Fleet
forces with the Japanese* This time the event occurred upon the hi$i seas
and resulted in a charts of violation of international law being leveled at
the United States Havy* This incident varied from the previous oases in two
significant ways? (1) This tins the Japanese initiated the casplalnt* and
(2) the complaint was handled in proper diplomatic channels rather than
between the military oasmanders directly* The Consul at Canton reported to
the Secretary of State the initial facts received from the Japanese Consul at
Canton* A destroyer division of the Asiatic Fleet was reported to have
ordered a Japanese military transport to heave to on the high seas* The
Japanese Consul requested "that appropriate steps be taken through your good
offices in regard to this incident which creates a violation of international
law and that Z be informed of the results thereof| furthermore* that measures
bl
be taken to prevent its repetition*"
Admiral Hart*s investigation determined that the Japanese had mistaken
a tactical signal flag being used by the destroyers to be an international
signal directed to the transport* The relay of Admiral Hart*s report by the
American Consul in Canton to his Japanese opposite in Canton ended the case*
A second incident on the high seas occurred in January 19lil when a crew
member of the U.S.S. MIWDAKAO took a photograph of a Japanese destroyer as
the two ships passed in the South China Sea* The "Japanese Consul General
acting on instructions from local naval authorities has registered verbal
protest against passing too close and photographing Japanese naval vessel*
Telegram? American Consul Canton to See* State. 7 June 191*0} NA 811*30
AF/3&*
Telegrams American Consul Canton to Sec* State. 31 July 19l<0; Ilk 311.30
A?/a$5, 869, 911.
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JapimM naval auth<wities demand apology, immediate surrender of film and
1*3
assurances that there will be no recurrence* " ' AAniral Hart's handling of
the report was sufficient to cause the withdrawal of the complaint* m
directed Hear Admiral Olassfard to inform \<*&ral Shimada, Comaander in Chief
Japanese naval forces in China that he was aaased that the Japanese naval
authorities at Canton should make such demands and that "he personally had
witnessed the photographing of his own flagship 07 persons on Japanese men
of war, notably the xnZW09 and that he never dreamed of protesting sueh
action*9
This Incident, which started in the same procedural sequence as the
earlier one at Canton described above, was resolved by Admiral Hart's direct
approach to his Japanese counterpart* Under the circumstances it was ty far
the easiest way to end the matter, because Adtairal Hart obviously had the
basis of a similar charge against the Japanese*
Admiral Hart's direct relations with the Japanese were much less frequent
or involved as the relations between Admiral Yarnell and the Japanese* Among
the reasons for the differences between the two commanders ares (1) The
personalities of the two Admirals* Admiral Tarnell was more aggressive and
outspoken than his successor* Admiral Hart, according to the records in the
archives, was nvmr in a position of having advocated a policy against the
Japanese such that unfavorable reaction and oountermeasures came from the
U3
Telegram American Consul Canton to Sec* Btate, 15 January 1°UL| HA
311*30 AF/919.
hh
Telej-Tssw American Consul Canton to Sec* State, 22 January l°Ulj HA
811*30 AP/922*
IS
Telegramt Consul General Shanghai to See* State, 13 January l°blf NA
911.30 AF/921.
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State Departmentj (2) The area of fighting between the Japanese and Chinese
had waved inland and beeone more stabilised* River traffic congestion was
much less critical during Admiral nart*s tenure and, though his gunboats
experienced delays in reaching stations* none was isolated like the ff)NOCAC¥.
(3) Tensions over strategic problems increased as war approached* Admiral
Hart had problems of positioning his forces and timing their withdrawal at
exactly the right time to meet his future mission of defending the Malay
Barrier* He could not afford to get involved with the Japanese over minor
incidents when his future assignment depended upon his flexible employment
of forces*
In August and again in October 191*1 the question of withdrawing the
marines and gunboats from China was discussed between the Navy and State
1*6 47
Departments* In November the decision was made to withdraw the marines
1*8
and two of the river gunboats to the Philippines* Admiral Hart* who had
been given the discretion of employment of his forces to defend the Malay
Barrier under the terms of war plan Rainbow 5* began to deploy his forces on
November 20. Pour destroyers and an auxiliary were sent to Balipapan and
five destroyers and a cruiser to Tarakan. both ports in Borneo* Bis second
cruiser* four other destroyers* six gunboats (three of which were Yangtse
River gunboats) and submarines were in Philippine by the end of November*
The Fourth Marines were evacuated from Shanghai the first days of December,
but the transport bound for Northern China to evacuate marines from that area
1*6
Memo: State Department 26 August 19l*X| NA 811*30 AF/?1*1 and Letter
i
OHO to Sec. State, 3 October 191*1; HA 611*30 AF/951*.
1*7
I earl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 21*56.
1*8
Memo of Conversation i State Department, 18 Sfovember 191*1; HA 811.30
AF/95U 1/2.
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was captured by the Jammw on December 8. By th© first nart of Karen the
British, Ooteh «nd Asiatic flemt surface forces had been expended In
attempts to hold back ths suoarler Japanese Havy with its sup ->ortln^ air
cover. Six destroyers, "the cruiser HA^LRRRAD and two gunboats were the
only surface fighting ships of the old Asiatic F1-; at to survive the Ave
campaign*" The defense of the Malay Barrier was a military failure , but
the Intangible example of gallant fightln;-* spirit could be credited to the
United States Nary.
^6
The Asiatic Fleet holds a unique place in the history of the United
States Nary. Its beginnings predated the opening end modernization of the
Oriental Power which ultimately proved to be its major opponent* the
mission of the Fleet changed ae American interests changed from the original
coastal trading to extensive investments in China' s commercial and religious
levelopment* From the earlier protection for almost purely commercial
reasons the mission of the Asiatic Fleet took on a higher moral sense in the
twentieth century* There was more than Just a trace of prestige and symbolism
in the presence of the naval vessels from the country which sponsored the
Open Deer Policy* The Asiatic Fleet represented a country which defended
the principles of that policy by diplomatic maneuvers and moral influence to
gain acceptance from other commercial powers*
The renewed fighting between China and Japan in 1937 rapidly spread into
the rich Tangtse Valley where extensive American investments and naval units
Samuel Morison, Vol* IH* Rising Sun in the Pacific, op* oit** p* 375*
to
Ibid.. o. 180.3 l * » p* 3 ,
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were located* It mi inevitable that the Sino-Japaneae military operations
would adversely affect American interest and naval finite* The diplomatic
procedures followed by the United States on such occasions can be dratm from
the records of the actual incidents. In the PAHAY case the State Department
handled the diplomatic demands on Japan, while the i&vy carried on the
military procedure of a court of inquiry* fhev^ was no attempt to make a
show of naval strength as suggested by the British* Diplomatic procedure
was effective and successful*
In subsequent eases the issues were not as clear cut or as dramatic as
in the PANAX case* In the ?f)M0CAGY incident military convenience and the
principle of freedom of navigation were balanced against the inconvenience
to Japanese operations* In the procedural handling of the ease are examples
of the possible relationships which could have been used* The Japanese
initially had warned the United States through diplomatic channels that
impending fighting approached the MOflDOACYte position and requested that the
vesssl be removed from possible danger* A Navy decision kept the vessel near
American missionaries and an oil installation* For the next three weeks
Admiral Yarnell made his requests concerning the movements of the HMQCkGI
directly to the Japanese naval authorities on the Yangtze* The Japanese fiavy*
limited In its authority by the Japanese Army who was in charge of the
China operations* could not give satisfaction to Yarnell* Had the military
situation been different on the Yangtse so that the MHNQCACT's movement would
not have involved the Army*s operations* it might be reasonable to assume
that the Japanese Navy would have cooperated to the extent desired* Admiral
Yarnell* s appeal to the Navy Department for State Department help was his
null, op* cit** p* $61*
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only recourse at the tiaa* The failure of the diplomats to got permission
for the MOJDCACY to move on an international waterway was due primarily to
the weak position of the Japanese Foreign Office relative to the military
conmanders in China* Svon if the Foreign Office had agreed with Mr* Grow,
it is possible that tho Japanese Ar^y would not have obeyed until it s Jited
their operations*
Cooperation between the State and %'avy Departments appears to have
improved with tlxsu The discussions over curtailing Iamell»s prass releases
in 1937 were referred to the President* Later discissions <m Yarnell's
acceptance of the Japanese offer of assistance in the logistical support of
the &)?*DCACT though less Important* were mutually agreed upon at ths working
levels in ths Navy and Stats Departments*
Admiral Hart's relations with ths Japanese did not necessitate having to
resort to diplomatic help or prolonged arguments with ths Japanese naval
commanders* In the two examples of naval involvement* one was handled
completely within the framework; of international diplomatic procedure* while
the less serious "picture taking incident" was taken out of the diplomatic
channels and handled directly between the senior naval officero of the
respective navies*
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R8UTI0KB RESULTING FROM VISITS BT AMERICAN AND JAffcHBSK NAVAL SHIPS
Introduction.
rT The gains from naval ships visiting foreign ports fall into two broad
categories) military and political. In the military category, the acquisition
of intelligence in the broad spectrum of useful war planning information is
the primary objective, while a show of friendly relations on the part of the
visitors and an expression of good will on the part of "the host country are
the usual motivations on the political side* The desires for American naval
visits to Japanese ports, therefore, stemmed from motives not unlike those
1
which inspired the Japanese visits to American ports* m seme eases the
issue of military information by far outweighed the political consideration*
Such a case was the Navy's desire to visit the Japanese Mandated Islands*
On the other hand, a visit to the Home Islands of Japan by the Admiral of the
Asiatic Fleet leaned heavily toward the political motive*
The Japanese visited with their naval vessels Manila, the Hawaiian
Islands and the west coast of the United States* Since each individual visit
involved entering territorial waters, a formal request was necessary from the
Japanese Foreign Office to the State Department* The State Department, in
turn, checked with the Navy Department to ascertain whether the Navy had
objections to the visit at the time and place requested* Occasionally, fleet
maneuvers or movements congested certain areas and the Navy suggested delaying
or advancing the arrival time or destination to avoid confusion (and spying .
An obvious exception to the comparison was the use of Japanese naval
tankers to carry oil from the United States to Japan* Of. Chapter Eight,
infra*
m* b ^ * -o
ui H9UKUL usa irnam
MMo1 OV# MlM J.'e'i itaM •jMMfl MtfHh tOjlM Irvwi JNCfltf anios tdT T*
no£*£ols/oo* ait* ,\a^***« ri**tUff orftf fll - LizxJlit<\ bom Tfio*2UUl solroio*t3
*1 nol*o*solol BOjtatifti taw Iiftooo lo owutooqt boo*tf wti n* omp. ItiwteX 1©
«rfj lo **rw oil* no oacltalf'i \£oaoJh(l lo vtifi A oXJUfw 4
oso \iia*oj ./ jcrt *U 'lo *toqi erfw «o HJbr boo? lo floloto «4J9 no hu wo*2*iT
tmi noabioMA -sol M*ltob orfT .eels Iocd*lIoq erf* no «nc1*ov£*m Ijwox/ wi#
oood* «UtIf8i ton ooYirfojtt ootl fcimiiN to*olo»ort* fO*wq «oonoq*t o* siJtt.tr
tfitt e©0»* MM «0#0»q OOOJHhU O* S*1a2t oooasqoV orf* bovljMdt 4*ftffar
•AottowblMM I*ol*Uo<i oitt borlftlortoo nc\ =tf moUmnB/lnt \u~ ,UJ* lo ou&*l
J
.>.-, •• M || rf| lit £*.'.-' " J Hff I I MM '^ Ml
«W lo XoalohA »H* <*»' aoqol lo timolol oo»H «f* o* *2aiT • %baorf *oftto o&
-? '.'xiJJtlc-. dfW frwvo* \Ltvoorf boaool *oo!t oi*o£tA
aoi.lowK 6dj toXlaoM tlotoor X«r«o xtoftt ii*hf bo**tlv tomo-jol oift'
*2o2v .-JUbt^l riooo toniS «oo*o*S bo*l«U od* lo *oooo **oir t/d boo ebnoltl
«rt* mnl fWoottg too *otfipon looiol o t«xo4ow IoJrto*liio* *:ai:-t»*nt bOTletnl
iti t*mo#UMa o*»*e o;"I •*«o*ioqpa *tsS£ oria ©* ooJ am* ooonoqol
boo* xvon m*j «w {*•/:* olotosoM o* Jrmtftoqod xte! oil* &t* bojloooo ,«**
*«oI1 «>&£Iono2toooO .oolooiJpov ooolq teo Mi* Off* *o -i rtlv twtf o* mottoofcdo
SMJbCOTob bo*t©syrr wit tet «om» niMMO bWMjMi oinoftoo io iiwimi
•-Jt\y.a bm) noJtaotnoo bixra o* A«a*onldooo to Mi# Xo*M%« orW yUtOMMo ic
XOVOC MOftMtl 10 OOV Off* OOW ITOOHoqtOO Off4 O* W>iii^OOQCO OOOJtttfO flA
-151-
The State Department informed the Foreign office which passed the clearance
to the Japanese Navy* Naturally* American naval requests for visits to
Japanese ports worked in reverse*
American naval visits to foreign ports*
One of the most frustrating problems feeing naval war planners was the
almost complete lack of Intelligence on the Japanese activities in the
Mandated Islands* The presence of military bases , even small ones capable of
supporting submarines or aircraft* posed a threat to the lines of communica-
tions to Ooam and to the Philippines* As previously noted, CSuara was
effectively surrounded by potential island bases* Although the mandate
absolutely forbid the construction of fortifications, the American Navy was
2
vitally concerned whether the mandate was being honored* Early war plans
called for immediate reinforcement of the Philippines in the event of war*
Later plans were more realistic and called for a progressive movement across
the Pacific* Under either contingency* knowledge of eneny capabilities in
the islands, which stretched across the shortest route* was a sine qua non
to effective planning*
Since the Navy periodically replaced ships in the Asiatic Fleet, often
there were ships traversing: the Pacific near the islands* To get close
enough to observe bases and defense works necessitated entering territorial
waters and that required prior permission* An occasion presented Itself
neatly to the scheme to see first-hand what was going on when the M ALDEK
was scheduled to sail for China and duty In the Asiatic Sleet.
In a letter of June 5>* 1936 the Secretary of the Navy presented his
2
Cf* Chapter Three for discussion of War Flans*
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eaat to the Secretary of State;
For some tine there has been a strong undercurrent of
conjecture and suspicion regarding the harbor development
or fortification of the Pacific possessions of both the
United States and Japan* With a view to allaying any such
suspicion which might be held by the Japanese Government*
the Navy Department recently has taken the stand that it
would welcome the visits this year lay two Japanese public
vessels to certain of the Aleutian Islands and other
ports not normally open to foreign vessels*
The voyage of the USS AIDEN to the Asiatic station
offers a similar opportunity to the Japanese Government*
It is therefore suggested that the State Government inform
the Japanese Government regarding the proposed trip of
this destroyer and suggest the desirability of an invita-
tion from that Government for the U«S»S* Alden to visit
informally certain of the larger unopened ports of the
Mandated Islands, as well as the open parte of Saipan,
Anguar, ^alau, Ponape, Jaluit, and Truk*.»3
This first approach was to solicit an invitation to visit the former Gerraan
Islands and to offer as a quid pro quo, visits to unopened Aleutian ports*
The American Ambassador, Mr* Grew, did not sound optimistic in his
telegram from Tokyo a few days later?
If the Japanese Government decides against favorable action
on my informal suggestion that an invitation of its own
volition be extended to the destroyer ALHEN to visit the
closed ports of the Japanese mandated islands, it is quite
possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will avoid
coraimuiicating to me the unfavorable reply and will tacitly
let the matter drop*»**Xf such proves to be the ease I can
see nothing to be gained by pressing for an answer because
failure to extend the suggested invitation would be tanta-
mount to a refusal ••• if the Department ... feels that a
definite even if adverse reply is desirable, it might be
well that I seek a further interview with the Foreign
Minister a few days before July 21* I shall not ••• do so
unless so instructed***
On July 21 the USS ALDBH was scheduled to depart Hawaii on its next westbound
Jetton Sec. Mavy to Sec. State 8D211/aU-S(3) (36o6g$) $ June 1936j
NA dll*339li/&l*
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log. the Navy desired an answer If possible before that date*
On July- 13 Captains Oanaga and Puleston of the Central division of the
Chief of Naval Operations* Office inquired of Mr* Max Hamilton of the Far
Eastern Division of the State Department if anything further had been heard
from Tokyo in regard to the visit of the ALDBH to the closed ports* Hamilton
informed them of Ambassador Grew's telegram #iich is quoted above*
Their first reaction was that if the Japanese did not
respond favorably to the approach which had been made by
Mr* Grew, the American Government might notify the
Japanese Sovernmsnt in the usual way that an American naval
vessel desired to visit the open ports of the Mandated
Islands* I replied that it seamed to me that as the
approach which had been mads to the Japanese in this
instance had been based at least partially xtpon the thought
that the Japanese might wish to extend such an invitation
as a good will gesture, we mi$Jt well await the outcome of
the present approach before giving consideration to the
question of an American naval vessels visiting th© open
ports of the Japanese Mandated Islands* Both Captain
Canaga and Captain Poleston indicated they concurred in
this view*
Captain Canada said that he would speak to A&airal
Standley in regard to Mr* Orew*s telegram of July 13 and
would ascertain Admiral Standley*s view in regard to the
question presented by Mr* Grew as to whether or not it
I be advisable that Mr* Trew again seek an interview
with the Japanese Foreign Minister with a view to pressing
for a definitive answer*^
Admiral Standley, the Chief of Naval Operations, conferred with his
assistants in War Plans and Central Division on the subject of AUXSN't visit
in the light of Mr* Qrew»s telegram* On July IS Comnander Hill of the
Central Division called Mr* Hamilton on orders of Admiral Standley to toll
the Far Eastern Division of the Admiral's views*
» • tAdbuiral Standley was of the opinion that Mr* drew
should press the Japanese Foreign Minister for a definitive
reply for the reasons (t) that in the past we had never been
able to get a formal reply from the Japanese Government to
*. by Mr* Hamilton July lli, 1936 j Ibid,
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previous approaches which we had made to the Japanese
Government with a view to the Japanese Government granting
permission for American naval vessels to visit closed ports
in the Japanese Mandated Islands, and (b) that should the
Japanese Foreign Minister return an unfavorable reply, the
Savy Department would then be In position and would wish to
ask the Department to notify the Japanese Government that
the Navy Department desired to have the U*S*S* AlDB&l visit
certain open ports in the Japanese landated Islands*
Commander Hill said that Admiral Standley felt that in the
event the Japanese Foreign Minister should be unfavorably
disposed in regard to the question presented to him by Mr*
Grew it was desirable that notification be made to the
Japanese Government that American naval vessels proposed
to visit open ports of the Mandated Islands in order that
there might oe inaugurated as a regular thing such visits
by American naval vessels to the open ports of the Mandated
Islands, or in order that this Government might have on
record any disposition on the part of the Japanese Govern-
ment to raise objection to visits of American naval vessels
to open ports of the Mandated Islands *°
A formal request at this juncture for the ALHSN to visit the open ports
would have put the Ambassador, Mr* Grew in an undesirable position* Having
entered into informal discussions in a spirit of good will and asking for a
mutual exchange of visits to show good faith, Mr* Grew was being asked by the
Navy Department to change his approach to a more demanding formal one in
which a definite answer would be required instead of the more discrete
diplomatic silence* If the Foreign Minister for reasons which he could not
disclose to Mr* Grew could not give an affirmative answer, he still was in
a position to keep friendly relations by remaining silent* to force the
issue after having tried to get mutual visits by the informal gambit would
most probably embarrass the Foreign Minister and strain the existing good
relations. In addition, to request to visit the open ports without waiting
for an answer to the informal request to visit all ports would make it
particularly difficult for the Japanese to accept, for it would show the
6
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actual motive was to see the Mandated Islands and not to promote good will
by mutual visits*
• ••U]fter sons consideration, Admiral Standi*? said
that he thought the best thing to do would be to let the
ease of the SS (Sie) ALBKN run its course} to send no
further instructions on this case to Mr* Grew; and, in the
event that the invitation should not be forthcoming from
the Japanese Government, the ALDKH would proceed to the
Asiatic station and the Navy Department would not request
in the ease of the AIDSN that this Government notify the
Japanese Government that the ALDSN would visit the open
ports of the Mandated Islands* Admiral Standley said that
later the Havy Department would give consideration to the
question of routing a naval transport which was proceeding
to the Far Sast via certain of the open ports of the
Mandated Islands and would make the usual requests of this
Department that diplomatic notification be made to the
Japanese Government of the proposed visits to open ports of
the Mandated Islands*?
the naval transport to which Admiral Standley had referred was the OSS
COW STAR scheduled to make an Oriental cruise the following year* In
February 1937 the Navy Department requested through the State Department
permission for the OOLD STAR to make informal visits as follows s Saipan,
I
Yokohama, Kobe, Milks, Falau and Truk* After months of waiting for a reply
the American Ambassador finally received the inevitable decision* Answering
a telegram from the State Department, sent at the request of the Navy
Department, "inquiring whether the proposed informal visits of the U.3.S.
OOID STAR to certain ports in the Japanese Mandated Islands would be agree-
able to the Japanese Government," Mr* Grew stated that he was "in receipt of
a reply from the Foreign Office. ••dated July 31, 1937* stating that
the Japanese Government is unable to give consent to the proposed
'Memo by Mr* Hamilton, July 16, 1936, Ibid,
a
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visit•* No reason was given since nana was reqilred, but the fact that
earlier in the month Japan had renewed the conflict with China would indicate
an unwillingness to be involved with African visits at that tine. No
follow-up request for other visits appear in the archive files* It must be
assisted the Navy gave up trying to get Japanese permission to visit even the
open ports in the Mandated Islands*
In the Japanese hone islands the star:' was different* There United
States naval ships visits frequently and generally were well received*
A.
Usually during a tour in the China Station, the Admiral of the Asiatic fleet
made a formal visit to Japan* Since Admiral tarnell had not visited Japan
since taking command of the Asiatic Fleet* he planned to visit that country
in the summer of 1937* In Kay before hie cruise to Japan he requested
authorisation to visit Vladivostok in July* Since the visits of an Admiral
of a Fleet had political ramifications in the diplomatic frame of reference*
especially if a second country is involved in the visit, the State Department
advised the Ambassador in Tokyo of the Admiral »s tentative plans* The
Department also stated that it
• ••conceives that it might possibly be advantageous
from point of view of psychological effects, both positive
and negative, upon both Soviet and Japanese officialdom,
for Yarnell to make the visits to Vladivostok and to Japan
on and as parts of one trip rather than as separate and
therefore more conspicuously special visits* Department
therefore desires that you lay this suggestion before and
discuss it with your Naval Attache with a view to its
being conveyed if only informally to Xaraell, perhaps with
your comments, for his consideration*10
The Ambassador replied to the Secretary of State the next week that the
9
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Raval Attache concurs In n^ opinion that a naval visit
to Japan during the summer months should be avoided, and ha
has recommended to Admiral Xamell that considerations be
given to a visit between October 1st and 20th or after
November 15th owing to Japanese naval and military maneuvers
between those dates or next Spring*** •Naval Attache feels
and has so advised Xamell that same political ends will be
gained if announcements of proposed visits to Vladivostok and
to Japan be concurrent but that the visits themselves need
not be concurrent* I eoneur.t.1*
The recommendation that the summer months should be avoided was very
prophetic* On July 7, 1937 the Japanese invaded China over an incident near
Marco Polo Bridge, and Admiral Yamell had to forego his formal visits for
more active relations with the Japanese*
~>C..h9 the Sino-Japanese conflict spread and tensions between the United
States and Japan increased, the use of naval visits took on new color* In
March 19U1 a formation of four cruisers and nine destroyers, on a hi^ily
secret mission unknown at the time of sailing even to the Commander of the
12
Pacific Fleet, left Pearl Harbor ultimately to visit Australia, New Zealand,
Tahiti and the Fiji Islands* The purpose was to emphasise "to Japan
solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to
indicate to Japan that If British interests were attacked that the United
States would enter the war on the side of the British*"
The cruise to Australia had been on the recommendation of the State
Department and it involved naval units which Acfedral Stark wished to keep
concentrated at Pearl Harbor* His taking of definite exception to the
precedent set by the Australian visit was shown in a letter to Admiral Kimmel
Telegram* American Stoibassy Tokyo to Secretary of State #132 19 May
1937| SA 311.33917257.
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The resident said* • .just as soon as those ships cons
back iron Australia and Slew Zealand, or perhaps a little
before, I want to send sons more out* I just want to keep
then popping up here and there, and keep the Japs guessing*
This, of course, is right down the State Department's
alley* To ray wind a lot of State Department's suggestions
and recommendations are nothing less than childish (don't
quote me) and I hare practically said so in so many words
In the presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they
finally got it going.* .we did keep them on a flank to be In
position to go to work or to retire if something broke. ••
How when the question of "popping up everywhere" came and
having in mind keeping on the flank, I said to the Presidents
"How about going North?" He said: "*ies, you can keep any
position you like, and go anywhere."!**
The Chief of Naval Operations had the carte blanche he wanted from the
*
III!
President. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy he described a "project
for carrying out the directive by the President for a northern cruise by
units of the Pacific Fleet*" The plan was timed to take place a few days
after Matsuoka arrived in Tokyo from his Berlin visit* One carrier, one
cruiser division, one destroyer squadron and a tanker were to maneuver off
Attu, to inform the U»S*S.R. of the maneuvers and to request the visit of a
few cruisers and a destroyer division to Petropavlovsk. The carrier and the
remainder of the ships were to stay in the Aleutians during the visit* The
visiting ships were to rejoin the carrier group and visit Kiska, Unalaaka,
and Kodiak before returning to Hawaii* On the day of arrival at Petropavlovsk
the American Ambassador would inform the Japanese of the visit and "that it
does not reflect on our relations*" If the *J.S*S.R. refused permission to
visit, the plan was to be executed without the Russian visit. The motive
was to influence Japanese policy*
lit
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The trend of Japanese policy at the moment appears less
aggressive than it was up to about two months ago* Japan
has apparently not yet reached a decision concerning further
mores to the south, even into Indo-China* the Japanese will
probably have extended discussions as to future policy after
Matauoka returns* Within two weeks after his return we may
be able to discover what decisions they have reached* The
effect of the proposed norther^cruise upon the Japanese
ought to be carefully considered before the cruise starts*
It might accelerate the present recession from their previous
aggressive attitude* On the other hand* they mi$tt view such
a cruise as an open threat* and minht become more than ever
determined to stick to the Axis and proceed with the southern
program*. .Please note that the force recommended for this
demonstration is considerably greater than was suggested by
the President* It is a real striking force, operating in an
area well situated to cause concern to a people which mi$it
fear bombing raids* Because it is stronger, and because of
the necessity for a concurrent diplomatic effort, you will
doubtless wish the President to re-examine the project* ••
When you subsequently take this up with Mr* Hull, I suggest
you ask that the least possible number of persons in the
State Department learn of it* You will recall that three
or four times recently matters under discussion by the State
and Navy Departments have promptly found their way to one or
the other of two pairs of newspaper columnists* If this
project be approved, we want, so far as possible, to insure
no leak*1?
The northern cruise rmror took place because, as Admiral Stark had hoped,
it was vetoed by the State Department* Admiral Stark continued his letter
to Admiral Kimmel quoted supra*
7; There was a little method in my madness as to the
Northern cruise; I thought for once, if I could, I would
give the State Department a shook which might make them
haul back, and incidentally, that Northwest cruise has many
good points* It still conforms to the flank, and a detach-
ment on an occasional sortie up in an unexpected direction
might be good ball, and if you ever want to make such a
cruise yourself on your own initiative, don't hesitate to
ask* Of course you can see what a striking force of the
composition I gave you, and known to the Japs, would mean
to them, in view of their unholy fear of bombing* This
striking detachment would have been right in position for
15
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I bad a broad inward smile when the State Department
in effect saidj "-lease Mr. ^resident, don't let him do it"}
or words to that effect* It was a little too much for
them, 16
There were no more visits by groups of naval ships after the Australian
cruise. Admiral Stark had won his point* Fear that the resident might
succumb to suggestions to send ships to visit Singapore was gone and the
policy not to divide naval forces and to keep a strong group on the flank of
any southern movement by the Japanese remainded as the deterrent threat* Stark
would be ready to move addition ships to the Atlantic on entry of the United
States in war, since Germany, and not Japan, was the primary enemy.
visits to American controlled ports.
In Guam the Japanese were allowed to operate a y^ry old transport, the
MARIANA HARU, in the copra trade during the depression years. Since the
administration of the island was a responsibility of the Navy, the Governor
of Quam sought Kavy Department authority to terminate the privileges of entry
on September 30, 193$, the expiration date of the current permit. The
Governor had information that upon renewal of permission of entry authorisation,
the Japanese planned to replace the MARIANA HARU with a bigger more modern
transport and to ask that the entry privilege be transferred to the newer
vessel. At that time the Hepburn Board, appointed by the Secretary of the
Navy to investigate and make recommendations on air and naval base needs, was
looking at Quam as a future bastion in the Pacific.
In a July 28, 1938 letter to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
Navy reviewed the Quam situation in the light of Japanese visits and defense
16
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nseds and suggested action by the State Department*
For your information, the Executive Order of September
23 , 1912, to which reference Is made in paragraph h of the
(iovemor , s letter, states that Guam Is not, and that it
shall not be made, a subpart of entry for foreign vessels
of commerce, and that said harbor shall not be visited by
any commercial or privately owned vessel of foreign registry!
nor by any foreign national vessel, except by special authority
of the United States Navy Department in each ease***
In view of present developments as reported in the
lnclosure, the Navy Department is approving the recommendation
of the Governor to revoke the privilege of entry of the
MARIANA MARU when the term of her current permission expires*
It is therefore suggested that the Japanese Ambassador
be informed that no action on his request to replace the
MARIANA MARU appears to be necessary since the Navy Department
has recently decided to close Quam to the entry of all vessels
of foreign registry, and that pursuant to this decision the
temporary privileges of entry previously granted the MARIANA
MARU are to be revoked on the expiration date of the current
permission September 30, 1938*17
Ironically, the first step in the improvement of Quam as a base, a bill to
authorise dredging Aprs Harbor, failed to pass in Congress* There was almost
nothing of military interest in Quam* m the Hawaiian Islands the attempts
by the Navy to close ports other than Honolulu were not so successful* Visits
by naval vessels of Japan to the porta of ^llo, Hawaii and Honolulu, Oahu
were a cause for much alarm among the intelligence and security officers in
the Hawaiian Islands* The largest foreign ethnic group in the islands were
Japanese and the occasion of visits by Japanese ships were usually festive
with deliberate programs to promote goodwill on the part of the Japanese Navy
and the local Japanese citizens. Numerous instances of photographing of
facilities, measuring piers and buildings and exchange ot packages were
observed by American personnel* In Kilo lack of customs and immigration
officials made the problems of control even worse*
17
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The concern over Japanese visits to the Hawaiian Islands was not solely
a naval officer's phobia* As far back as August 10, 1936, the Coanandsr in
Chief expressed himself in very positive languages
One obvious thought occurs to ma — that every Japanese
citisen or non-citlsen on the Island of Oahu who meets
these Japanese ships or has any connection with their
officers or men should secretly but definitely identified
and his or her name placed on a special list of those who
would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in
the event of trouble*
As I told you verbally today* X think a Joint 3oard
should consider and adopt plans relating to the Japanese
population of all the Islands* Decision should be aade as
to whether the island of Hawaii could or should be defended
against landing parties* From my personal observation X
should say off-hand that it would be extraordinarily
difficult* as the Island is quite far from Oahu* The chief
objective should be to prevent its occupation as a base of
operations against Oahu and other islands*^
In October 1939 the visit of a Japanese Training Squadron to Kilo*
Hawaii generated a new request from the Mavy to close ports in Hawaii other
than Honolulu to visiting foreign ships* Among the irregularities during the
visit were the posting of an armed sentry on the dock and the abuse of mail
privileges • The Secretary of state's reply referred to a discussion at an
inter-Departmental committee meeting in November 1937 » when it was decided to
make a recommendation to the Iresident as follows t "the State Department to
consider* in consultation with the Kavy Department* withholding from Japanese
public vessels permission to visit ports in the Hawaiian Islands other than
Honolulu, «t
This Department is of the opinion that the recommendation
of the Havy Department* if affirmatively acted -upon at the
present time* might adversely affect the relations between
our naval forces in China waters and the Japanese 8avy and
might be prejudicial to the efforts o£ our naval forces to
13
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render protection to American interests in China during the
eontinuanoe of the current hostilities in so far as such
relations and such efforts are dependent upon the good-will
ot the Japanese Navy*.*
In the circumstances this Department inclines to the
Tiev that the present would net seem to he an opportune
time to put into effect the recommendation under considera-
tion. However, should the '*avy Department still consider
that in the interest of national defense its reootamendation
should be adopted, this Department would be disposed to
agree in principle provided that it was wade applicable to
the government vessels of all foreign countries**9
Farther discussions on the subject took place between Admiral Stark,
General Marshall and Mr* belles of the State Department* On June 23, 192<0
General Marshall recommended, and Admiral 3tark concurred, "that the
Department of State, when presented with future requests from foreign
governments for permission for their public vessels to visit ports in the
Territory of Hawaii other than Honolulu, will replp that such visits are
inconvenient •" In identical letters to the ftfer and JJavy Departments on
July «>, 19h0 the State Department reiterated its position*
The Department of State is doubtful whether, apart
from the legality of such action in time of peace, it would
be practicable from the standpoint of policy to close open
ports in the Territory of Hawaii to visits of peaceful
foreign merchant ships even though it may be suspected that
their primary purpose in making such visits is other than
commercial* The Department of State ventures to suggest,
however, that the wide police powers accorded to the United
States Customs authorities by the Presidential Proclamation
issued June 27, 19l£ under the authority of Section 191*
Title 50, of the United States Code may afford the
opportunity to institute routine safeguards which would
seriously hinder any propaganda activities in the Hawaiian
Islands* The War and Navy Departments may care to consult
in this connection with the appropriate officials In the
Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department*20
9L»tten Secretary of State to Secretary of Navy, 81 February 19l*0|
NA»3?u.331l/6lO*
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A letter from the Chief of Javal Operations to the Commander of the
Fourteenth Naval District, which encompassed the territory of Hawaii in
March 19J&* is the last evidence in the %vy files of the final position of
the flavy relative to visits to Hilo*
The Navy Department does not desire at this time to
recommend to the Department of State that the government
vessels of all foreign countries be excluded from all ports
in the Hawaiian area except Honolulu* • .When it appears in
individual oases that the visits of Japanese public vessels
to Hilo will not be agreeable, the State Department will be
so informed and Honolulu or some other port will be
suggested as an alternate port of call*21
The National Archives files do not show further request to visit Hilo or
other Hawaii ports after this date* Thus* in effect* the Japanese solved
the problem by using their ships to better advantage elsewhere*
(Visits of Japanese ships to west coast ports will be discussed in the
next Chapter in conjunction with a discussion of the oil embargo*)
In retrospect the value of the ship visits by the American and Japanese
Navies In the period prior to *orld War II pales into insignificance*
Neither the good will derived from American visits to Japan nor the indica-
tion of solidarity with New Zealand and Australia by visits there noticeably
affected Japanese policy toward the United States* Japanese visits to
Hawaii had certain military advantages* but post war analysis showed that
most military intelligence work in Hawaii was by trained military personnel
working in the area* Japanese naval attempts to weaken the Japanese*
American loyalty to the United States failed miserably* Japan did have one
21






OQ IMfaN woe 10 B
10 o: o* t*mp*i *«#*ft *•*•••« •* atXi* ttf^nf SamttW •**
t^ioa nMil ttfsrvil* el vt«ffi ••*** ti/ii »«.« <*H»« U**tf wtfo
iiftigfi Ht<—rt< Yttttd «4 efj.We iM* tfU«* t* emMtH •*>
«14 ia fmnnoi • **W 4N*©o Jet* •* bbJb* oetoarwl 1* •#!*
ijumii Xi» «£# *© ftmUomlfe n 4*4* mttwvtl** ni i»^q*rfO **•*
1—nirnl teg ntehwi tftf *f atteiv «Jtf* trfi 1* *rJ*r «& JMqsonfvt ft?
imraftln&fcattt o4&l Ml* jX***' o* foil boJfttq ftitt ftf tftJhr»K
•saltaJt: •& w« ar^sl of ad£tlv imaitinft «»rt bwliftb ££Jkv fro*? ••** mifiltJ'
o* tflaJt*—iTpr •tftteJC JtftJJttfB uf-f In**** you
Xtfloemwi twMXJa JbooJt/ aw 11*m*K oi *»r *fft*ttXX*tet ?t£;r.t£ia *«o«
MO 9vad Mb uacj* «**** r*Ltal t*vJ Jl«\p.r. OAtiitflA
big success j that of keeping American ships out of the Undated Islands, the
one place where visits were most desired*
In this study the significance of the visits was not so much that which
was gained, but the relationships between the State Department and the wavy
Department cnmr what steps should be followed* The State Department was not
willing to risk a crisis to force the Japanese to give permission to visit
their islands to verily suspicions of illegal fortifications* On the other
hand, the State Department did not want to close our ports in Hawaii other
than Honolulu to Japanese visits for fear of repercussions in China, where
the safety of Americans and their interests depended on the tenuous good
will of the Japanese* From the Navy point of view, it was a frustrating time*
It could not get support in their own rjovernment to penetrate the restrictive
wall around the Mandated Islands, and it could not restrict Japanese
activities by denying ports in Hawaii*^ Admiral Stark »s planning of the
northern cruise to force a change in State Department suggestions on the
use of American naval ships for visits is indicative of the lack of
harmonious cooperation between the two departments* Fortunately for national
strategy, the visits by both Navies played a miner role*
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CHAPTER SIGHT
THE HOLE OF THE SAVX IS THE ifiQAROO OP OIL TO JAPAN
Tvo of the major prerequisites to any war machine are steel and
petroleum and in both categories Japan since its modernisation depended
heavily upon imports* The necessity for oil in modern warfare encompasses
the needs for aviation gasoline and lubricants* fuel oil for ships, gasoline
for land vehicles and the various forms of oil used in the civilian economy
which supports the war machine* Approximately eighty per cent of Japan's
crude oil and refined stocks in the early 1950* s was imported from the United
States and from those Imports Japan be^an to accumulate an oil reserve for
1
war* By 1939 that reserve had grown to a peak of 55*000,000 barrels* With
a subsequently reduced oil reserve Japan went to war with the United States
and "it is highly probable that the aircraft which attacked Pearl Harbor and
the carriers which transported them across the Pacific operated on American
2
fuel."
The heavy use of petroleum products in the Sino-Japanese War cut into
the reserved oil* Only an increase in volume of imports would allow the
reserve to be maintained and, of course, to build up the reserve in the face
of increased use required an even larger volume of imports* Reports of the
startling demands made for accelerated imports reached the State Department
in June and July 19l|0* France recently had fallen and Britain was fighting
for her existence* Did the Increased demands for oil portend a Japanese move
1
oil in Japan's War* Peport of the Oil and Chemical Division, United
States Strategic Bombing Survey (a copy in »KD Files), p* 11 j Herbert Feis,
The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princetons Princeton University Press, 1950), p* 263*
2oil in Japan's War, op* clt** p* 1*
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to the south or were they part of a build-up of a larger reserve for a long
war In the Pacific?
Before Secretary Hull departed for a conference in Havana on July 19
he rejected suggestions that he advocate to the Jfresidsnt the cutting of
3
Japanese exports to their normal dimensions. Perhaps Mr* Hull remembered
the words of warning of Ambassador Grew to President Roosevelt in 1939
1
"I •••said that if we out off Japanese supplies of oil and that if Japan
then finds that she cannot obtain sufficient oil from other commercial
sources to ensure national security, she will in all probability send her
I
fleet down to take the Hutch East Indies •"
On the day Hull left for the Havana meeting the President conferred with
stimson, Knox and VfeHss on a proposal passed to him toy Secretary of Treasury
Morgenthau* The proposal had been suggested in part by Lord Lothian, the
British Ambassador, who had discussed the matter with Stimson, Knox, Morgenthau
and the Australian Minister at a dinner party the previous evening*
This was the plant The United States was, on the
ground of national defense, to stop all exports of oilf
Britain was to get all its oil from the Caribbean area;
Britain was to arrange with the Dutch government to
destroy the oil wells in the Indies} and, finally, it was
to concentrate bombing attacks on the synthetic oil
plants in Germany* Where then, and how, would Japan and
Germany get oil for war?
5
Welles, who objected to m embargo against Japan because he believed that it
"would cause Japan to make war on nreat Britain, ••• "entered into a series
of consultations with the President and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval
operations •" A ban on oil might force the Japanese to make a decision about
*sis, op* cit *# p* 89* Ibid** p* !*1«
Ibid ,, p* 90.
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golng into the Indie* and Welles doubted that the American people were ready
to support a counter military move« He thought he had impressed the
6
President with his arguments, and, from later evidence, he most probably had
Stark's support*
Other members of the Cabinet were mush more prone to take a firm stand
against Japan* The "hard line element" of Horgenthau, Stirason and Knox
actually succeeded in getting the resident to sign a proclamation on July 25
to establish export controls over all kinds of oil and scrap metals* Welles
and "his worried subordinates'1 in the Far Eastern Division were disturbed on
learning of the President's move, because they feared that the embargo would
"provoke a crisis with Japan sooner or later, and probably sooner* " Velles
argued his case again and managed to persuade the President to issue a State
Department version of a control proclamation "to make clear the proclamation
of July 25*" That version applied export controls only to "aviation motor
7
fuels and lubricants and HO* 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap*"
The term "aviation motor fuel" was further defined in the Presidential
Proclamation of July 26, 19hP act "high octane gasolines, hydrocarbons, and
hydrocarbon mixtures which, with the addition of tetraethyl lead up to a
total content of 3 c.c* per gallon will exceed 3? octane number, or any
material from which by commercial distillation there can be separated more
3
than 3 per cent of such gasoline, hydrocarbon, or hydrocarbon mixture*" 7hs
question of circumventing the restriction on petroleum exports based on octane
level became the center of controversy between those who viewed the
7
, pp» 90-91* Ibid** pp* 92-93*
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roelamatlon as a oiniansm move in the right direction and who wanted "tight"
control and those who viewed the proclamation as a guide to maximum Unite
of control ^gainst Japan*
Within the Navy were many officers who wanted the export controls
rigidly enforced by applying restrictions to all fuels which could be made
to serve as aviation fuel throng the use of additives and/or further
distillation* The one section of the Wavy Department best informed on efforts
to circumvent the octane limits and who were anxious to restrict the
Japanese efforts to increase their reserve was the Office of Naval
Intelligence* The Director of Naval Intelligence informed the Chief of Naval
Operations
t
1* Information from highly reliable sources has
reached this office regarding negotiations being carried
on between the Associated Oil Co** Standard Oil Co* of
California, and Japanese oil Interests which appear to be
aimed at circumventing the export on aviation gasoline*
2. Specifically, it appears that Japanese interests
are now able to obtain not only Kettleman fuel oil, but ft
special blend of crude from Kattleman rated at 59 octane*
The U*S* oil oompanles concerned are negotiating with the
Japanese interests to supply this special 89 octane crude
against outstanding large orders for 9? octane, 92 hi-
ootane, and 37 octane fuel* It is contemplated that by
suitable leading of this special blend with ethyl,
practically all Japanese requirements for high octane fuel
can be net regardless of export control* 'Whether or not
this "special blend" is a commercial grade, or a blend
developed for the above outlined purpose, is not known
from information at hand*?
By using the special blend of crude oil, which was not restricted, the
Japanese could meet their gasoline needs*
Records do not indicate what, if anything, Admiral Stark did or thou^it
about the specific information on cirmimvention, but four days later the
o
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Director of Naval Intelligence, Bear Admiral Walter Stratton Anderson wrote
directly to the Secretary of the Navy vith a carbon copy to Clff and Naval
Aide to the President* After reviewing the circumvention techniques being
worked out by certain American oil companies with the Japanese, Aetoiiral
Anderson continued}
An official of an oil company, which has proved itself
cooperative with government policies, has iiade the suggcs-
tion that the desired dsgree of embargo against Japan can
be made air-tight and defeat such schemes as the foregoing
if the following two conditions are met*
First, for the proper governmental authorities,
presumably the State and Treasury Departments, to sot forth
exactly what degree of embargo they desire to enforce*
Second, qualified commercial oil experts could then
implement this policy by writing the necessary roles with
the proper technical specifications to make the policy
really binding.***
While the JJavy is not charged with primary responsi-
bility in connection with the enforcement of any embargo,
such embargo is definitely of Navy interest, and it is
believed the Departments charged with enforcing the embargo
would welcome suggestions from the %vy in the premises*3-"
The memorandum from Admiral Andersen was dually significant* First, it
stated a position for the '"avy, namely, that since the embargo ot oil was of
interest to the Ktvy, the Navy was ready to <;ive suggestions on how better to
enforce that embargo* The feeling expressed by the head of Haval Intelligence
was not shared by the military head of the 3favy, which prooab3y accounts for
the direct correspondence with the Secretary* It was quite "legal" for
Admiral Anderson so to correspond, but It was not the accepted procedure* The
second significance of the memorandum concerns its treatment after Secretary
Knox received it* Hot only was Knox in agreement with the suggestions
contained in the subject memorandum, he wanted to share them with the leader
10
Memo i Director of Naval Intelligence to Sec* liavy, 30 August 192*0
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of the "hard-line" ^roup, Secretary Horgenthau. Attached to the memorandxim
la an undated pencilled note from the Offlee of the Secretary of the Navy
which reads t
Jim, /presumably James Forreatal, Under-Secretary of the
Jfevy/
Take this up with Henry Morgenthau early next week*
Ask Adm Anderson for a copy of letter he has on this
subject I give that to H*K. also.
/a/ F.K.
Obviously part of the ttavy favored ti^ht controls*
^One of the first indications of the feelings of the Chief of Naval
Operations on the subject of embargo of oil to Japan was contained in a
letter of September 2k $ I9h0 to Admiral tiiehwrdson, Commander in Chief,
nited States Fleet*
Frankly, I do not like the look of things any too
well* Spent over three hours in the State Department
yesterday—something over two in the morning with Mr*
Hull, Welles and Bornbeek, and then again in the after-
noon or&r an hour with Mr* Welles* I believe had you
been present you would have been in agreement with what
I did and I pushed my thoughts home just as hard as I
could. • •
•
I strongly opposed, and I believe carried my point,
an embargo on fuel oil for reasons which are obvious to
you and with which I may say I think the State Department
is in concurrence* I believe Mr* Hull brought it up to
get a thorough discussion of the subject and Mr, Welles
said he was in complete agreement with me**2
Stark was in the camp of Welles and certainly not that of Morgenthau*
If Stark did not like the look of things on September 2u, he would like
them less three days later* On September 27, the Tripartite act between
Japan, Germany and Italy was signed, leaving little doubt that the united
UMd,
12
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Statee would eventually fight Japan* A clash was possible If the United
States in support of Britain against her opponent Germany encountered the
Japanese in support of Germany against Britain* Fear that the new formal
alliance was a prelude to a Japanese more against Singapore or the Indies
prompted many discussions in Washington* Within the State Department, one
faction* including Hornbook and Norman Davis* stood for further use at once
of American economic power as a deterrent* while Hamilton and his associates
in the far Eastern Division advised otherwise e» unless the United States was
prepared for war* Horganthau, Stimson and Ickes wanted to lower the octane
levels of exports* and in the Navy* though Knox still seemed inclined to
use pressure* Stark and his admirals said that the Navy was not ready for war*
Meanwhile the Dutch were asking the State Department to refrain from actions
which would increase Japanese pressure against the Indies* Stirason's
suggestion of sending a flying squadron of warships to the Indies to deter
Japanese actions was strongly opposed by Admirals Stark and Hichardson* The
Navy was in no state of readiness to oppose Japanese action in the Dutch "iast
Indies*
A naval intelligence report on November 2 showed that despite the
licensing of exports since July* the aviation gasoline exports to Japan jumped
to a new height two months later* Department of Gonmerce figures for exports
to Japan in barrels readt
Aviation Gasoline Other Gasoline
July liO,938 119,277
August %#j0 233,550 „
September ll£,0$l U3U*23It ^
13
Memos Commander teCollum to Director of Naval Intelligence, 2 November
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The intelligence report continued.
The Division of Controls (State Department) inferos us
that while the Commerce Department figures are accurate
they are based upon the presumption that any gasoline
suitable for use or actually used in aeroplanes is
"aviation" gasoline) the Controls Office uses a stricter
definition in terms of octane count* It is recognised
in that office that a very largs proportion of the
gasoline now being sent to Japan is actually used In
planes and can be stepped up by "boosters" to high
octane count* It is also stated that the question is
essentially political insofar as the Controls Office is,
under instructions » following a lenient policy designed
to appease Japan and relieve tlw Motherlands Sast Indies
of pressure *-"* (Kmphasis mine*)
Under the circumstances the State Department had little choice. The %vy was
reluctant to deploy forces to the Far Sast and was not ready to fight Japan*
Tir:ht restriction might force Japan to take the alternate source of supply*
Lenient policy might buy sons time to prepare for war*
m the setting of the Fall of I9I4O ^resident Roosevelt received advice
from every quarter on actions against Japan* Into the hopper of suggestions
Admiral Stark dropped one of the more important analyses of the international
situation and the courses of action which the United States could follow* It
was his ?lan Dog* which proposed American military support to Britain to
defeat Germany and if forced to fight in the Pacific against Japan* to fight
a defensive war using economic restrictions to limit the Japanese* The
economic measures were to be used in a war* Stark looked upon the embargo of
oil to Japan as an unnecessary risk of war where he wanted no war until
Germany was defeated*
While Stark was working out his Flan Dog memorandum, the British were
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Lord Lothian on ffovembor 1 asked the Amerloan Government to join the
British Dominions and Empire "in limiting the total export to Japan of all
15
essential goods to what oould be considered *normal » amounts •» Later in
the month the question of restricting oil exports boiled up again* On
November 2C the British sent a long taanarandum entitled "Japanese Oil
Situation" which reviewed in detail their intelligence on the matter* The
key to the figures in the papers relative to the reserve of Japanese oil were
based on the United States Navy's estimate of consumption for the last three
years* The British were of the opinion, based on their war experience* that
the estimate of consumption was too hi^h* They made a specific point
• ••to inform the It*S* Government that if, on reconsideration,
the TJ*S* Navy were to lower their estimates of consumption*
H*M*G* took the view that the only reliable means of dealing
with the very undesirable situation inherent in further
accumulation of stocks by the Japanese would be by a joint
policy designed to curtail Japanese chartering of foreign
flag tankers* ••Our policy is not to cut Japan off from
supplies but to oo -operate with the >?*£* Government in
restricting by the least provocative means* Japanese imports
of oil now going forward at a rate for which there is no
commercial justification*10
The offer had merit but Hull insisted that any action which might provoke the
Japanese was unwise unless the British and American forces in the far East
were stronger* The senior a<b*&rals of the Mavy were saying the ?&vy was not
ready* "Hull and Admiral Stark, to whom the British proposals were primarily
directed, let them rest*" Stark had already proposed joint discussions with
the British to arrive at a better basis of possible future operations together*
Although the British Government "accepted toe decision" of Hull and Stark,
1<
F#i8 » op * clt** p* 136*
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nemo; "Japanese Oil Situation," dated 20 November 191*0, Enclosure (A)
to letters Rear A<todral Ohormley to CNO, 11 February 19lil$ MiD Piles CNO
JJ7/SF37-JJ7-3/3F37.
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according to Herbert Feie, there was another attempt to get consideration
on their memorandam on the "Japanese Oil Situation*" A copy of the paper
was given to Rear Admiral Ohormley, the Special Naval Observer in London,
who forwarded it to the Chiex of Haval operations*
3* Flease note Paragraph lh» Enclosure (a), [the
subject memorandum] that the proposals contained herein
were presented to the State Depavteaent on November 20th,
19hP $ but no reply from the State Department has yet been
received*
li* In view of present conditions in the Far East* it
is recommended that the suggestions contained herein be
given careful consideration as a possible deterrent to
Japan becoming engaged in war at this time*3-®
Ghormley did not know that the suggestions had been carefully considered by
Hull and Stark and shelved*
Discussions within the Cabinet and the State Department through the
following months concontrated on freezing Japan's American assets and further
restrictions on oil* In the meanwhile Japanese imports of gasoline and
crude oils from which aviation gasoline could be obtained continued to
increase* State Department estimates in April 19b! were that the Japanese
would receive from the United States and the Dutch Bast Indies 12 million
19
barrels during that year or three times the normal amount*
Despite Admiral Stark's feeling on embargo of oil* Japanese practices in
the procurement of oil on the west coast could not continue without comment
to the State Department* For each Japanese naval ship visit to United States
ports permission was obtained from the State Department by the Japanese
Government* The State Department always advised the Navy Department and
17
Feis* op* cit#, p* 136.
Letter t RAM Oiormley to CNQ* op. cit., nl6 supra *
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requested comment* In April the Secretary of the *laiy informed the
Secretary of State that the Navy Department had no objection to a proposed
Japanese ship visit, btit called attention to the recent frequency of naval
visits.
• ••a total of twelve Japanese naval vessels will have
obtained a cargo of oil from the United States within a
period of six months, five of these within a period of
sixty days*
Certain of the vessels now listed as naval vessels
have made previous similar trips in their original status
as eomneroial vessels* It appears more than probable
that their current naval status has been devised to bestow
upon them, and upon their obvious purposes, a degree of
immunity which a commercial vessel could scarcely command*
It is suggested that the frequency of such visits is,
to say the least, unusual} and a matter regarding which it
is considered that some restrictive policy would be a
timely precaution to prevent the abuse of international
courtesy in a manner which appears contrary to the best
interests of the United States**
The fact that the frequency of the visits had increased to one naval
21
tanker every ten days throu#i Fetoaroary and March was disturbing: enough, but
the abuse of designating commercial vessels as naval vessels was more than
the Naval Intelli,
;
'ence Division cared to tolerate* the courtesies of the
oort allowed too much freedom to the crew for the many facets of espionage
work and to accord commercial vessels the honors 6m to men of war was
highly unpalatable* On the recommendation of the Director of Naval Intelligence
the Secretary of the Navy informed the Secretary of State on May 23 s
Although the matter was not pressed during the
previous visit of the KOKUYO MARU to San Prancisco
April 13, to April 21, the Wavy Department is unable to
20
Letter! Sec« Navy to Sec* State, 3 Aoril 19Hs WHO Fllex CNQ AiH>(2)
/3F37.
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identify the K0&J70 MAflA as a bona fide vessel of the
Japanese Navy and it is therefore in soae doubt as to the
interpretation of the courtesies and facilities which are
requested. When a bona fide nian-of-war visits a port it
is courtesy and custom that the name of the commanding
officer be furnished* However the request in this ease
specifically states that the senior officer on board is an
inspector* and in no way indicates that the ship is under
his command* In view of this unusual situation the 'Navy
Department would appreciate some application of the exact
status of the ship* If she is merely an oil cargo ship
aboard which has been placed a naval inspector* the wavy
Department fails to see any reason why she should be
accorded the privileges* imsunities and courtesies i&lch
would be accorded with pleasure to any recognised ship of
the Japanese ftavy*
If* under these anomalous circumstances* the KOKUYO
*ARU enters Los Angeles as a merchant ship subject to all
applicable regulations the matter is beyond the cognisance
of the Navy Department* Should the Japanese Government
insist that the ship is entitled to the courtesies and
privileges of a bona-fide man-of-war* the Navy Department
does not consider such requests as legitimate and
recommends that in this ease* and all subsequent similar
cases* the Japanese Government be informed that the visit
is not convenient*22
The Navy would not have to concern itself about Japanese naval talkers
for many more months* On June 20 due to an actual domestic scarcity on the
east coast and as a move against the Axis Powers % oil exports from uie east
coast were restricted to the British Empire* the British forces in Egypt
and the Western Hemisphere* Arguments within the Cabinet ever restricting
oil exports from both coasts resulted in Secretary Icfces resigning* Stark
and Welles had delayed again cutting off oil to Japan* In July the tempo
quickened* Japan was poised to acquire additional bases in Indo-Shina* On
the direction of the President Acting Secretary of State Welles informed
British Ambassador Halifax that "If Japan now took any overt step through
force or through the exercise of pressure to conquer or to acquire alien
op
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territories in the Far Stat* the Government of the JJnited States would
23
immediately imnose various embargoes, both eoononlc and financial. .." Umi
showdown on the embargo (question grew near.
Among those with whan the resident conferred on the oil embargo was
Admiral Stark. Stark described his feeling to belles in a letter afterwards.
The latter part of last week the President asked my
reaction to an embargo on a number of commodities to Japan.
I expressed the sane thought to hits which I have expressed
to you and to Mr. Ball regarding oil, but as to the subject
in general I would be glad to have War : lans division nake
a quick study. This study was finished yesterday. I sent
it to the President and told his Aide I should also like to
send a copy to Mr. Hull, which I have done; ana to talk it
over with you.2**
The "study of the Effect of an Embargo o£ Trade between the United
States and Japan" was prepared by the War lans Division (OP 16) under the
direction of Rear Adsdral Turner. It read in part as follows s
It is generally believed that shutting off the American
supply of petroleua will lead promptly to an invasion of
the Netherlands East Indies, foliile probable, this is not
necessarily a sure immediate result.... Japan has oil stocks
for about eighteen months war operations. Export restric-
tions of oil by the nited States should be accompanied by
similar restrictions by the British and Butch....An
ttobargo on exports will have an immediate severe
psychological reaction in Japan against the United States.
It is almost certain to intensify the determination of
those now in power to continue their present course.
Furthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then
take military measure against the British and Dutch, she
would also include military action against the Philippines,
which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war....An
embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by
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possibly would involve the united States is earl/ wax* in
the Pacific...•Recomi^ndationj That trade with Japan not
be embargoed at this time*2?
Co the copy of Admiral Turner 9 ® study sent to the President, ::tark wrote
26
"I concur in general. Is this the kind of picture you wanted?1* 9M
resident does not appear to have heeded the evaluations of Turner or Stark*
IHs actions in ordering a freese of Japanese assets on 25 July after the
Japanese entered southern Xndo-China showed that he was less worried about
immediate Japanese reaction against the ftited States than were his military
advisers* Aa long as Britain stood, he thought, the Japanese would not
enter the war, because they did not want to fight the British Empire and the
27
United States together.
The Navy through the period of embargo considerations was divided. The
Secretary of the Navy and certain officers below the senior admirals were
for tight controls or even complete embargo* The Chief of "rfeval Operations,
who had the advantage of personal contact with the -resident and who agreed
with the President's trusted Mr, Welles, opiosed actions which would result
in war with Japan* To the v^ry end Stark held his position, so wrapped up
in the problems of the Atlantic that he veered away from eny action which
would commit his limited ships to the Far ast against Japan* Stark accented
the calculated risk of allowing one very potential enemy to build up huge
petroleum reserves in order to keep peace in one ocean while defeating an
enemy considered more dangerous in another oce n.
25
Letter: Director, ^ar lane Division to CNQ, 19 July l?ULj HHB Filej
A11-A15.
26
Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 5, pp. 2382-238U.
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Feis, op* cit« , p* 21*1.
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Intro Motion*
There are generally two roles for naval and military forces in a
democratic nation* First* the ultimate fixation of any military force is to
wage war* and the ability of a democratic state to muster its manpower and
productive capacity to form a successful war machine when necessary is one of
the prerequisites of national survival* A short step from the ultimate use
of force is the second function — the effect of military capability in foreign
relations* The diplomat who negotiates without actual or potential force
behind him, negotiates from a weak position* If circumstances are such that
his opponent has decidedly superior actual and potential force, that opponent
may with impunity ignore or reject any proposals or agreements* The
democratic state, net Choosing to field large military forces unnecessarily*
usually seeks by a combination of existing military force* diplomacy*
economic pressure and cooperation with other like-minded powers to deter any
aggression or acts by other powers in violation of principles or national
interests* In broadest terms, then, the strategic thinking which is a major
component of international relations in a modern democracy is based on a
deterrent concept*
From a vantage point bought with time, one can see in American polities
in the Pacific a definite pattern of strategic thinking before Pearl Harbor*
For moral and commercial reasons the United States took on almost a
paternalistic national attitude toward China in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries* m the same period various island groups with potential
bases were acquired* ?or reasons already discussed, decisions were made not
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to build strong bases and support a large fleet in the Orient* The
substitute for naval force to back the Open Door Policy was moral influence
and diplomatic agreement among; the commercial powers in the area* Implicitly
behind the agreements in China, but not formally cossaltted to use* was the
collective military potential of the participants*
An indication of the precarious balance of forces in the deterrent
arrangement in the Orient was seen daring World War I* Japan, with little
hesitation, made her twenty-one Demands after most of the European naval
forces were withdrawn and attention was centered in Europe* Subsequently,
the provisions for naval limitations and the non-fortification of Pacific
islands in the Washington treaty, and the agreements to recognise national
rights and China's integrity, in the Four Jower and Nine Power treaties,
respectively, aimed at deterring future aggression by agreements only* Japan
obviously was not deterred by the existing arrangement from taking military
action in Manchuria in 1?31* The absence of effective Occidental military
forces in the Orient and the international unwillingness to use collective
economic or military action blessed the Japanese move* An opposite situation
relative to the forces or collective action most probably would have deterred
Japan from the Manehurian move*
As Japanese, German and Italian military might increased rapidly in the
mid-1930' a, the American diplomats found themselves in progressively weaker
positions* The potential power of the United States was still greater than
any of the militants, but that power was not being channeled into war
machinery* The existing Army was at a low ebb and the H*wy was not up to
treaty strength* The actual and relative military power at hand in the Axis
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Cordell Hull "should be plugging 1 for & bigger Navy" in 1936*
^ Against Japanese naval strength, their strong Army and tho propensity
to use their forces to gain objectives in the Orient the Havy and State
Department representatives had the weak Asiatic Fleet, the presence of the
United States Fleet at Hawaii and economic presa\ires* Though the areas,
tines and degrees of use varied, the two main forces used to deter Japan from
using her localised advantage against United States* interests and assumed
responsibilities were naval and economic* The problem facing the American
strategists was how to deter the Japanese from expanding southward into
Xnte-Chlna and especially the Hutch East Indies using the relatively weak
forces available* The problem intensified after the decision to concentrate
American effort in the Atlantic to defeat Germany first*
Proposals fo deter Japaq ly increasing Far Eastern, naval strength*
The history of the Asiatic ileet, its mission to protect American
nationals and their property and its role in tempering Japanese actions
2
adversely affecting American interests have already been discussed* The
effectiveness of the Asiatic Fleet as a deterrent was derived not from the
strength of the fleet itself but from what it represented* namely, a country
capable of drastic economic reprisals and additional naval action* If the
decision were made by the Ja anese to risk the American use of either or both
of the underlying sources of potential power, the naval forces on station
in the Orient would be sadly inadequate in &v&ry respect* This fact had been
recognised clearly since Mahan*
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In 1935 the Hepburn Board, reviewing the future needs of the Navy,
specially recommended "adequate air and submarine protection securely based
on Quam" to make that island "secure against anything short of a najor effort
on the part of any probable enemy* "^ If the use of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor
"on the flank of any Japanese move to the south" served Stimson as a deterrent
against Japan in 1932, would not a secure base at Oosm to which Melts of the
United States Fleet migfrt deploy to operate thousands of miles closer to
Japan and "which would provide for the security of the Asiatic fleet in time
of sudden emergency" be even more deterring" The Japanese definitely thought
so earlier* The removal of the threat of a fortified Guam was sine qua non
to their acceptance of the Washington Haval Treaty in 1922* For many
reasons Congressmen did not approve the Apra Harbor Improvement bill which
was the first step in building up the base at 3uam in 1939* In retrospect*
a defended Guam would have strengthened considerably the Orange and Rainbow
5 War Plans, most probably would have served as a stronger dete rent than the
fleet in Hawaii and quite possibly would have received the same treatment
meted out at ftsarl Harbor.
Coincidentially, days before the Hepburn Board Report was published,
Admiral Yamell in a personal letter informed Admiral Leahy, the Chief of
Naval Operations, of his views of problems in the Pacific. Admiral Leahy by
memorandum passed extracts of larnell*s letter to ^resident Roosevelt*
TarneU*s recommendations weret
'Tetters Statutory Board on Submarine, Destroyer, Mine and Naval Air
Bases, 1933 j (Hepburn Board Report)} 1 December 1933, p. 66$ MHD Filet
Hepburn Board*
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3* ** An annooneansnt to Japan that the United
States, freat Britain, France and the Netherlands East
Indies, that [violations of the Nina ower] Treaty vill
not be recognised*
b, No money to be loanod to Japan ty any of the
signatory powers*
c* Prohibition of shipssnt of war material to
Japan*
d* Strengthening of acific and Guam specifically.
1. Decided Increase of Aaray and Navy aviation
in the Pacific*
2* Increase of submarine force*
3* Tioerease of base facilities*
U* Increase of AA defense*
5* Base an Increased amber of heavy cruisers
on Hawaii*
e* The otlier nations to increase their forces
accordingly and to take similar measures*
f• For every note written, there should be some
increase of cur strength in the Far East*
h» It is only by such means that respect will be
gained for our diplomatic efforts* Japan at present is in
a dangerous position with respect to her• • •military men In
China who must be supplied from overseas* Any threat
against this line of communications by a competent and ample
force. ••will have a profound effect on her attitude of mind
^y regarding the settlement of the present controversy***
J&et of A&alral Tarnell's suggestions were adopted, but generally too late
In 19lil to deter the Japanese.
Another Admiral who need the Chief of Naval Operations as a pipeline to
the ^resident during this period was Admiral Richardson* He was vary
concerned about the inadequacy of American preparedness to act alone in the
Far East against Japan* "When the China Incident started and on every
opportunity until after I left the Job as Asst* C*M*0* I used to say to Bill
Leahy, Be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to [be] drawn into
this unless we have allies so bound to us that they can not leave us In the
semot William D. Leahy to the President, 15 December 1933 f Roosevelt
^pers* Secretary's Files j I Dip* Correspondence, 1933-37, 1939-Ul, Box 11,
Memorial library*
-dtva \.T£J; bo* viA :© Memo! btklteG JT
.
••owl mUramkn 1© ••sewiX
ffnfp Mttrf 1* MtMl
itefttb AA ?.c «umt_
JMjMi pUM ftMftiMI bBMNNtf rA Mtf
nwil Ytari* macvmU o* sopite widr




«w;j ^kA *mmwvo »*»* IxtfJDqtpi «* *•** offer aabfO
rffto to* *nmHt?v * vrf wmiiiiyfi—i * mOX 9U» imln*
tete fc IxtUtt* -km' no 4oc»tte batata** « mruf
viMKMTUf fff* lfl HMMtrtttn «£4 OlttWJII
.ffwwif* *rf «jj—iwa« «tmt — AJwi»aj atJUtfritt Jtautf
c j anlX*^ « »t tnolAraqO .CataM 1c lelrfs ad J fc*eu <r. «&A **UtwU
oil tf£i 4»a •* wafciygrm gUihww* to \iiwiiilii«t *# AhwT» Jbtitfte ttK i
CLM M r*f; -* iMktr I * •« • . • >j ' ; 'v; '. •• •i'iwt I wAi £ltM
•All HMTii* io-.fi o4 Arunr to:; ob iv m.^ ««oj e.tt Mi «M«* M •
«rii at «.' #t**I ion km \mU Jtott aa •# bootf 08 mmUlM tvjd r * m#Xj
MtMgMf - ' VHtavMd • * . ifcfeJtaMri Mtt -x? <0mJi «a fcftlXXJi
tG0i»*Vtt>f<s<moC< .cJtfJ I M*.
lurch."
On September 1, 1939 the War : lans Division was concerned over Japanese
mores "In the event that England and France enter war with Germany" and
recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations "that the nited States take
such immediate steps as nay be practicable to provide a deterrent effect
6
against such aggressive measures by Japan." Later, in December, the War
Plans Division was more specific in its recommendations. The Dutch East
Indies were particularly vulnerable to Japanese demands since England and
France were fully occupied in Europe and the ifetherlands "are so exposed to
German pressure*"
Consideration is therefore recommended as to whether or not
we should strengthen our military position in that area
before Spring in order to serve as some additional
deterrent to further Japanese expansion plans, and possibly
to make more forceful the efforts of the State Department
in that direction. Specifically, consideration is recom-
mended as to the advisability and practicability of
increasing, without delay and certainly before Spring, our
Army Air Force in the Philippines and possibly its garrison,
with an increase of at least one squadron of Navy patrol
planes to make more effective such an Army augmentation.
(Written at the bottom of the memorandum t "Discussed in
Joint Board meeting—no action taken as Army could not
comply.")'
Since the Army was incapable of reenforcing the Far r,ast forces, the
tfevy studied actions which it could take alone. On learning that the Japanese
Navy intended to move into the Dutch East Indies in May 19i|0, Captain Crenshaw
of War Plans Division suggested that the Havy discuss with the State
! earl Harbor Attack, Part Ha, p. 921*.
6
Memos War lane Division to CflD, 1 September 1939 j T3© File: Al6/Hbb
lists,
7
Memoi Certain Crenshaw to Admiral Stark, 9 December 1939$ HHD Files
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Department and the IVesident the interesting possibility of the United States
Fleet sending a division of OMAHA class cruisers to the Indies to make
a
similar mores* Captain Schuirmann, Liaison Officer with the State Department*
Discussed with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr* Hamilton* Chief of
Far Eastern Division, the proposal that* if Japan sends a
small occupation force for protection of Dutch ast Indies
we send a slmiliar (Sic) force* - and the variant of the
same idea* i.e** that we suggest or notify Japan that if
they occupy the islands that the United States share in
the occupation* Hornbeck and Hamilton were in agreement
that unless we were prepared to go to war* if necessary*
in event such joint occupation were opposed by Japan that
we should not make such a move* The proposal ~ of
suggesting to Japan some joint occupancy was not feasible
as Japan has stated they wished the status quo preserved*
I explained that this was not a proposal but was more
a suggestion which we were exploring* and in order to
clarify our own ideas we wished the reactions of the State
Department*?
The "grasping at straws" to deny the Dutch East Indies to the Japanese
gave way to more practical considerations of Joint actions with the Dutch
and British* Stanley Hornbeck extracted for the State Department the chief
points of a letter from Admiral Hart to Admiral Stark dated 13 November 19hp*
Stark earlier had reported to Hart by despatch advanced information
concerning his Plan Dog and proposals for American representatives to confer
with British and Dutch force commanders at Singapore and Batavia* Hart •a
letter interpreted lay Hornbeck read in parti
$• The only thing which will deter the Japanese
from an attempt to seise the Netherlands East Indies
will be their fear of opposing forces* By refusing to
confer with the British for defense of the Indies* the
Dutch are only doing themselves harm*
6* The certainty of British aid to the Dutch would
probably not be sufficient of itself permanently to deter
the Japanese*
^temot Captain Crenshaw to CNO, 15 May 19li0| NHD Files SA-SZ*
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7* The fullest use of our joint resources calls
for Staff discussions that would go immeasurably beyond
the "exchange of information" basis on which we are now
working* It should be possible for the United States, with-
out making any political oosnitment, to proceed on certain
assumptions* if there is a possibility that we will be
acting jointly with the British or Dutch*
3* A Japanese attack on British or mrtch possessions*
or both* is a most likely development unless the Japs are
fairly certain that we will Intervene. The occasion
approaches which will be our last chance to maintain our
right and interests in the Par "ast except entirely on our
own and starting from scratch*3**
Cooperation among the Far Kastern Powers was considered fcgr Hahan and f!ayj
Tarnell and Richardson had seen the nmA to cooperate against Japan, and
now Hart and Stark proposed agreements with a view to possible joint action,
yet history shows that the united front came only in extremis and certainly
too late to deter or to oppose effectively the Japanese*
On January 16, 191*1 the President in a White House conference announced
his decision to make no further reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet* The
background behind the decision is most significant because two schools of
thought were involved—one advanced by Admiral Stark was much more reserved
vis a vis Japan than the one advanced by the former Commander in Chief
Asiatic Fleet, Admiral larnell* Though in this instance Stark again was
able to persuade the 'resident to accept his reasoning, most of Actairal
Tarnell *s recommendations ultimately were tried*
Stark must be given credit for his consistency in the application of his
concept to naval and economic pressures against Japan* As indicated in Ids
Plan Dog, Stark did not want to do anything which would bring Japan into the
war until Germany was defeated. Just three days prior to the Presidents
10
Memot HORNBKCK's Evaluation of Letter Admiral flart to Admiral Stark,
13 November 19*40} Hat 71*0.0011 P.W./72*
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decision not to reenfarce the Asiatic Floet, he had written Admiral Ximmelt
Of course I do not want to become involved in the : acific,
if it is possible to avoid it* I have fought this out tine
and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully
realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in
the Atlantic at the same time; and to put it mildly, it
will be one H (sic) of a job...11
A month later Stark wrote? "There is a chance that farther moves againt (sic)
Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. WS want to
give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities
12
with Germany who w© all consider our major problem. w * The degrees to which
he was willing to go were indicated in his full support of Welles in the
13
State Department not to embargo oil to Jar? an and his unrelenting attempts
to counter the more daring proposals of Admiral Yarnell. )n the reenforcement
question, Stark had the complete support of Admiral Beeves, who had bBen
Oommander in Chief. United States Fleet in 1935.
The record does not show definitely who initiated the proposal which
triggered the discussion on the reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet. It could
very conceivably have been Admiral Yarnell. The proposal was to send
immediately to the Asiatic Fleet the aircraft and vessels which in the Navy
Basic *fer I Ian Rainbow 3 were termed the "Asiatic Fleet Reenforcement." In
the war plan the detachment to the Asiatic Fleet was to be sent from earl
Harbor "as soon after the outbreak of war as it could be prepared for the
trip." The detachment was not designed for operations in the Philippines,
11
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but for operations Initially from bases in the ?felay Barrier "in cooperation
15
with the British and Dutch naval, land and air forces there, » "The
reenforcement...if it had ever arrived, would have about trebled the surface
16
power of our Asiatic Fleet.
*
The analysis by Admiral Stark of the effects of reenforcing the
Asiatic Fleet in early January 19hX continued;
It is assumed that the reason for sending a reenforce-
raent to the 9« S. Asiatic Fleet is for the purpose of
deterring Japan from advancing against Malaya and the
Netherlands East Indies* It is not known whether or
not the government proposes to initiate war against
Japan. If we should do so. the demands of that war
will be such that we can do little to aid the British
Isles or to assist the British ffevy in the Atlantic
Ocean. It is my opinion that the British Isles cannot
long hold out against Germany unless we continue our
supply of materials to those Isles and, probably,
actively enter the war with our major naval forces
deployed in the Atlantic. Should we make war with our
major naval forces against Japan, X believe that
Britain will be defeated by Germany, and that the
nited States will then be left with decidedly inferior
naval forces in the Atlantic to protect our national
position and that it will be unable to withdraw from
the war with Japan without heavy losses of ships and
prestige. Should the reenforcement of our Asiatic
Fleet not deter Japan, but actually encourage her to
strike, we may be creating a situation that will
> result in a national disaster.^Hy advice is there-
fore, that we avoid war with Japan.1 '
Stark's analysis was consistent with his : Ian Dog and his often repeated
views on defeating Germany first. He was not willing to risk actions which
would lead to war with Japan or to risk the loss of his naval forces needed
15
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Admiral Yarnell may be said to have had the opposite perspective. He
was willing to send naval, forces to the Far "Ast to deter Japan and to use
force if the Japanese moved into southern Indo-Chlna. His suggestions to
the Secretary of the Navy may be summarised as follows: Strengthen the
hilippines with forces from ^anama and Hawaii} send a division of heavy
cruisers on a visit to Hew "©aland, A^istralia and Singapore; maintain a
striking force of cruisers and carriers at rearl IJarborj discuss plans of
coordinate action with the British and Dutch; the British should maintain
as large a naval and air force in Singapore as possible consistent with the
situation in dxrorte; and take positive action if Japan moves south from
18
Hanoi to Kamranh Bay and Saigon.
Admiral Stark commented on the Yarnell suggestions item by item in a
letter to the Secretary of the Navy on 17 January. Relative to the
strengtheni.jg of the "hilippines, Stark stated? "Anything we can send would
probably be inadequate for a successful bluff or deterrent to Japan. It
would certainly be inadequate to defend the Philippines, and it is doubtful
if it could be withdrawn in time to preserve Singapore, Malay or the Dutch
Fast Indies. It is inadequate for effective action of any serious nature
from the Philippines. " On the heavy cruiser visits to New Zealand,
Australia and Singapore, he commented i "From a military standpoint I think
a division of heavy cruisers in such an area on the outbreak of war would
be unfortunate." And finally, the taking of positive action against Japan
if she moved south from Hanoi, Stark interpreted as meaning war with Japan.
18
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"X do not recommend war against Japan if she seizes all of Indo-Cliina."
The Philippines were strengthened, cruisers were sent on visits to New
Zealand and Australia and "positive action" was taken by freezing assets
and invoking a complete oil enbargo after the Japanese moved south in Indo-
china. > Xarnellts suggestions were tried with Stark fluting then every
step of the way*
The final phase of the deterrent concept took on new meaning with the
fast moving events in the Fall of 19ijl« The previous attitude that it was
impossible to defend the Philippines gave way to optimism over General
MacArthur's new Army command and the arrival of B-17 bombers* submarines
and additional troops* In November Marshall and Stark in an "Estimate
concerning Far pastern Situation" for the "resident were able to report?
The present combined naval* air and ground forces will
make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking* Qy
about the middle of December. 191*1, United States air
and submarine strength in the Philippines will have
become a positive threat to any Japanese operations
south of Formosa* The **S* Army air forces in the
Philippines will have reached its projected strength by
February or March, 19U2. The potency of this threat
will have then increased to a point where it might well
be a deciding factor In deterring Japan in operations
in the areas south and west of the Philippines* By
this time, additional British naval and air reinforce-
ments to Singapore will have arrived* The general
defensive strength of the entire southern area against
possible Japanese operations will then have reached
impressive proportions*20
The last attempt to deter Japan failed by months* In an intriguing game of
historical supposition* it is most interesting to speculate whether Japan
would have been deterred if the final ?hilipr>ine buildup had been attained*
19
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The United states fleet at Hawaii as a deterrent*
As the war broke in Europe, Admiml tart, Commander in Chief Asiatic
Fleet, asked for a division of four heavy cruisers to rsenforce his fleet*
The Chief of Ifeval Operations, Admiral Stark wanted to do what he could for
Hart, to strengthen the State Department* s hand and at the sane ti»e not
weaken the Navy's position. On review of the Orange War rlan, and after
having talked it over with the resident who "okayed it one hundred percent;
as did the State Department" rtark sent a detachment to Hawaii rather than
to the Asiatic Fleet* The Asiatic Fleet received one tender, a squadron of
patrol planes and six new subnarines instead of the cruisers, which remained
under the control of the Commander in Chief* In correspondence with Admiral
Richardson over the Hawaiian Detactsient, Admiral Stark said a
I still think the decision to send the Detachment
to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound* No
one can measure how Much effect its presence there may
have on the Orange foreign policy* The State Depart-
ment is strong for the present setup and considers it
beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press
releases, etc."
At the end of the annual naval maneuvers the United States Fleet was
in Hawaiian waters* On May 7 Stark wrote to Richardson in Hawaii* "Just
hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this
reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian Waters for a
couple of weeks*" On May 22 Richardson, still in Hawaii uninformed about
the plans for his fleet and facing problems of scheduling and training,
wrote rtark again to find "why we are here and how long we will probably
23
stay?" Stark »s answer wast "You are there because of the deterrent effect
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whlch it Is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East
Indies* M Later he added:
• ••you would naturally ask—suppose the Jape do go
into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it?
Hy answer is that is, (sic) I don»t know and I think
there is nobody in Ood*s green earth who can tell you.
I do know my own argument with regard to this, both in
the White House and in the State Department, are in line
with the thought contained in your recent letter*
I would point out one tiling and that is that even
if the decision here were for the tf*S* to take no
decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the
Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as
by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for
your presence in the Hawaiian area* Just remember that
the Japs don*t know what we are going to do and so
Icing (sic) as they don*t know they may hesitate, or be
deterred *<2*
It would appear that a cycle had been completed* Roosevelt had inherited a
fleet at earl Harbor being used as a deterrent against the Japanese when
he took office in 1933*
Admiral Richardson did not accept the validity of the concept that the
fleet at Pearl Harbor was a deterrent to the Japanese* He visited Washington
to persuade the President to return the fleet to the west coast where it
could be better supported and trained* In a memorandum covering his talks
with the President, Richardson recorded that the President could be convinced
"of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if /he
couldJ7 be given a good statement which will convince the American people,
and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West
2$
Coast we are not stepping backward. " Roosevelt is also reported to have
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stay put." Stark in November 19u0, reiterated the problem to Richardson:
n Aa you know, the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii is delicate,
and could hardly be accomplished without a certain amount of preparation in
Washington* It does not now appear that we can withdraw it without some
2?
good pretext*" It would appear that the Fleet was imprisoned at I earl
Harbor by the deterrent idea which first put it there* Its withdrawal might
be considered by the Japanese as the withdrawal of a deterrent, thereby
giving encouragement to any moves which were held in abeyance because of the
deterrent*
In a letter to Stark on October 22, Hiehardson stated that his feelings
the previous July were "that the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area
solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese
aggressive action and ... that there was no intention of embarking on actual
hostilities against Japan*" After Ills October visit he felt that the United
States planned more active steps against Japan which would lead to war*
He then outlined the serious deficiencies in the Fleet *s readiness for war*
On February 1, l?Ul, Admiral Richardson was relieved by Admiral Ximmel
because he insisted upon the fleet returning to the west coast, according to
one revisionist* ^IClmnel and the deterring fleet remained in place until
the deterrent was removed not to the West Coast by the Jaited States but to
the bottom of Paarl Barber by the Japanese*
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The attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines narked the end of a
nost significant >hase in Japanese-American foreign relations. The years
of planning forwar with Japan were at &n end. In the preceding five years
the old unrealistic Orange War Ian reached its last stage of development.
Fortunately for the United States it was not given the ultimate test, for
although the objectives and estimated requirements were pared down from the
original,^ihe last )range Plan was still overly ambitious. The chronic
shortage of troops, the lack of a train to sup; -art a fleet movement, the
weakness of the ; hilippine defenses and the unknown oar abilities of the
Japanese in the Jiandated Islands were factors which couM not be ignored.
Attempts to visit the strategically located islands, so inconveniently
located across American lines of communications to the Orient, failed,
lending more weight to suspicions of illegal fortifications. To have allowed
the islands to pass from Spanish possession through German hands to the
Japanese was a strategic mistake due to lack of foresightedness. Hot to
ensure that the islands were kept in accordance with the mandate was an
accepted strategic risk, since Ouam and the Philippines were undefended by
the Washington Treaty of 1922.
As German successes continued in 19k0 American naval leaders appreciated
more the necessity of cooperation with allies in the Atlantic and Pacific.
The strategic thinking found expression in Admiral Stark* s Ian Dog.
Subsequently conferences with the British in early 19iil produced an agree-
ment on strategy in the Atlantic, but meetings with the British and Dutch
in Singapore and Batavia were less fruitful* In the pacific the strategic
questions such as the defense of Singapore continued to generate disagree-
ments, so much so that war started without a workable operations plan. The
weak Asiatic Fleet and its British and Dutch counterparts paid the price
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before a superior Japanese force* In fairness to the Tar East allies an
operations agreement would not have solved all their problem. Too little
attention was paid to a major strength factor of the Japanese which effectively
took its toll of ships—air superiority. The subsequent loss of ths PRXKOS
OP WAI.ES and the I are oases in point.
The question of the oil export restrictions was a thorny one. Japan
received the bulk of her oil frora the 'nited States. As the possibility of
war with Japan increased, the export of oil was tantamount to furnishing a
probable enemy with important logistic support. )n the surface such actions
would appear strategically unsound, but several considerations colored the
whole picture. Qy 1939 Japan had accumulated her huge oil reserves 9 and
in the period of accumulation the American people were little concerned over
future national security. There was no attempt to curtail the profitable
oil trade while the reserves were being built, When operations in China
out into the reserves and huge orders were placed to compensate for the
increased use. the international situation had changed. Oil in 19u0 had
become a strategic commodity due to the war in ®xro\m 9 and Japan was tied
to the Axis I overs fighting in that area.
Secretaries Morgenthau, Stimson. Knox and Ickes and many naval officers
thought that curtailing shipments of oil to Japan would deter that nati
from further aggression, reasoning that for want of oil she could not fight
elsewhere. It would appear that this faction had a low estimate of the
accumulated reserve, or else chose to ignore the fact that a total embargo
did not run the tap) dry immediately. Conservative estimates gave Japan
nine to twelve months reserve at "normal" war usage. The group lead by
Stark and Welles, who wanted limited shipments continued (which amounted
to near total orders through circumvention) reasoned that though the price
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of peace in the Pacific were high, it was worth it until the defeat of
Germany- were assured* Again it is interesting to speculate whether
continuing the oil shipments would have kept Japan out of the war long
enough for the deterrents in the Pl&lippines and in the British Far eastern
Fleet to become completely effective, or whether Ja an would have reacted
to the deterrents regardless of the oil policy. Fears of Japanese seizure
of the oil in Dutch Bt*t Indies started even before the War in Europe and
certainly contributed to the ultimate decision to build up the British and
American forces in the Far East in late lylil. Those deterrents in the
Philippines and the augmented British Fleet and the 'Jnited States Fleet "on
her eastern flank" were effective against Japan until the decision to strike
I earl Harbor was made. That which Stark feared happened. With prospects of
diminishing oil reserve and ever growing deterrents encircling her. Japan
decided she had to strike while she could. Those forces which posed the
greatest threat to her were the first to be attacked and quickly eliminated.
The first target was the fleet at .earl Harbor. That force represented
the only military force available to the Administration until mobilization
and training created a new Army. Though its presence at Hawaii served as a
deterrent force, units were constantly being siphoned off for duty in the
Atlantic against the German threat. Until the build up of the "two-ocean
navy" voted in July 191*0, there were not enough ships to fight a war in both
oceans. Genuine fear that Germany might gain control of the French and
British Fleets in the summer of 1?U()* dictated avoidance of war with Japan.
History will probably uphold Stark's Plan Dog as good strategic thinking
under the circumstances.
The influence of the naval leaders and the use of the Mavy figured
heavily in determining American positions in relations with Japan in this
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period. Stark 1 e support of Welles on the oil matter and his fighting the
State Department on the use of ships to vieit the Far Bast or to be used to
reenforce the Asiatic Fleet or Singapore night appear inconsistentX ctually
there was continuity to Stark's thoughts and that was to keep Japan out of
war until Germany were defeated. To this end also Stark, according to his
correspondence, repeatedly and successfully pressed his points en the
resident. He was in an ideal position with a personal relationship with
a naval-oriented r resident. Yet despite his favored position, his near
opposite in strategic thinking, Admiral Yarnell, also influenced the
resident and had most of his ideas tried. The Hoosevelt technique of
orchestrating the divergent views of his subordinates applied to naval
strategy at well as in the political fields.
The Tnited States Navy in the period discussed was certainly the
dominant American force in the acific and naval strategy and naval
influence were deeply involved in almost all relations with Japan. Though
the naval influence was pronounced and the ?Javy must take its share of the
mistakes made, the final decisions were made by the .resident.
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APPENDIX A
"PUN DGO"
Op-12-CTB November 12 , 19UQ
'MORANDUN FOR THE SECRETARY
Referring to my very brief touch in a recent conference as to the
desirability of obtaining at once some Hpjht upon the major decisions which
the Fresident nay make for guiding our future naval effort in the event of
war, and in further immediate preparation for war, you my recall my remarks
the evening we discueeed War ^larai for the Navy* I stated then that if
Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere? but that if
she loses the problem confronting us would be very great j and, while we
ml?>ht not lose everywhere , we might possibly, not win anywhere .
As I stated last winter on the Hill, in these circumstances we would be
set back upon our haunches* Our war effort, instead of bein :: widespread,
would then have to be confined to the "'©stern Hemisphere*
I now wish to expand my remarks, and to present to you ay views con-
cerning steps we might take to meet the situation that will exist should the
United States enter war either alone or with allies* In this presentation, I
have endeavored to keep in view the political realities in our own country*
The first thing to consider is how and where we might become involved*
(a) War with Japan in which we have no allies* This mi^t be
precipitated by Japanese armed opposition should we strongly reinforce our
Asiatic Fleet or the Philippines Garrison, should we start fortifying Guam,
or should we impose additional important economic sanctions; or it might be
precipitated by ourselves in case of overt Japanese action against us, or by
further attention of Japanese hegemony*
(b) War with Japan in which we have the British Empire, or the British
Empire and Netherlands East Indies, as allies* This might be precipitated
by one of the causes mentioned in (a) , by our movement of a naval reinforce-
ment to Singapore, or by Japanese attack on British or Netherlands territory*
(c) War with Japan in which she is aided by Germany and Italy, and in
which we are or are not aided by allies* To the causes of such a war,
previously listed, might be added augmented American material assistance to
Great Britain, our active military intervention in Britain's favor, or our
active resistance to German extention of military activities to the -Western
Hemisphere*
(d) ,Tar with Germany and Italy in which Japan would not be initially
Involved and in which we would be allied with the British* Such a was- would
be initiated by American decision to intervene for the purpose of preventing
the disruption of the British Empire, or German capture of the British Isles,
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(e) We should also consider the alternative of now remaining out of
war, and devoting ourselves exclusively to building up our defense of the
Western Hemisphere, >lus the preservation by peaceful means of our Far
Eastern interests, and plus also continued material assistance to Great
Britain.
As I see it, our major national objectives in the immediate future
"tif-ftt be stated as preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological
integrity of the ifcited States, plus that of the remainder of the Western
Hemisphere} the prevention of the disruption of the British itoipire, with all
that such a consummation implies; and the diminution of the offensive
military power of Japan, with a view to the retention of our economic and
political interests in the Far East* It is doubtful, however, that it would
be in our interest to reduce Japan to the status of an inferior military and
economic power* A balance of power in the Ear East is .to our interest as
much as is a balance of power in Europe*
The questions that confront us are concerned with the preparation and
distribution of the naval forces of the United States, in cooperation with
its military forces, for use in war in the accomplishment of all or part of
these national objectives*
I can only surmise as to the military, political, and economic situation
that would exist in the Atlantic should the British Empire collapse* Since
Latin-America has rich natural resources, and is the only important area of
the world not now under the practical control of strong military powers, we
can not dismiss the possibility that, sooner or later, victorious Axis nations
ni^ht move firmly in that direction* For some years they might remain too
weak to attack directly across the seaj their effort more likely would first
be devoted to developing Latin American economic dependence, combined with
strongly reinforced internal political upheavals for the purpose of
establishing friendly regimes in effective military control* The immediacy
of danger to us may depend upon the security of the Axis military position
in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, the degree of our own military
preoccupation in the Pacific, and the disturbing influence of unsatisfied
economic .eeds of Latin-America*
The present situation of the British Empire is not encouraging* I believe
it easily possible, lacking active American military assistance, for that
empire to lose this war and eventually be disrupted*
It is my opinion that the British are over-optimistic as to their chances
for ultimate success* It is not at all sure that the British Isles can hold
out, and it may be that they do not realise the danger that will exist should
they lose in other regions*
Should Britain lose the war, the military consequences to the United
States would be serious*
If we are to prevent the disruption of the 3ritish Empire, we must support
its vital needs*
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Obviously, the British Isles, the "Heart of the Empire", mist remain
intact*
But even if the British Isles are held* this does not mean that Britain
can win the war* To win* she must finally be able to effect the complete* or*
at least* the partial collapse of the Gorman Reich*
This result might* conceivably* be accomplished by bombing and by
economic starvation through the agency of the blockade* It surely can be
accomplished only by military successes on shore* facilitated possibly by
over-extension and by internal antagonisms developed by the Axis conquests*
Alone* the British Empire lacks the man power and the material means to
master Germany* Assistance by powerful allies Is necessary both with respect
to men and with respect to munitions and supplies* If such assistance is to
function effectively* Britain must not only continue to maintain the blockade*
but she must also retain intact geographical positions from which successful
land action can later be launched*
rovided England continues to sustain its present successful resistance
at home* the area of next concern to the British Empire ought to be the
Egyptian Theater*
Should Kgypt be lost, the Eastern Mediterranean would be opened to
Germany, and Italy, the effectiveness of the sea blockade would be largely
nullified | Turkey's military position would be fully compromised! and all
hope of favorable Bussian action would vanish*
Any anti-German offensive in the Near East would then become impossible*
The spot next in importance to Egypt, in my opinion, is Gibraltar,
combined with /est and northwest Africa* From this area an ultimate
offensive through Portugal, Spain and Prance, with the help of populations
inimical to Germany, might give results equal to those which many years ago
were produced by Wellington* The western gate to the Mediterranean would
still be .cent closed, provided Britain holds this region*
This brief discussion naturally brings into question the value to Britain
of the Mediterranean relative to that of Hon?: Kong, Singapore and India*
Were the Mediterranean lost, Britain's strength in the Far East could be
augmented without weakening home territory*
Japan probably wants the British out of Hong Kong and Singapore; and
wants economic control, and ultimately military control, of Malaysia.
It is v&ry questionable if Japan has territorial ambitions in Australia
and New Zealand*
But does she now wish the British out of India, thus exposing that region
and Western China to early Russian penetration or islifluence? I doubt it*
It would seem more probable that Japan, devoted to the Axis alliance only
so far as her own Immediate interests are involved, would prefer not to move
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military forces against Britain, and pr*sib3y not against the Netherlands
East Indies , because , if she can obtain a high decree of economic control
over Malaysia* she will then be in a position to Improve her financial
structure by increased trade with Britain and America. Her economic offensive
power will be increased. Her military dominance will follow rapidly or
slowly, as seems best at the time.
The Netherlands East Indies has 60,000,000 people, under the rule of
80,000 Dutchmen, including women and children. This political situation can
not be viewed as in permanent equilibrium. The rulers are unsupported by a
home country or by an alliance. Native rebellions have occurred in the past,
and may recur in the future. These Dutchmen will act in what they believe
is their own selfish best interests.
Will they alone resist aggression, or will they accept an accommodation
with the Japanese?
Will they resist, if supported only by the British Krapire?
Will they firmly resist, if supported by the British Empire and the U.
States?
Will the British resist Japanese aggression directed only against the
Netherlands 3ast Indies?
Should both firmly resist, what local military assistance will they
sBquire from the 'tatted States to ensure success?
No light on these questions has been thrown by the report of the
proceedings of the recent Singapore Conference.
The basic character of a war against Japan by the British and Dutch would
be the fixed defense of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and Java* The allied
army, naval, and air forces now in position are considerable, and some
future reenforcement may be expected from Australia and Hew Zealand. Borneo
and the inlands to the Bast are vulnerable. There is little chance for an
allied offensive. Without Dutch assistance, the external effectiveness of the
British bases at Hong Kong and Singapore would soon disappear.
The Japanese deployment in 'lanohukuo and China requires much of their
Army, large supplies and merchant tonnage, and some naval force* It is
doubtful if Japan will feel secure in withdrawing much strength 1'rom in front
of Russia, regardless of non-aggression agreements. The winter lull in China
will probably permit the withdrawal of the forces they need for a campaign
against Malaysia. The availability of ample supplies for such a campaign is
problematical.
Provided the British and Dutch cooperate in a vigorous and efficient
defense of Malaysia, Japan will need to make a major effort with all
categories of military force to capture the entire . rea* The campaign mijht
even last several months. Whether Japan would concurrently be able
successfully to attack Kong Kong and the Philippines, and also strongly to
support the fixed positions in the Mid-Pacific, seems doubtful.
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Daring such a campaign, due to her wide dispersion of effort, Japan
would, unquestionably be more vulnerable to attack by the United States (or
by Russia) than she would be onoe Malaysia is in her possession.
This brings us to a consideration of the strategy of an American war
against Japan, that is, either the so-called "Orange Plan", or a modification.
It must be understood that the orange Flan was drawn up to govern our opera-
tions when the United States and Japan are at war, and no other nations are
involved.
You have heard enough fc£ the Orange Plan to know that, in a nutshell,
it envisages our Fleet 1 s proceeding westward throu# the Marshalls and the
Carolines, consolidating as it goes, and then on to the recapture of the
Philippines. Once there, the Orange Plan contemplates the eventual economic
starvation of Japan, and, finally, the complete destruction of her external
military power. Its accomplishment would require several years, and the
absorption of the full military, naval, and economic energy of the American
people.
In proceedine through these Xle> Pacific islands, we have several sub-
sidiary objectives in mind. First, we hope that our attack will induce the
Japanese to expose their fleet in action against our fleet, and lead to their
naval defeat. Second, we wish to destroy the ability of the Japanese to use
these positions as air and submarine bases from which to project attacks on
our lines of communication to the mainland and Hawaii. Third, we would use
the captured positions for supporting our further advance westward.
Most of the island positions are atolls* These atolls, devoid of natural
sources of water other than rainfall, and devoid of all supplies, are merely
narrow coral and sand fringes around large shallow areas where vessels may
anchor. Alone, they are undefendable against serious attack, either by one
side or the other. They do, however, afford weak positions for basins
submarines and seaplanes. Our Fleet should have no difficulty in capturing
atolls, provided we have enough troops, but we could not hold them
indefinitely unless the Jleet were nearh •
We know little about the Japanese defenses in the Mid-Pacific. We
believe the real islands of Truk and Ponape in the Carolines are defended with
guns and troops, and we believe that some of the atolls of the Marshalls may
be equipped as submarine and air bases, and be garrisoned with relatively
small detachments of troops.
The Marshalls contain no sites suitable for bases in the absence of the
Fleet, though there are numerous good anchorages. With the Fleet at hand,
they can be developed for use as seaplane and submarine bases for the support
of an attack on real islands such as onape and Truk. ith the Fleet
permanently absent, they will succumb to any serious thrust.
Our first real Marshall-Caroline objective is Truk, a magnificant
harbor, relatively easily defended against raids, &ai capable of conversion
into an admirable advanced base. When we get this far in the accompl*ahment
of the "Orange Plan", we have the site for a base where we can begin to
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assemble our ships , stores, and troops, for farther advance toward the
illppines* It would also become the center of the defense system for the
lines of communications against flank attack from Japan.
Getting to Truk involves a strong effort* We would incur losses from
aircraft, mines and submarines, particularly as the latter could be spared
the operations in Malaysia, ^ie would lose many troops in assaulting the
islands*
doing beyond Truk initiates the most difficult part of the Orange Flan,
would take a Ion? time, and would require the maximum effort which the United
States could sustain*
Truk is not looked upon as a satisfactory final geographical objective*
It is too far away to support useful operations in the China Sea* It can not
be held in the absence of fairly continuous Fleet support* >o matter what
rains are made in the Old- 'acifle, they would undoubtedly be lost were the
Fleet to be withdrawn to the Atlantic* We would have then to choose between
a lengthy evacuation process, and a major loss of men, material and prestige*
In advancing to the capture of Ponape and Truk, the Orange flan con-
templates proceeding promptly, delaying in the Marshalls only lonj enou^i to
destroy Japanese shore bases, to capture the atolls necessary to support the
advance and to deny future bases to Japan*
We have little knowledge as to the present defensive strength of the
Marshall and Caroline groups, considered as a whole* If they are well
defended, to capture them we estimate initial needs at 25,000 thoroughly
trained troops, with another $0,000 in immediate reserve* If they are not
well defended, an early advance with fewer troops might be YQry profitable*
Several months must elapse from the present date before 75#0O0 troops could
be made ready, considering the defense requirements of Alaska, Hawaii, and
Samoa, and our commitments with respect to the internal political stability
of the Latln-Amerioan countries*
We should consider carefully the chances of failure as well as of success*
An immediate success would be most important morally, while a failure would be
oostly from the moral viewpoint* Before invading Uorway, Germany trained for
three months the veterans of the Polish campaign, Itemerabering Norway, we have
the example of two methods of overseas adventure* One is the British method;
the other is the German method*
The question of jumping directly from Hawaii to the iMU|)plnes hao often
been debated, but, so far as I know, this plan has always been ruled out by
responsible authorities as unsound from a military viewpoint* Truk is 1900
miles from Yokohama, 5300 miles from San Francisco, 3200 from Honolulu, and
2000 miles from %nila* I mention this to compare the logistic problem with
that of the Norway incident* An enormous amount of shipping would be required.
Its availability under present world conditions would be doubtful.
Of course the foregoing, (the Orange Plan) , is a major commitment in the
aeific, and does not envisage the cooperation of allies* Once started the
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abandonment of the offensive required by the plan, to meet a threat in the
Atlantic, would involve abandoning the objectives of the war, and also great
loss of prestige*
A totally different situation would exist were the Philippines and Guam
rendered secure against attack by adequate troops, aircraft, and fortifica-
tions* The movement of the fleet across the Pacific for the purpose ot
applying direct pressure upon Japan, and its support when in position, would
be less difficult than in the existing situation*
Should we adopt the present Orange Plan today, or any modification of
that plan which involves the movement of very strong naval and army
contingents to the Far East, we would have to accept considerable danger in
the Atlantic, and would probably be unable to augment our material assistance
to Great Britain*
We should, therefore, examine other plans which involve a war having a
more limited objective than the complete defeat of Japan, and in which we
would undertake hostilities only in cooperation with the British and Dutch,
and in which these undertake to provide an effective and continued resistance
in Malaysia*
Our involvement in war in the Pacific might well make us also an ally of
Britain in the Atlantic. The naval forces remaining in the Atlantic, for
help ng our ally and for defending ourselves, would, by just so much, reduce
the power which the United States Fleet could put forth in the Pacific*
The objective in a limited war against Japan would be the reduction of
Japanese offensive power chiefly through economic blockade* Under one
concept, allied strategy would comprise holding the ^alay Barrier, denying
access to other sources of supply in Malaysia, severing her lines of
communication with the Astern Hemisphere, and raiding communications to the
'*id-Pacific, the hilippin%, China, and Indo-China* United States defensive
strategy would also require army reenforcement of Alaska and the Hawaiian
Islands, the establishment of naval bases in the Fiji, Samoan and Gilbert
Islands areas, and denial to Japan of the use of the Marshalls as liiht
force bases* V'e might be able to re-enforce the 'hiliapine garrison,
particularly with aircraft* I do not believe that the British and IXitch
alone could hold ?folay 3arrier without direct military assistance by the
United States* In addition to help from our Asiatic Fleet, X am convinced
that they would need further reenforcement by ships and aircraft drawn fro»
our KLeet in Hawaii, and possibly even by troops*
Besides military aid for the allied defense forces, our intervention
would brin,* them a tremendous moral stimulus*
An alternative concept of the suggested limited war would provide
additional support from the main body of the Fleet either by capturing the
Harebells, or by capturing both the Marshall* and Carolines* This, or a
similar fleet activity, would be for the purpose of diverting away from
Malaysia important Japanese forces to oppose it, and thus reducing the
strength of their assault against the Dutch and British*
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But we should consider the prospect that the losses which we would incur
in such operations wight not be fruitful of compensating results. Furthermore,
withdrawal of the Fleet from captured positions for transfer to the Atlantic
would be more difficult*
It is out of the question to consider sending our entire Jleet at
to Singapore. Base facilities are far too limited, the supply problem would
be v9ry great, and Hawaii, Alaska, and our coasts would be greatly exposed to
raids.
One point to remember, in connection with a decision to adept a limited
offensive role, as in both of the alternative plans just mentioned, is that,
in case of reverses, public opinion may require a stronger effort. For
example, should Japanese success in the Far "ast seem Imminent, there would
be great pressure brought to bear to support our force there, instead of
leaving it hanging in the air* Thus, what we might originally plan as a
limited war with Japan might well become an unlimited war; our entire
strength would then be required in the Far East, and little force would remain
for eventualities in the Atlantic and for the support of the British Isles*
Let us now look eastward, and examine our possible action in the Atlantic.
In the first place, if we avoid serious eomitment in the Pacific, the
purely American Atlantic problem, envisaging defense of our coasts, the
Caribbean, Canada, and South America, plus giving strong naval assistance to
Britain, is not difficult so long as the British are able to maintain their
present naval activity. Should the British Isles then fall we would find
ourselves acting alone, and at war with the world. To repeat, we would be
thrown back on our haunches*
Should we enter the war as an ally of Great Britain, and not then be at
war with Japan, we envisage the British asking us for widespread naval
assistance* Roughly, they would want us, in the Western Atlantic Ocean from
Cape Sable to Cape Horn, to protect shipping against raiders and submarine
activities* They would also need strong reenforcements for their escort and
mlneaweeping forces in their home waters; and strong flying boat reconnaissance
from Scotland, the Atlantic Islands, and Capetown* lyw might ask us to
capture the Asores and the Cape Verde Islands*
To their home waters they would have us send submarines and small craft,
and to the Mediterranean assistance of any character which we may be able to
provide* They would expect us to take charge of allied interests in the
acifio, and to send a naval detachment to Singapore*
This purely naval assistance, would not, in my opinion, assure final
victory for Oreat Britain* Victory would probably depend upon her ability
ultimately to make a land offensive against the Axis powers* For making a
successful land offensive, British man power is insufficient. Offensive
troops from other nations will be required* I believe that the United States,
in addition to sending naval assistance, would also m&d to send large air
and land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, and to artieipate strongly in
this land offensive* The naval task of transporting an army abroad would be
large*
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To carry out such tasks we would have to exert a major naval and
railitary effort in the Atlantic. Wo would than be able to do little more in
the Pacific than remain on a strict defensive.
Were we to enter the war against Germany and Italy as an ally of Great
Britain, I do not necessarily anticipate imsedi&te hostile action by Japan*
whatever may be her Axis obligation* She may fear eventual consequences and
do nothing* we might be faced with demands for concessions as the price of
her neutrality* She might agree to defer her aggressions in the Netherlands
East Indies for the time being by a guarantee of ample economic access to the
Western Hemisphere and to British and Dutch possessions* But she mi^ht even
demand complete cessation of British and American assistance to China*
The strong wish of the American government and people at present seems
to be to remain at peace* In spite of this, we must face the possibility
that we may at any moment become involved in war* With war in prospect, I
believe our every effort should be directed toward the prosecution of a
national policy with mutually supporting diplomatic and' military aspects *
and having as its guiding feature a determination that any intervention we
may undertake shall be such as will ultimately best promote our own national
interests* We should see the best answer to the question? wwhere should we
fight the' war, and for what objective?* With the answer to this question to
guide me, I can make a more logical plan, can more appropriately distribute
the naval forces, can ':. itter coordinate the future material preparation of
the Navy, and can more usefully advise as to whether or not proposed
diplomatic measures can adequately be supported by available naval strength*
That is to say, until the question concerning our final railitary
objective is authoritatively answered, I can not determine the scale and the
nature of the effort which the Havy may be called upon to exert in the Far
?ast, the Pacific, and the Atlantic*
It is a fundamental requirement of our military position that our home-
land remain secure against successful a&taek. Directly concerned in this
security is the safety of other parts of the Western Hemisphere* A very
strong pillar of the defense structure of the Americas has, for many years,
been the balance of power existing in Europe* The ccl lapse of Great Britain
or the destruction or surrender of the British Fleet will destroy this
balance and will free Kuropean military power for possible encroachment in
this hemisphere*
I believe that we should recognise as the foundation of adequate armed
strength the possession of a profitable foreign trade, both in raw materials
and in finished goods* without such a trade, our economy can scarcely
support heavy armaments* The restoration of foreign trade, particularly with
Europe, may depend upon the oontinued integrity of the British ^Smpire*
It may be possible for us te prevent a British collapse by military
intervention*
Our interests in the Far FAst are very important* The economic effect
of a complete Japanese hegemony in that region is conjectural* But regardless
of economic considerations, we have heretofore strongly opposed the further
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expannion of Japan*
We might temporarily check Japanese expansion by defeating her In a war
In the Far Seat, but to check her permanently would require that ve retain
possession of, and militarily develop* an extensive and strategically
located Asiatic base area having reasonably secure lines of communication
with the United States. Retaining, and adequately developing, an Asiatic base
area would mean the reversal of longstanding American policy*
Whether we could ensure the continued existence of a strong British
Empire by soundly defeating Japan in the Jar Sast is questionable, though
continuing to hold on there for the present is a definite contribution to
3ritish strenjjth*
Lacking possession of an Asiatic base area of our
,,
own, continued British
strength in the Far East would doubtless prove advantageous to us in checking
Japan permanently*
The military matters diseased in tills memorandum nay property receive
consideration In arriving at a decision on the course that we should adopt
in the diplomatic field* An early decision in this field will facilitate
a naval preparation which will best promote the adopted course* As I see
affairs today } answers to the following broad questions will be most useful
to the Navy*
(A) Shall our principal military effort be directed toward hemisphere
defense, and include chiefly those activities within the Western hemisphere
which contribute directly to security against attack In either or both oceans?
An affirmative answer would indicate that the United States, as seems now
to be the hope of this country, would remain out of war unless pushed into
it» If and when forced into war, the greater psrtion of our Fleet could
remain for the time being in its threatening position in the Pacific, but
no major effort would be exerted overseas either to the east or the west) the
most that would be done for allies, besides providing material help, would
be to send detachments to assist in their defense* It should be noted here
that, were minor help to be given in one direction, public opinion might
soon push us into giving it major support, as was the* *?ass in the World War*
Under this plan, our influence upon the outcome of the European War would
be small*
J
Shall we prepare for a full offensive against Japan, premised on
assistance from the British and Dutch forces in the Far Sast, and remaf i on
the strict defensive In the Atlantic? If this course is selected, we would
be placing full trust in the British to hold their own indefinitely in the
Atlantic, or, at least, until after we should have defeated Japan decisively,
and thus had fully curbed her offensive power Tor the time being* Plans for
augmenting the scale of our present material assistance to Oreat Britain would
be adversely affected until Japan had b&en decisively defeated. The length
of time required to defeat Japan would be very considerable*
If we enter the war against Japan and then if Great Britain loses, we
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probably would in any case havo to reorient towards the Atlantic* ihere is
no dissenting view on this point*
(C) Shall we plan for sending the strongest possible military assistance
both to the British in Europe, and to the British, Dutch and Chinese in the
Far East? The naval and air detachments we would send to the British isles
would possibly ensure their continued resistance, but would not increase
British power to conduct a land offenslYe* The strength we could send to the
Far ";act might be enough to check the southward spread of Japanese rule for
the duration of the war* The strength of naval forces remaining in Hawaii
for the defense of the Eastern Pacific, and the strength of the forces in
the Western Atlantic for the defense of that area, would be reduced to that
barely sufficient for executing their tasks. Should Great Britain finally
lose, or should Malaysia fall to Japan, our naval strength might thev be
found to have h&«n seriously reduced, relative to that of the Axis powers*
It should be understood that, under this plan, we would be operating under
the handicap of fighting major wars on two fronts*
Should we adopt Plan (C), we must face the consequences that would
ensue were we to start a war with one plan, and then, after becoming heavily
enganod, be forced greatly to modify it or discard it altogether, as, for
example, in case of a British fold up* On neither of these distant fronts
would it be possible to execute a really major offensive* Strategically, the
situation might become disastrous should our effort on either front fail*
(0) Shall we direct our efforts toward an eventual stroa* offensive in
the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific? Any
strength that we might send to the Far East would, by just so much, reduce
the force of our blows against Germany and Italy. About the least that we
would do for our ally would be to send strong naval light forces and aircraft
to Qreat Britain and the Mediterranean* Probably we could not stop with a
purely naval effort* The plan might ultimately require capture of the
Portuguese and Spanish Islands and military and naval bases in Africa and
possibly Europe; and thereafter even involve undertaking a full scale land
offensive* In consideration of a course that would require landing larga
numbers of troops abroad, account must be taken of the possible unwillingness
of the people of the United States to support land operations of this
character, and to incur the risk of heavy loss should Great Britain collapse*
Under Plan (D) we would be unable to exert strong pressure against Japan, and
would necessarily gradually reorient our policy in the Far Bast* The full
national offensive strength would be exerted in a single direction, rather
than be extended in areas far distant from each other* At the conclusion
of the war, even if Britain should finally collapse, we might still find
ourselves possessed of bases in Africa suitable for assisting in the defense
of South America*
Under any of these plans, we must recognize the possibility of the
involvement of France as an ally of Germany*
I believe that the continued existence of the British Itapire, combined
with building up a strong protection in our home areas, will do most to ensure
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the status quo in the Western Hemisphere, and to promote our principal
national interests* As X have previously stated* I also believe that Great
Britain requires from us very great help in the Atlantic* and possibly even
on the continents of surope or Africa* if she is to be enabled to survive*
In my opinion Alternatives (A) * (3) • and (C) will most probably not provide
the necessary degree of assistance* and* therefore* if we undertake war*
that Alternative (D) is likely to be the most fruitful for the United States*
particularly if we enter the war at an early date* Initially* the offensive
measures adopted would* necessarily* be purely naval* Even should we
intervene* final victory in Europe is not certain. I believe that the
chances for success are in our favor* particularly if we insist upon full
equality in the political and military direction of the war*
The odds seem against our being able under Plan (D) to check Japanese
expansion unless we win the war in Europe* we might not long retain
possession of the hilippines* Our political and military influence in the
Far East minht largely disappear* so Ions as we were fully engaged in the
Atlantic* A preliminary to a war in this category would be a positive effort
to avoid war with Japan* and to endeavor to prevent war between Japan and the
British Stopire and the Netherlands East Indies* The possible cost of
avoiding a war with Japan has been referred to previously*
I would add that Plan (D) does not mean the immediate movement of the
Fleet into the Atlantic* I would make no further moves until war should
become imminent* and then I would recommend redistribution of our naval forces
as the situation then demanded* I fully recognize the value of retaining
strong forces in the Pacific as long as they can profitably be kept there*
Until such time as the United States should decide to engage its full
forces in war* I recommend that we pursue a course that will most rapidly
increase the military strength of both the Army and the Navy, that is to say,
adopt alternative (A) without hostilities*
Under any decision that the President may tentatively make* we should at
once prepare a complete Joint Plan for guiding Army and Navy activities* r*to
should also prepare at least the skeletons of alternative plans %$ fit
possible alternative situations which may eventuate* Z aake the specific
recommendation that* should we be forced into a war with Japan* we should,
because of the prospect of war in the Atlantic also* definitely plan to avoid
operations in the iter East or the Mid-Pacific that will prevent the Navy from
promptly moving to .he Atlantic forces fully adequate to safeguard our
interests and policies in the event of a British collapse* We ou^ht not now
willingly engage in any war against Japan unless vq are certain of aid from
Oreat Britain and the Jethsrlands Sast Indies*
So important allied military deeision should be reached without clear
understanding between the nations involved as to the strength and extent of
the participation which may be expected in any particular theater* and as to
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Aco rdingly, I <»ke the recommendation that, as a preliminary to
possible entry of the United States into the conflict, the United States
Army and Mavy at once undertake secret staff talks on technical matters with
the British military and naval authorities in London, with Canadian military
authorities in Washington, and with British and Dutoh authorities in
Singapore and Batavia* The purpose would be to reach agreements and lay down
plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find it
necessary to enter the war under any of the alternative eventualities
considered in this memorandum.
H*R* Stark
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